DIGGING IN ON ABM

THE Nixon Administration's proposed anti-ballistic missile system promises to be the most complex weaponry ever devised. Difficult as it is for laymen to comprehend the technical and strategic functions of the ABM, the great debate over whether the U.S. should deploy the Safeguard system is made infinitely more complicated by public uncertainty as to what the Russians may be planning in the way of offensive or defensive weapons. Last week, to bolster the Administration's case for ABM, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird made public some startling--and previously classified--information.

He told members of two Senate committees that the Soviet Union has gone ahead to install hundreds of giant S59 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each of which can deliver up to 25-megaton hydrogen warheads. (The U.S. Minuteman ICBM carries a relatively modest one-megaton punch.) The SS-9, said Laird, is far too potent a weapon for the mere destruction of cities: since the Soviets must have it in their inventory for the purpose of knocking out a tougher target, the U.S. ICBMs in their silos.

First Attack. Therefore, Laird concluded, the Soviets have done more than construct a missile system restricted to retaliation in case the U.S. strikes first. They have gone on to build missiles that can only be intended to render the U.S. incapable of responding to a Soviet attack--which means that they propose to make the first attack themselves. "There is no question about that," said Laird.

By Laird's estimates, by 1975 the Soviets will have deployed some 500 S59 missiles, which--only if the U.S. takes no countermeasures--would enable the U.S.S.R. to knock out substantial numbers of U.S. ICBMs. Last December, however, a top Pentagon official said that the S59 was merely a retaliatory weapon, and was not designed for a first strike against the U.S. There has been no new intelligence since then. The Soviets had installed nearly 200 SS-9s by last summer; and they have now added roughly 15.

One line of reasoning among critics of ABM has been that, since Safeguard would defend only a part of the U.S. deterrent, it is unnecessary. Even if many of the 1,054 U.S. ICBMs were knocked out, the U.S. would still have not only its strategic bomber force but also its 41 nuclear-powered Polaris submarines. Each can launch its 16 missiles instantly. However, Laird reported that the Soviets are developing their own equivalent of Polaris.* He said that they are also launching nuclear-powered attack submarines designed to track down the U.S. subs wherever they go, and thus might be able to neutralize a key element of the U.S. deterrent by 1972. The Navy was stunned. Said one officer: "He is about ten years ahead of our predictions."

Dialogue of the Deaf. Except for Laird's disclosures, his presentation on Capitol Hill and the answering attacks last week resembled a dialogue of the deaf, in which debating opponents resolutely ignore each other's arguments. Laird first appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee, where he preached to the converted and encountered skeptical questioning only from Missouri's Stuart Symington. When Laird later came to grips with hostile Republicans and Democratic members of Senator William Fulbright's Committee on Foreign Relations, there was scarcely a new idea on either side.

As before, critics argued that the proposed Safeguard system is unnecessary, unproved and likely to intensify the arms race. Laird maintained that construction of Safeguard is essential to U.S. security. It would not provoke the U.S.S.R., he said, because it was purely defensive.

Option to Ride Out. While Laird found it "most encouraging to see a national debate" growing on ABM, he did not budge under attack. Tennessee's Senator Albert Gore told Laird that deploying ABMs "would make armaments-limitation agreement more difficult, if not impossible, to attain, and thus ultimately could degrade our deterrence." Laird replied soothingly that he would like nothing better than to see his job done away with by disarmament. Gore described the ABM scornfully as "a defense in search of a mission," noting that the system had been switched from defending cities to protecting missile sites--"apparently because of a commotion in Boston and Seattle."

Why, asked Symington, could the U.S. not launch ICBMs at an attacker's territory as rapidly as it could fire ABMs at incoming missiles? Laird passed the question to Dr. John Foster, the Pentagon's research and engineering chief, who replied that he would much rather the U.S. had an option to "ride out" an attack before it had to commit its missiles to irrevocable retaliation. That was one of the few fresh points made on either side.

Fulbright accused Laird of making public classified information that helped his case while withholding secret data that might harm it. In an impassioned outburst, Fulbright accused Laird and the Nixon Administration of applying a "technique of fear" in order to justify the ABM.

Canadian Debate. While the Soviet press handled Nixon's ABM announcement routinely, there was anxiety and outrage in Canada. Since the first Safeguard bases would be a few miles south of the Canadian border, and since Chinese or Soviet ICBMs would come in over the North Pole, the nuclear-armed ABMs sent to intercept them would probably be detonated over Canada. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was kept posted of Lyndon Johnson's Sentinel plans, but he was not informed in advance of President Nixon's switch to Safeguard. In an emergency debate in Ottawa, Socialist Leader Tommy Douglas protested: "Canada is not a banana republic."

Though Trudeau was to confer in Washington this week with Nixon on ABM and other questions, Tory Leader Robert Stanfield doubted that it would do much good. "What is the use," he wondered, "of going to Washington with an open mind when the President of the United States has already made up his mind?"

On Capitol Hill, the debate was obviously going to continue for weeks. An Associated Press poll last week showed 44 Senators against ABM and 35 for it, with 21 undecided. Thus the ultimate resolution seems as uncertain as the prospect of any meeting of minds.

-At the 17-nation disarmament meetings in Geneva last week, the Soviet Union proposed a draft agreement forbidding any use of the ocean floor for military purposes--which would force the U.S. to abandon the network of electronic devices that the Navy either has or intends to place on the seabed to keep track of submarine traffic. However, until there is agreement on limiting a much wider array of armaments, the U.S. is not likely to give up its seabed monitoring gear.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.