THE WAR: Hopeful Half Steps

AFTER three years of ever more furious combat, after dozens of feints and one-sided gestures toward conciliation, the U.S. and North Viet Nam finally moved in the same direction at the same time. The first half step, when it occurred, was just as swift as it was unforeseen.

It came last week when President Johnson dramatically restricted the U.S. bombing of North Viet Nam without demanding any reciprocal restraint by the Communists. North Viet Nam, in turn, agreed to the first significant face-to-face diplomatic contact with the U.S. since embassy-level talks in Moscow 14 months ago, although its insistence upon an end to all attacks on its territory had not been met. Washington accepted, even though Hanoi limited the initial agenda to the question of a full cessation of U.S. attacks. The entire exchange took just 68 hours. Washington, through embassy channels in Laos, immediately proposed Geneva as the meeting place. North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in a Hanoi interview with CBS, suggested Pnompenh, the Cambodian capital, as the site.

Whether these events will loom large in history, or will fade along with all the previous false starts towards peace, may not be known for weeks to come. Not even negotiations on the main issues of the conflict are assured, let alone a successful outcome. On the other hand, said the President, "it could lead to another positive step and another positive step and another positive step that might end this terrible war."

No Cracks. Even the first half step proved difficult for each side. Bombing of the North, particularly around the heavy-population centers, has been a constant impediment to any peace talks --not to say one of the most emotional issues of the war. Between May 1965 and February 1967, the U.S. suspended the bombing--"Operation Rolling Thunder" -- five times, the halts ranging in duration from two to 37 days. None of them cracked the diplomatic ice.

Last year the Johnson Administration considered a partial pause--exempting the area north of the 20th parallel from bombardment--but military advice went against it. In subsequent testimony before the Senate's Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee, General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that he and his colleagues had "concluded unanimously that the concept was erroneous." There was no indication that the generals had changed their minds this year, and until recently it looked as if Johnson agreed with them. On Feb. 1, he depicted a grim situation if the U.S. stopped bombing: "The enemy force in the South would be larger. It would be better equipped. The war would be harder. The losses would be greater."

The chief reason for limiting the bombing this time was a strong hunch that Hanoi might finally cooperate. The Communists' Tet offensive, despite its savagery and shock effects, cost the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong heavily. Recently, a 9th Infantry Division brigade captured a revealing critique of the Tet fighting. Issued by Hanoi's Central Office for South Viet Nam, it said: "We failed to seize a number of primary objectives and to destroy mobile and defense units of the enemy. We also failed to motivate the people to stage uprisings. The enemy still resisted and his units were not dis rupted into pieces." The U.S. estimate of enemy combat deaths between Jan. 28 and Feb. 24 is 42,000. Hanoi did not mount a second wave of attacks, and probably would have been unable to do so if it wished. The Saigon government responded to the crisis with more vigor than many thought possible. Though General Vo Nguyen Giap may never have intended to take Khe Sanh, he mounted a convincing siege at considerable expense in casualties, but that bastion is now liberated (see THE WORLD).

Gut Decision. The carnage of Tet demonstrated to each side its own weaknesses and its adversary's strengths. With the U.S. public becoming ever more weary of war, Johnson began to talk in private of "forcing the pace" toward the settlement that has frustratingly eluded him. As his decision not to seek re-election hardened, so did his determination to make one more peace effort and to make it soon. It was, said a White House aide, Johnson's "gut decision," and it was his alone.

"In the hope that this action will lead to early talks," he told the nation, "I am taking the first step to de-escalate the conflict. We are reducing--substantially reducing--the present level of hostilities, and we are doing so unilaterally and at once." Observed a State Department Orientalist: "The President in effect committed political suicide before the world. In the Sinic tradition, this is considered a time-honored gesture of sincerity."

