Friday, Apr. 04, 1969
Battle for the Backyards
From powerful Chinese-built radio transmitters somewhere in Albania, a torrent of anti-Soviet diatribe pours forth each day. Though Russia, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria try to jam the broadcasts, a large part of Eastern Europe can readily hear Peking's attempts to turn the East-bloc countries against their Soviet Big Brother. Meanwhile, even as the Chinese-controlled station denounces "the Soviet renegades" in eight Eastern European languages, the Russians are steadily building up their own presence throughout Asia, an area that China regards as its own sphere of influence.
China's efforts in Eastern Europe and those of Russia in Asia are part of a global Sino-Soviet competition that has gained new impetus and urgency because of the firefights on the Ussuri River border. Though the Soviets claim they have evacuated the disputed island in the Ussuri and have called for a negotiated settlement of the issue, the competition continues. The immediate aim of both sides is to recruit supporters for the world meeting of Communist parties, now scheduled for June 5 in Moscow. The long-range objective is to gain a strong foothold in the adversary's own backyard.
Philosophy of Bullies. Until a short time ago, the Chinese lumped together the Eastern Europeans and the Soviets as unpardonable revisionists. Now, siding wholeheartedly with the Eastern Europeans, Peking condemns the Russians for their political and economic domination of the East bloc. Bemoaning the fate of Czechoslovakia, Chinese propagandists attack the Brezhnev policy of limited sovereignty for socialist countries as "a philosophy of bullies."
To the Eastern Europeans, China holds out the promise of increased trade. A Yugoslav economic mission has just concluded a small trade agreement in Peking, and East-bloc countries are expected to be invited to do likewise. The East Europeans, of course, are far too realistic to think that China can replace Soviet influence in Europe. Yet many of them welcome the new Chinese approach because it gives them additional leverage against the Soviets.
An example of that leverage came at last month's Warsaw Pact Conference in Budapest, when Rumanian President Nicolae Ceausescu refused Soviet demands to condemn China for the border troubles. Exploded Soviet Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev: "You are as bad as the bastard Hoxha [the pro-Peking party boss of Albania]!" By the same token, the Rumanian, Hungarian and Czechoslovak parties are likely to assert their independence at the planned Moscow meeting by attempting to block any Soviet plan to excommunicate the Chinese from the world Communist movement.
Trade and Culture. By comparison, the Soviets have managed to make perhaps more lasting gains along China's own borders. In three encounters, the Soviets have been able, partly through China's own maladroitness, to increase Moscow's influence at the cost of Peking. Soviet counsel seems now to prevail in North Viet Nam, though Ho Chi Minh apparently retains a high degree of independence by playing off one side against the other. In Laos, the Russians have managed to prevent the Communist Pathet Lao guerrillas from falling under Chinese influence. In North Korea, the Soviets capitalized on Peking's insults of the regime of Premier Kim II Sung to nudge the country closer to Moscow's position.
To the non-Communist countries of Asia, the Soviets present a remarkably bourgeois face. Aware that China's subversive tactics have given Communism a bad name among Asian governments, the Russians play down politics, deal directly and frankly with the regime in power, and base their appeal chiefly on the offer of trade and cultural ties.
The Soviet approach is working fairly well. In the past year, Soviet trade with Singapore has grown to nearly $40 million, and the Soviets apparently would like access to the British naval base for their own growing Pacific trading fleet when the Union Jack is hauled down in 1971. In two short years, the Soviets have become the largest purchasers of Malaysian rubber. As the flag follows trade, they have opened an embassy in Kuala Lumpur. They are offering the Japanese the opportunity to share in the development of Siberia's natural riches; one deal concerning timber has already been made. In addition, the Japanese are building a canning factory that will handle the catches from a substantial part of the Russian Far East fishing fleet.
The Soviets are also making an inroad in a historic U.S. preserve. For years, the Philippines shunned any ties whatsoever with Communist countries. Now Filipino students and journalists in growing numbers visit the Soviet Union. The Russians, in turn, send trade and cultural groups; Bolshoi dancers were performing in Manila last week. Many Filipinos expect that the two countries will establish diplomatic relations within a few years.
Identical Attitudes. So far, the Soviets seem to feel that their own purpose is served best by the existence of Asian countries strong enough to resist Chinese influence. If that is the case, the Russian attitude is almost identical with that of the U.S. In the long run, however, the Soviet penetration of Asia may make the problems of peace more difficult to solve. The Russian presence can only add to China's paranoid feelings of encirclement. The time may come when the U.S., either as a counterbalance to Russia or to aid a more moderate and rational post-Mao China back into the community of nations, will have to assuage China's fears. But the Soviets, who face a much more immediate danger from China, may be unwilling to pull back from any position that has enabled them to outflank a potentially dangerous enemy.
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