THE ABM: NOT REALLY SETTLED

WHY did Richard Nixon decide to deploy the Johnson-planned ABM system, though in "substantially modified" form? The decision was an astute attempt at compromise between all-out advocates and all-out opponents of the system. But it would be wrong to ascribe to the President only political or public relations motives. Last June, during his campaign, he praised the proposed Sentinel system as essential to the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. At his second news conference as President a month ago, Nixon observed that "this system adds to our overall defense capability."

His rationale has not always been consistent. However, as Nixon pointed out last week, the U.S.S.R. already has 67 ABM sites ringing Moscow. He has long argued that the principal justification for the ABM is that there is "a race already in progress, a race in which the Soviets threaten to leave us behind." Further, he has often noted that if the U.S. is to approach serious negotiations with the Russians on the reduction of nuclear arms--offensive and defensive--the ABM could prove useful as a bargaining counter.

Given this belief, backed up by the views of his top military advisers, Nixon ruled out the possibility that had seemed attractive to many: in effect cancel construction of Sentinel while continuing research and development to find a more dependable system. Beyond that, his choices were clear-cut:

1) He could continue with the program that he inherited, which he refused to do because he preferred to give still greater emphasis to protection of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

2) He could expand Sentinel massively to protect major cities against all-out attack, which he dismissed because such protection is virtually impossible anyway.

3) He could modify Sentinel in a way that would make it more palatable to its political opponents as well as more defensible on strategic grounds.

The President had settled on this third alternative by the time he returned from his Key Biscayne weekend last Monday, but took several more days to ponder, discuss and whip his arguments into shape--largely in consultation with Adviser Henry Kissinger. The Nixon solution has both the virtues and defects of most compromises: it may fall short of either its political or military objective, but it has a fair chance of being accepted by Congress and may be politically tenable for a while.

In his press conference, the President left the impression that the new ABM program would be severely cut back from Johnson's blueprint. He mentioned only two proposed installations, designed to protect Minuteman ICBM sites in Montana and North Dakota--compared with 17 Sentinel bases planned by Johnson primarily to defend major U.S. cities. As it turned out, the two installations will be built first, but later, Nixon's proposal calls for 14 ABM bases in all. The system's function has been shifted from the protection of cities to the defense of the nation's nuclear deterrent. Its cost would be at least $1 billion more than the $5.8 billion estimated for the Johnson system, although the first-year cost would be half the $1.8 billion proposed by the Johnson Administration. Actually weapons costs invariably increase so much that probably neither figure represents anything like the final accounting.

Strength and Weakness. The Nixon plan provides more radar equipment to detect incoming ICBMs and guide the defending missiles than did Johnson's. Since the first two installations will not be completed before 1973, the system could be canceled somewhere along the line--after having cost vast amounts of money. Nixon promised that his system, quickly dubbed "Safeguard," would be reviewed annually and revised, if necessary, to meet possible changes in the strategic situation and in weapons technology, and to take into account any developments in arms-control talks.

The differences between the Johnson Administration's Sentinel program and Nixon's Safeguard are more in emphasis than in scale. Johnson's 17 Sentinel sites would have covered all the continental U.S., Hawaii and Alaska with Spartan rockets designed to intercept incoming missiles up to 400 miles above target, backed up by shorter-range Sprints to knock down any ICBMs that penetrated the Spartan screen. Nixon's plan, while providing extensive area defense, will concentrate not only on Minuteman ICBMs in their concrete silos, but also on bomber bases, Washington, and the Charleston base for Polaris submarines.

As the President explained it, the aims of his program are threefold. One is "protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union." This is the strongest reason. The system could probably intercept a significant part of a massive Russian first strike against U.S. missile sites. The weakness of the argument, as critics point out, is that protection of the U.S.-based deterrent is not really necessary, because with its seaborne Polaris missiles and foreign-based bombers carrying H-bombs, the U.S. would retain a sufficient retaliatory strike force.

Common Cause. Nixon's second aim was "protection against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source." Should either a Chinese or a Soviet Strangelove go berserk, an attack might strike anywhere--and a limited defense would not necessarily be effective against it. Nixon's third stated aim was the shakiest: "Defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade." It was a difficult line of reasoning to maintain, since the Chinese, until at least the mid-1970s, will not have the sophisticated weaponry to zero in on U.S. ICBM sites. They would be readier for the less precise task of attacking U.S. cities, which will not be defended by the Safeguard system.

Pursuing his goal of conciliation and negotiation with the Soviet Union, which has been the major thrust of his foreign policy, the President pointed out that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. now share a joint threat from China. In fact, he assumed such a distinct posture of making common cause with Russia against the Chinese that he may have foreclosed any future U.S. power of maneuver between Moscow and Peking. Nixon went out of his way to reassure Moscow that his projected ABM is purely defensive and not a provocative escalation of the arms race. As an earnest of this, he emphasized that U.S. cities would remain naked to Soviet attack. By leaving the cities unprotected, in the intricate logic of nuclear weaponry, the U.S. would convince the Soviets that it does not intend to make the first strike. If it did plan to do so, it would be forced to erect a defensive system to guard American population centers against retaliation. Moreover, it would have no need to shield its missile sites from an enemy, since most of the ICBMs would already have been fired. In an attempt to emphasize the restrained character of the Nixon system, the Administration added a new phrase to the convoluted lexicon of defense: "limited pilot deployment."

Maginot Line. The most immediate result of removing ABM sites from urban areas was to hurdle one major political obstacle to the system. For months now, Congressmen have been under pressure to halt the program from suburban constituents who do not relish the prospect of nuclear weapons on their doorsteps. Clearly, the President did not convert his most obdurate foes on Capitol Hill. Nor did he discuss two of their chief criticisms of the ABM: that it may not work, and that it would divert vast sums that are sorely needed for domestic programs. Kentucky Republican John Sherman Cooper, who was one of the first Senators to challenge the ABM, said he would continue the fight against it. Senate Majority Whip Edward Kennedy riposted with an eight-point set of objections, pointing out that doubts about ABM's reliability remain unanswered. Michigan Democrat Philip Hart likened ABM to France's ill-fated Maginot Line. "These two defensive systems," he said, "will prove about equally effective in guaranteeing peace." Eugene McCarthy called it "the President's first serious mistake."

At a Senate subcommittee hearing last week, three former scientific advisers to the Eisenhower Administration --George Kistiakowsky of Harvard, James Killian of M.I.T. and Herbert York of the University of California--advanced additional arguments against ABM. They asserted that because reaction time must be so swift in an attack, the decision to launch Spartan would not rest with the President but would have to be made by junior officers or even by computers.

Premature Judgment. In retrospect, it is evident that the President could have avoided much of the fuss. When he ordered a month-long review of Sentinel, he gave its opponents time to muster. Once Nixon had allowed criticism to build, however, he apparently felt that any deferment would seem like a withdrawal under fire.

To many, it looked last week as if the new President's honeymoon was ending with his first tough decision. That judgment seems premature--but the beginning of the end of forbearance and tolerance is probably in sight. Nixon's gamble is that the ABM will prove technically workable within the next five years. More vital than its defensive value, perhaps, is how important any ABM system may prove to be in dealings with the Russians on such urgent questions as arms control and Viet Nam.

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