WHAT SHOULD HUMPHREY DO?

Almost every parlor pundit in the country has his own theory about how--if at all--Hubert Horatio Humphrey can manage to save the day for the Democrats. The armchair strategy, which could be called Operation Resuscitation, would commit the Vice President to one of three more or less clearly defined alternatives:

1. The Shock Ploy. This is the most extreme version of the theory that Humphrey must above all dissociate himself from Lyndon Johnson. He resigns forthwith as Vice President (this has been seriously considered by Columnists Clayton Fritchey, Ted Lewis and others) and proves that he has at last become his own man. He calls for an immediate, unconditional bombing halt in Viet Nam and phased withdrawal of U.S. troops. He possibly balances this dovish move in Asia by getting tough with the Russians in Europe, issuing stiff warnings to Moscow against any more dangerous moves on the Continent. He further breaks with the President by declaring that the Great Society is a shambles and publishing his own detailed domestic program. The essential speech accompanying this scenario might go something like this: "This election is about the future. I ask the country to judge me on my personal record--on the fact that my ideas have always centered on goals attainable despite the obstacles of the moment. My yesterdays have been dedicated to today. Today, I still dream of our tomorrows and here, specifically, are the things I will strive to achieve . . ."

2. The Candor Caper. Conceding that Plan No. 1 is too extreme, Humphrey resuscitators consider this a more reasonable and plausible version of the shock ploy. After hymning the Democratic record under such great Presidents as Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, Humphrey announces that it is indeed time for a change--a Democratic change. He analyzes the nation's discontents, proposes root-and-branch cures, and submits a list of priorities based on de-escalating a war that, however noble its original aims, has become irrelevant to the more pressing needs of a divided America. The line would go something like this: "To recognize past imperfections, my friends and fellow Americans, is only to recognize that we can achieve perfection in the future. Viet Nam has become an occlusion of our best aspirations. It must be settled justly and promptly. True, most of us have never had it so good as under our present Administration. But what was good for most in the '60s is not good enough for all in the '70s. I pledge myself here and now not only to a new day but to the Democratic Decade that will see an end to violence, the draft, ghettos, poverty, inadequate educational and health services, inflation, pollution, corruption and the dismaying concentration of power in the White House that began with a Republican President."

3. The Give 'Em Hell Gambit. With barely a reference to the Administration and only a peep at his programs for tomorrow, the Vice President concentrates his fire on the Republicans and Nixon in particular. Humphrey colors himself the underdog and labels Nixon the most sinister figure since Jack the Ripper. At the same time, he castigates George Wallace as a demagogue and menace, linking both adversaries at every opportunity. The likely theme: "What we have taken decades to build, my opponents would tear down overnight. Where we have prescribed harmony, they would substitute harassment; they would pit class against class, black against white, rich against poor, South against North. They would build jails instead of schools. And they are squishy-soft on bigotry."

The trouble with the first two schemes is that Humphrey to date has shown no stomach for divorce from Johnson. While there could be no better way of asserting himself and attracting skeptical McCarthy and Robert Kennedy supporters, there are powerful arguments against any such move. The intriguing question that remains to be answered is whether Humphrey shies away from a break because, after years of service, he is still hypnotized and cowed by Johnson; or whether he reasons that a break might cause him more political damage than gain. He might thereby lure back many dissidents, but he would also alienate Lyndon loyalists who still flex formidable muscles in the party. He would also be running against the record he helped to write, thus risking the accusation of hypocrisy--although the trick has been turned before.

Yet a strong case can be made that Humphrey--apart from his official status as Vice President--no longer owes Johnson absolute fealty. True, Johnson made him. But in the making Johnson may have come close to emasculating Humphrey. Partly because of the nature of the vice-presidency, mostly because of the President's approach to subordinates, the once irrepressible Humphrey may have become a bond servant of Lyndon Johnson.

In recent months, as his exit from power approached, Johnson has made some intimates wonder whether he really wants his Vice President to win. Humphrey's victory would be a vindication for Johnson in many respects. Yet it is Richard Nixon who L.B.J. figures has been more steadfast on the issue that weighs most heavily: Viet Nam. If few really believe that Johnson would welcome a Nixon victory, there is a feeling that the President cannot quite envision anyone succeeding him. In a way he might even prefer a Republican victory, suggesting a deep turn of national sentiment and a rejection of the Democratic Party as a whole, rather than the victory of another Democrat, which would suggest merely a repudiation of Johnson personally. Besides, a Bourbon sense of apres moi, le deluge now pervades the White House; L.B.J. seems at the moment far more concerned with his own place in history than with the question of succession. Thus the lack of real coordination between the Humphrey staff and Johnson's--and between the two old friends themselves.

Tugging the Tether. Johnson, to be sure, came out fulsomely for Humphrey last week in a statement to the Texas Democratic Convention. It would be far more valuable to Humphrey, however, if the President would stop tugging the tether each time the Vice President strays a bit from the Administration reservation. Sometimes it seems that it is a three-against-one race, with Johnson, Nixon and George Wallace all ganging up on hapless Hubert.

Therefore, Humphrey is more likely to follow the third scenario. He is going all out to discredit the Republicans, hoping that in the coming weeks he can build momentum by combining a tough attack on Nixon with the presentation of hard programs that would build on the Democratic record of the last eight years. Perhaps. But a determined slashing of the umbilical cord would be far more satisfying to those who want the Democratic standard-bearer to campaign--win or lose--as Hubert Horatio Humphrey, his own man.

* As in 1961, when New York Mayor Robert Wagner broke with the Tammany Hall organization that had done much to make him a two-term mayor. He blamed the "bosses" for the city's woes and easily won a third term.

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