Praise & Disillusion. For a little while, a shadow fell on that sincerity. In preliminary drafts of the speech--and in the advance word given to congressional leaders and foreign powers including Britain, the Soviet Union and France--the 20th parallel cutoff point was explicitly stated. That specific was deleted from the final speech on the ground that Washington should retain some flexibility; thus many listeners inferred that the bombing would continue only in the area immediately north of the Demilitarized Zone. The day after the speech, U.S. bombers ranged more than 200 miles into North Viet Nam to raid a radar site in the Thanh Hoa area, just below the 20th. The first high praise of Johnson's initiative turned suddenly in some quarters to sour disillusion. Said an Administration official: "We had a public relations catastrophe on our hands."

Then North Viet Nam came to the rescue. After initially castigating the U.S. move as a "new plot to maintain its new colonialism," Radio Hanoi issued a 1,000-word statement bristling with the cliches of intransigence. But nestled in the bombast was a bomb shell: "However, for its part, the government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam declares its readiness to appoint its representative to contact the U.S. representative with a view to determining with the American side the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam so that talks may start."

Myriad Maybes. The North Vietnamese statement electrified Washington. After conferences with key aides, Johnson went on television to announce: "We will establish contact with the representatives of North Viet Nam. Consultations with the government of South Viet Nam and our other allies are now taking place."

While specific arrangements were being worked out, the favorite guessing game concerned Hanoi's reasons for accepting any kind of talks after rejecting similar opportunities in the past. Many officials theorized that North Viet Nam was at last hurting enough to be interested in diplomacy. At the other pole, speculation had it that Hanoi was confident the U.S. was faltering and thus ready to make major concessions. Indeed, Ho Chi Minh's regime is keenly aware of U.S. political turmoil and economic problems, and could well interpret the resignation of former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, the imminent departure from Viet Nam of General William Westmoreland and Johnson's noncandidacy as sure signs of U.S. vulnerability. CBS Correspondent Charles Collingwood reported after a visit to Hanoi last week that Premier Pham Van Dong was in a tough, confident mood. Collingwood quoted him as saying of peace talks: "I am a measured optimist"--meaning, presumably, that talks will ensue and that Hanoi's interests will prevail.

Between the extremes--Hanoi dealing from strength or dealing from weakness--are other possibilities: that the Communists want a brief respite in which to prepare a new offensive; that North Viet Nam felt it had to make a countermove at the risk of losing a propaganda round. In this land of myriad maybes, some of the possibilities are no happier than the war has been until now. A talk-and-fight phase has always been thought a Communist goal, particularly if the U.S. could be pressured into ending all bombing of the North while the ground conflict continues in the South.

Doubled Club. The off-guard reaction within the Administration seemed to rebut speculation that the exchange of statements was pre-scripted in a secret Washington-Hanoi deal. The Administration did concede that through the Russians and perhaps the French, the North Vietnamese had received ad vance word on what Johnson was going to say about the bombing. But Hanoi's only pre-announcement response was: "We will listen carefully."

So did everyone else. One thing that is known only to Johnson and a few others is how long the present bombing limitation will continue if there is no significant diplomatic progress. Restricting the raids to the narrow panhandle below the 20th parallel for a few weeks is not much of a hindrance to the allies in South Viet Nam. "If you shorten the gauntlet," said one general, "you double the size of the club." The number of U.S. bombing missions actually increased slightly over the previous week while the target area shrank.

"No Fake Solution." Regardless of immediate tactical considerations, the Saigon government--and some of its Asian allies--evinced anger and resentment at what they feared might be the beginning of an American desertion of their cause. Despite Johnson's assurances that the U.S. "will never accept a fake solution and call it peace," and despite his announcement of a U.S. troop increase and better arms for the South Vietnamese, Thailand's Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, said the Communists would regard the U.S. overture as proof that "the American will to win the war is crumbling." South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu observed that he had gone along with the bombing restriction--actually he had no real choice--but warned that South Viet Nam would continue the fight alone if necessary. Alarmed by a phrase in Johnson's speech hinting at political recognition of the Viet Cong, the Front for National Salvation, which represents most of South Viet Nam's anti-Communist political elements, talked of possible "betrayal" by the U.S.

