READY TO TALK WITH THE VIET CONG

THE U.S. has long had a strategy for simplifying and speeding the Paris peace talks, a strategy that has the virtue of reflecting the reality on the ground in Viet Nam. In essence, it aims at a partitioning of the issues. The U.S. and North Viet Nam would bilaterally negotiate military matters, the most important being the mutual withdrawal of their forces from South Vietnamese soil. The South Vietnamese government of President Nguyen Van Thieu and the National Liberation Front, the political organization of the Viet Cong, would meanwhile work out together the terms and conditions of their coexistence once the guns fall silent.

Sensible as such an approach seems, it has been impossible until now, in part because of South Viet Nam's refusal to meet with representatives of the N.L.F. However, the Nixon Administration, through Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, has been applying heavy pressure on President Thieu to modify his position, and last week he did. Calling foreign correspondents to the presidential palace, Thieu announced: "We are ready to have private talks with the N.L.F., if they like."

Expected Response. It was a significant concession, for Thieu, like other South Vietnamese leaders, had shied away from such meetings on the ground that these might constitute de facto recognition of the Front. Emphasizing this concern, Thieu stressed that the Saigon government has no intention of allowing the N.L.F. to join any sort of coalition government in South Viet Nam, and he barred any Communist participation in elections, at least as overt

Communists. "They may dissolve and become another political party," he suggested. As for the private talks themselves, Thieu was equally vague. "Nobody can guess the attitude of the Communists. We let them understand we are ready. It's up to them."

The Front's first public response was to be expected. An N.L.F. broadcast called the bid "a crafty trick," and in Paris both Hanoi and N.L.F. negotiators heaped scorn on Thieu's offer. For all the obloquy, however, no spokesman for either group flatly refused the offer of private talks, and Western sources privately described the statements as a matter of routine propaganda, entered for the record before the real talks begin in secret--if they have not already.

Gamut of Problems. In Saigon, reaction to Thieu's move was mixed. Mrs. Kieu Mong Thu, a militant Buddhist member of the National Assembly, said that "President Thieu should have thought of this measure sooner." Supporters of Lawyer Truong Dinh Dzu, the runner-up in the 1967 presidential elections who campaigned on a peace platform and is now in jail, reminded the world that Dzu was sentenced to five years at hard labor last year for suggesting direct talks with the N.L.F. "Thieu should get ten years," said a Saigon politician. A leader of the North Vietnamese Catholic refugees who came South after the 1954 armistice warned that "if this direct talk with the N.L.F. leads to recognition of the N.L.F., or acceptance of a coalition, or abolition of this regime, we will fight against it."

Just who would be assigned to make the initial contacts with the N.L.F. remained to be seen. Palace sources said that the Vice President and chief South Vietnamese negotiator at the Paris conference, Nguyen Cao Ky, would not take part in the meetings until a lower-level delegate had made the first soundings. If these turned out to be fruitful, Ky would take over. The agenda? Ky's advisers said he was planning to discuss the gamut of problems, from the war itself to the issues of withdrawal and a ceasefire. Any reports that some concrete concessions were in hand were scotched by Thieu himself: "I cannot tell you what we can offer them right now. It depends on their attitude."

Militarily, there was no doubt about Communist intransigence. During the week, there were about 130 rocket and mortar attacks against cities and bases. The headquarters bivouac of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division at Dong Tarn, 35 miles southwest of Saigon, was torn up so severely by hostile fire that U.S. newsmen were barred from the scene. Two ARVN Special Forces battalions were also savaged by enemy attacks 35 miles northeast of Saigon: their casualties were reported as "moderate," a euphemism for fairly substantial losses. The continued enemy pressure around Saigon was underscored by the U.S. sweep in the V.C.-infested Michelin rubber plantation northwest of the capital. After a week of battle, more than 600 enemy troopers were reported killed. To the north, along the Demilitarized Zone, U.S. infantrymen ran across a North Vietnamese force, killing 120 Communist soldiers while taking 14 dead and 30 wounded of their own.

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