THE ABM, THROUGH THICK AND THIN

BARELY three years ago Congress attempted to force Robert McNamara's Defense Department to go beyond the research and development stage of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) by voting $168 million for initial hardware. The skeptical McNamara, backed by the White House, refused to spend the extra funds. The very next year, in the face of domestic political pressure and continued weaponry development by the Chinese and Russians, the Johnson Administration reluctantly reversed itself. Now the Pentagon under Defense Secretary Melvin Laird seems eager to press ahead at full speed with an ABM system called the Sentinel--despite hesitance elsewhere in the Administration and increasingly stubborn opposition to ABM in Congress.

In the first five weeks of the Nixon Administration, the costly complex of defensive missiles and radars has become the nexus of several great issues: the allocation of resources between domestic and military programs, overall nuclear strategy and the possibility of arms-limitation negotiations with the Russians. The 91st Congress is more conservative than the 89th--on paper at least--and therefore could be expected to be more sympathetic to requests from the military. Changing public attitudes and political considerations over the past three years, however, have stiffened resistance on Capitol Hill. Many Congressmen are concerned that any hold-down on Government spending should not be at the expense of social-welfare efforts. There is apprehension about being drawn into a project of questionable military value that may end up costing ten times the initial estimates, or even more. The fact that the Pentagon organized a promotion program to create pro-Sentinel sentiment raises the old fears of the military-industrial complex that Dwight Eisenhower once warned against. With the Russians now pressing for arms-control talks, the hope exists that a possible agreement would make ABM unnecessary. Finally, there is widespread opposition by voters from areas that do not want nuclear-stocked Sentinel sites close by.

Not an End in Itself The Administration has given the opponents of Sentinel ammunition by shifting its justification for immediate deployment of the weapon. Originally, Sentinel was billed by the Johnson Administration as a "thin" shield against a possible attack by the relatively small and primitive missile force that the Chinese are expected to have in five years or so. Then the argument was introduced that the ABM might protect the nation against an accidental missile firing from anywhere abroad. As the Soviets continue to increase their offensive missile force, the thin Sentinel began to appear not as an end in itself, but only as the first step toward a "thick" defense against Soviet attack. Its ultimate cost was estimated to be $50 billion--and many in Washington feel that it would far exceed that. Now Laird is arguing that, if nothing else, the Sentinel would serve as a bargaining point with the Russians should negotiations take place. Russia, after all, has actually begun to install its "Galosh" ABM network around Moscow. Last year the Soviets slowed construction of their defense network, perhaps because of technical problems or possibly to improve on the model they originally planned.

In an appearance last week before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Laird put great stress on the competitive aspect of the question. The Russians, he said, are spending three times more than the U.S. on missile defenses and are now testing a "sophisticated new ABM system" while going full tilt to catch up with the U.S. in offensive capability. Laird has completely halted physical work on Sentinel sites pending a new review of the ABM project. While still insisting that all options--including having no system at all--are receiving "very thorough" study, he conceded that "personally, I lean toward some type of deployment for the protection of the people of the U.S." Deputy Secretary David Packard, who is in charge of the study, said that the "problem is going to be largely in terms of how it should best be deployed."

Overwhelming Force. At this point, the argument becomes essentially strategic. The Sentinel was originally planned to offer widespread, if shallow, "area defense," including protection for major population centers--an approach that war gamesmen call "damage limitation." An alternative to that aim is to reduce the number of missiles and concentrate on "point defense," in which most of the protected points would be offensive missile sites. This plan comes under the heading of "assured destruction"--the fundamental U.S. nuclear strategy until now. It assumes that the best way to prevent an enemy attack is to convince the other side that under any circumstances the U.S. would retain the ability to strike back with overwhelming force.

Still, the debate, as it has developed recently, has concentrated not so much on how many missiles are put where as on whether to install Sentinel at all, and if so, when. On the Senate floor and in the Foreign Relations Committee last week, Democratic and Republican opponents of the missile defense project fought to convince their colleagues that early construction would be a blunder. In the committee hearing--ostensibly on ratification of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty--Tennessee's Albert Gore got Secretary of State William Rogers to agree that the ABM had become "the big issue with respect to limiting the arms race." Rogers also said that he shared the hope that the decision on deployment could be deferred pending negotiations with Moscow. Laird, on the other hand, argued that "if we have an effective system, we should go forward immediately."

Logical Demand. The difference between the Laird and Rogers positions is not as wide as it seems. Rogers does not categorically oppose the ABM. Last week he denied that there is any inconsistency between continuing to press ahead with the project and ratifying the Nonproliferation Treaty, even though the pact contains a clause pledging the parties to seek "cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date." Said Rogers: "Realism requires that there be a certain mutuality."

It is certainly logical to demand that the Russians relinquish or freeze their ABM program if the U.S. does the same. But since no one can be sure when talks will begin or how long it will take to reach agreement, the question remains as to what the U.S. should do now. For the current fiscal year, about $1 billion has been appropriated for Sentinel. The budget request for the year starting July 1 is $1.8 billion. The overall cost of even a thin system, originally pegged at $3.5 billion, is now officially estimated to be more than $5 billion. Some critics think that a more realistic figure for the defense system would be closer to $10 billion.

Hottest in Years. Exactly what would the money buy? Proponents of the Sentinel have a simple answer: a reduction in casualties of perhaps millions of Americans in the event of nuclear war, plus an additional deterrent to enemy attack. Opponents of Sentinel, including Senator Edward Kennedy, answer that the Sentinel represents "false security" because it would only accelerate nuclear-arms competition. Some distinguished scientists, notably Hans Bethe, Ralph Lapp and Jerome Wiesner, argue that the system would not live up to its advance advertising. Previous attempts to develop ABMs have faltered on the theory that they would be obsolete by the time they were installed.

Many experts remain convinced that, in nuclear war, the offense would always have the advantage--that any new defensive device could easily be neutralized by improvements in attack missiles. Contending that the Pentagon's review was inadequate, Kennedy announced that he was organizing an independent study by outside experts. This week the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee will begin hearings on ABM. Both inquiries can be counted on to generate still more controversy in what has already become one of the most heated--and most crucial--defense disputes in many years.

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