Elsewhere the Administration came in for some unaccustomed support. House Republican Leader Gerald Ford even took the opportunity to bill the whole operation as a "bipartisan peace initiative based on a Republican peace plan." Johnson drew personal praise from such diverse critics as Robert Kennedy, Charles de Gaulle and U Thant. "I am happy to note," said the U.N. Secretary-General, "that the initiative taken by President Johnson in de-escalating the war has led to this promising development."

The path to fulfillment of that promise may be one of the most tortuous in U.S. diplomatic history. Overshadowing it always will be the memory of Panmunjom, where angry bickering and bargaining with the North Koreans dragged on for 25 months while some of the worst fighting and the heaviest losses of that war took place. Nonetheless, the continuation of the bombing over a considerable area of North Viet Nam gives the U.S. a quid to exchange for Hanoi's quo--an agreement to reduce infiltration. Considering its present flow of men and materiel to the South--which amounts to an estimated 12,000 men per month and a 300% increase in supplies over last year's rate--Hanoi might be willing to cut back, at least for a time. Thus Hanoi could agree to a control on infiltration without making an unbearable military sacrifice, if it really desires full-scale negotiations. In exchange, it would be free from air attack indefinitely.

Irreconcilable Aims. What might happen next is far less clear. President Johnson has named as his negotiators Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman, 76, sometimes called "The Crocodile" for the snapping speed of his mind on complex problems, and Llewellyn Thompson, 63, Ambassador to Moscow. Both are veterans of many confrontations with the Communists. What can they negotiate?

North Viet Nam has maintained that it cannot bargain for the Viet Cong, that this must be done by the National Liberation Front, which neither the U.S. nor the Saigon government recognizes as an independent entity. N.L.F. representation in some form would be tolerated by Washington, but the Thieu regime says it will never make a deal with the Viet Cong's representatives. The N.L.F., for its part, insists it will not bargain with Thieu's government, whose legitimacy it denies.

These are procedural points. Next would come the fundamental issues. The U.S. wants the withdrawal of all Northern forces from the South, an end to Viet Cong insurrection, and assurances that the South would have a reasonable chance to remain non-Communist and independent. Hanoi's maximum goals are contained in the oft-stated four points of 1965, which--among other things--call for complete U.S. military withdrawal, settling of South Viet Nam's internal affairs on N.L.F. terms, and eventual reunification (i.e., Communization) of North and South "without foreign interference."

For either side to accept the other's full demands would amount to surrender, and neither is ready for that. An immediate goal of the U.S. is a ceasefire, even though it would probably be subject to frequent violation. In exchange for that, the U.S. might well accept continued Viet Cong control of the areas it now holds. A marked decline in the level of hostilities would permit gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces if North Viet Nam reciprocated --which might be a very big if.

Bitter Legacy. Another possibility is the continuation of military activity but on a declining level, as both the U.S. and North Viet Nam disengage. For this to lead to peace, formal political status for the N.L.F. would be required eventually. The Thieu government, as recently as last week, continued to insist it would never accept any coalition with the Front. There are other variations on the theme. But any settlement that promises to yield any satisfaction to both sides also entails concessions by both sides. The Communists might have to forgo their goal of an immediate N.L.F. takeover of the South coupled with a prompt and total end of U.S. involvement in the country's future. For its part, the U.S. would have to face up to the possibility of a new alignment in Southeast Asia in which the trend would be toward neutralization. In this framework, South Viet Nam might eventually come under the North's control.

Last week's very limited agreement could develop into an opportunity for the adversaries to work toward a settlement. Yet the chance carries with it a risk that cannot be ignored. If, once begun, talks fail to bring an accommodation, hostilities could rage even more fiercely than before and make it more difficult than ever to end the conflict through negotiations. That would be a bitter legacy for Lyndon Johnson's successor, and one that the President hopes with all his heart not to bequeath.

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