TORTUOUS ROAD TO NUCLEAR SANITY

the world's first cloud billowed over Alamagordo 23 years ago this month, every U.S. President has hoped to cap his Administration with an agreement designed to avert nuclear Armageddon. Truman described it as "the one purpose that dominated me." Eisenhower called his failure to make any progress in the disarmament field "one of my major regrets." Kennedy's efforts to "get the genie back in the bottle" had some success in 1963's limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and he considered it one of his greatest achievements. Now, in the waning months of his presidency, Lyndon Johnson can take satisfaction from a comparable feat--and can claim credit for having set the stage for another that could prove even more historic.

During parallel ceremonies in Washington, London and Moscow, more than 60 nations last week signed a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the same time, Johnson announced that the U.S. and the Soviet Union had agreed to start discussions about limiting and reducing both offensive nuclear weapons and anti-ballistic missiles. Close to Parity. Why were the Russians now ready to talk? For one thing, they may be convinced that the near future may bring a negotiated settlement of the Viet Nam war, which could allow Washington to channel billions of defense dollars into new weapons systems. For another, they may be worried by U.S. advances in multiple warheads for missiles. In recent years, Moscow has tripled its long-range missile force, is now very close to parity with the 1,710-missile U.S. arsenal; American multiple-warhead missiles would again put parity well beyond their immediate reach, and undoubtedly prompt them to embark on a new race to catch up. Finally, a disarmament-minded faction within the Kremlin, led by Kosygin and other economic planners, is believed to have won out for the moment over the generals and the "metal eaters" by arguing that the arms race could lead not only to further economic strain but even to war. Johnson's spadework for the forthcoming talks began less than two months after he took office. In January 1964 he wrote to Nikita Khrushchev, calling for talks on controlling nuclear weaponry. Ever since, he has kept after Moscow with what an aide called "enormous, stubborn persistence." During his summit meeting with Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin at Glassboro, N.J., in June 1967, he urged talks on limiting the ruinously expensive development of anti-ballistic missile defenses. The Russians, then in the process of emplacing their "Galosh"* ABM system around Moscow and Leningrad, said they would think about it. After his March 31 decision not to seek a second term, Johnson wrote to Kosygin emphasizing that "now is the time" for both countries to act. Two weeks ago, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko declared that Moscow was ready for talks.

No Illusions. The break in the ice left some U.S. officials notably cool. After Kosygin announced a nine-point program to halt the nuclear-arms race, one Washington official declared: "Most of that stuff is old garbage. It's a propaganda cover for the fact that their position is not formulated." Indeed, Kosygin's prospectus did have a ring of familiarity. Its major proposals --for limitations on the production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and restrictions on the movement of nuclear-armed bombers and missile-launching submarines--have been made before, but never came close to being implemented. But the British thought they saw signs of progress. Said one Whitehall official: "There are some points which seem to signify an advance, for they pick up what are earlier Western proposals." The British believe, for example, that Kosygin's proposal for nuclear-disarmament zones might be an oblique response to recent hints from NATO's foreign ministers of a desire to negotiate mutual force reductions in Central Europe.

Nonetheless, the discussions are likely to be long and at times exasperating, as is suggested by the nyet-studded and tortuous history of disarmament talks (see box opposite). "Discussions of this most complex subject will not be easy," conceded Johnson, "and we have no illusions that it will be." Not even the wildest optimists in the Administration consequently believe that the talks will lead to the complete elimination of missile systems. A freeze on existing offensive missiles is about the best that is hoped for; orbiting satellites could easily detect any effort to install new missile launchers, making inspection a relatively routine task. As for ABM systems, the Russians are not about to permit on-site inspection--or dismantling--of Galosh. Neither is a U.S. President likely to risk a political uproar by canceling plans for the "thin" $5.5 billion Sentinel system. A pact that would place severe limits on both systems, and keep down their enormous costs, is feasible, though on-the-ground verification is certain to remain a thorny issue, given the deeply ingrained fear of espionage that persists in Russia's closed society.

Still, as Lyndon Johnson put it, man must try to "shape his destiny in the nuclear age," and the President solemnly pledged all U.S. resources to help the world move "into the light of sanity and security."

* NATO code name.

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