Collision Course

In the clear desert air, Israeli outposts along the Suez Canal were readily visible targets for Egyptian gunners. The Egyptians aimed their artillery well in advance. Then last week, they suddenly opened up along the 70 miles of the canal with the heaviest sustained barrage that the Arabs have succeeded in laying on the Israelis since their hostilities began in 1948. As shells whined in around them, the surprised Israelis fired back. In a 31-hour duel before both sides bowed to a United Nations cease-fire call, the Egyptians killed ten Israeli soldiers and wounded 18. Israeli shells killed five Egyptian soldiers and 15 civilians, injured another 104. Uncharacteristically, the Israelis stopped firing first, and the Egyptians had the last shot.

That artillery ambush signaled the opening of a fresh front of harassment, this time along the canal, which has been more or less quiescent since last year's Six-Day War. It was also a measure of the renewed aggressiveness and confidence of the Egyptian army, which has been demonstrating increasing boldness in other ways as well. Bedouins have lately probed deep into the Israeli-held Sinai Peninsula, successfully mining major Israeli roads and getting within twelve miles of strategic Mitla Pass. In one raid last month, an Egyptian patrol killed two Israeli soldiers and kid naped a third. Last week Cairo followed up its barrage by proudly announcing a policy of "preventive defense," meaning that "Egyptian forces will no longer allow the enemy to attack first. Egyptians henceforth will launch offensive operations."

Imbalance of Firepower. Cairo's evident intent was to restore Egypt's status among its Arab neighbors as their leading belligerent, and to answer Jordan's complaint that it has borne the brunt of Israeli reprisals. Egypt's newly aggressive stance indicates that its rehabilitated armed forces, if not yet ready for another war, are now confident enough to challenge the Israelis shot for shot at times.

Only 15 months ago, that sort of behavior would have seemed suicidal, if not impossible. In six disastrous days, Egypt and her chief allies, Syria and Jordan, lost three-quarters of their air and armored forces and the economic wherewithal to buy new arms. Egypt also lost the cream of its officer corps. The Soviet Union, anxious to increase its influence in the Middle East, stepped into the breach with new planes, tanks and guns. Now the Arabs' military machine has been 80% refurbished and considerably upgraded in quality. Once again, it heavily outnumbers Israel's armed forces in men and firepower. Last week London's prestigious Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that Egypt alone has 700 tanks and 280 heavy guns. Its air force now has 400 combat aircraft, including 40 SU-7 all-weather fighter-bombers, and 110 Mig-21s that can fly higher and faster than Israeli Skyhawks. Since other Arab forces have been similarly re-equipped, the balance of firepower has been tilted heavily in the Arabs' favor--at least on the paper order of battle (see chart).

Uphill Work. For all their numbers and new equipment, the Egyptians know that the Israelis still retain the preponderance of martial skills. Egypt's new aggressiveness leans heavily on an estimated 3,000 Soviet advisers salted through its forces down to battalion level, with power to order their Egyptian counterparts around. The Soviets are doing their best to shape the Arabs up to the fighting force that they have never been. It is uphill work. One disgruntled Russian tank instructor confessed to a visitor last month: "The Egyptians want to learn it all in half the time. When we try to make them work at it in the proper way, they get angry and say, 'We will learn quickly. Just give us the keys.' This is nonsense." So great is the gap in training between the two sides that, despite the Arabs' superior numbers, the Egyptians admit that they cannot be ready for another war before 1970.

While the Arabs have had to concentrate on bringing their forces back to last year's levels, the Israelis have had a year to improve. Their advantage in training and skills is likely to widen as the arms race moves to more sophisticated levels of technology. The Six-Day War also left Israel with the geographic advantage of straighter and more defensible frontiers. And the Israelis retain a spirit born of the necessity for self-defense that the Arabs have never been able to evoke in their disparate national armies.

Neither side is seriously looking for help from the United Nations. In nine months of mediating, U.N. Representative Gunnar Jarring has been able to bring the combatants no closer to a settlement. The Arabs remain convinced that negotiations are useless, and that only by war will they be able to recover their lost territories. The Israelis, in turn, are determined not to yield their conquered territories without a permanent settlement. Given that intransigence on both sides, and the arms race in the area, the Middle East is bound to be one of the world's continuing trouble spots.

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