Conversation in Berlin

In addition to imposing strict travel control over passenger and freight traffic between West Berlin and West Germany, Communist Boss Walter Ulbricht has solemnly decreed that no senior of ficials of the West German government may set foot on East German territory. Last week Ulbricht's law was flouted by his closest ally. After secret arrangements worked out by the Soviet Union through Swedish intermediaries, a black Mercedes with a Russian driver called for West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt in West Berlin, whisked him past East German checkpoints without even bothering to stop, and drove him to a suburban villa in East Berlin.

There, with only three aides present, an extraordinary confrontation took place. For eight hours, Brandt, the author of West Germany's policy of conciliation toward Eastern Europe, talked with the U.S.S.R.'s ranking authority on German problems, Pyotr Abrasimov, the Russian Ambassador to East Germany and a member of the Communist Party Central Committee.

What did they talk about? On his return to West Berlin, Brandt was unusually closemouthed about his meeting, refusing to answer newsmen's questions. But, after talking with many of Brandt's Socialist and Cabinet colleagues, TIME Correspondent Herman Nickel pieced together what happened in East Berlin. His report:

First over coffee, then at supper on the terrace, and later over Russian cognac, Brandt tried to impress on his Soviet host the fact that, as he put it, "the East German measures are damaging and place a burden on efforts to reach a detente." Despite the good personal relations between the two men (they met five times while Brandt was still West Berlin's mayor), it was a tough session. Though he issued no blustery warnings, Brandt made it clear that Bonn would not allow itself to be provoked into abandoning its policy of improving relations with the East bloc --a policy whose moderate success in Bucharest, Prague, Belgrade and Budapest obviously seemed to Ulbricht and his Soviet backers to be a dangerous flanking operation.

In a cool ploy, Brandt openly mused whether the East German moves were indeed serving the best interests of the Soviet Union. He explained that Ulbricht's aggressive actions only encouraged the rise of right-wing extremism in West Germany and strengthened the obduracy of conservative elements that oppose West German ratification of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which Russia and the U.S. jointly sponsor.

For his part, Ambassador Abrasimov went out of his way to emphasize that he saw nothing approaching a Berlin crisis, evidently convinced Brandt that the Soviets did not have another East-West confrontation in mind. He downgraded the East German travel restrictions as formalities that were fully within East Germany's rights, but denied that they were the result of Soviet-East German consultations. If Bonn did not like the new measures, Abrasimov archly suggested, the simplest way to resolve the situation was for it to recognize the East German government as an independent sovereign state and to establish normal diplomatic relations. In fact, Abrasimov stressed that Moscow regards West Germany's attitude toward East Germany as the acid test for any future dialogue between the Soviet Union and Bonn. Intimating that Bonn's three Western allies lack both effective means and the political will to enforce civilian access to Berlin, he warned that the West Germans would be rendered isolated and helpless unless Bonn recognizes East Germany.*

In the Red Sea. Abrasimov's warning underlined the dilemma into which the Berlin affair has plunged the Osi-politik of the Grand Coalition. When he started the new policy 18 months ago, Brandt sought to establish diplomatic relations with all 'Eastern European countries except East Germany. Under pressure from Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger's Christian Democrats and from moderates in his own Socialist party, Brandt retained the Federal Republic's old insistence that it, and not Ulbricht's regime, is the legitimate representative of all Germans, including those in East Germany.

In summoning Brandt to East Berlin, the Soviets served notice that they will use their influence to frustrate Bonn's efforts to enjoy better relations with other Communist states until Bonn extends its desire for detente to Ulbricht's fiefdom. The West Berliners blame Russia as well as Ulbricht for their plight; an angry crowd of them marched on the Soviet memorial in the British sector, only to be turned away by bayonet-wielding Russian soldiers. Radio Moscow beamed some advice to West Berliners: "He who lives on an island must be friends with the sea."

Facing such Soviet intransigence, many Socialists, especially those near Brandt, would like to respond to Ulbricht's travel restrictions by some daring move, such as abolishing the need for visas for other East bloc visitors to West Germany, in order to illustrate how anachronistic Ulbricht's restrictions are. In today's relaxing Europe, they also favor diplomatic recognition of East Germany in hopes that even a slight reduction in tensions there might help to create a situation in which the 74-year-old Ulbricht's successor, or perhaps his successor's successor, might turn out to be an East German Alexander Dubcek.

Those desires are unrealistic at present, because the Christian Democrats refuse to go along with them. Many of them, on the contrary, favor a return to a far tougher line with the Soviet bloc and argue that West German concessions are likely only to encourage Ulbricht to tighten his grip on West Berlin. As they see it, deals between the two Germanys ultimately would erode the allied responsibility for West Berlin, still the city's best guarantee for safety.

After a Bundestag debate, the Grand Coalition of Christian Democrats and Socialists decided to take a few short-range measures to bolster Berlin somewhat, to encourage investment in the city and arrange for more air travel to and from it. Meanwhile, West Germany's NATO allies agreed to ban many East German businessmen and officials from their countries and to levy a $5 fee on travel documents for other East Germans visiting Western Europe. The steps were mild enough, but they were all the West seemed prepared to do for now to counter the new threat to the continued well-being of its vital and symbolic outpost.

* In Washington, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, reflecting on the U.S.'s determined response in 1961 to Khrushchev's threats to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, cautioned his aides against any hasty action. Said Rusk: "We mobilized troops, we spent $6 billion, and when we looked around, nobody was there."

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