CHINA'S SEARCH FOR STABILITY

To the clang of cymbals and drums, China plunged into a pandemonium of celebrations. From humid, semitropical Yunnan to frigid Heilungkiang, millions of Chinese paraded through cities and towns, waving the little red books of Mao Tse-tung's quotations and chanting "Long life to Chairman Mao!" Many carried sunflowers as symbols of loyalty to a man whom his followers revere as "the red sun in our hearts." The occasion was, according to its official title, "The Ninth National Congress of the great, glorious and correct Communist Party of China."

Control Upheaval. Thus, for the first time since 1958, Mao last week opened a national political convention. It was a highly significant moment for him. After having subjected China and the party to more than two years of chaos in the name of his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Mao was trying not only to control the upheaval that has threatened to plunge the country into civil war but also to rebuild the party.

The very fact that the congress was convened at all showed that Mao had made at least some progress toward domestic peace. According to the 1956 party's constitution, the congress should have been held in 1961, but it was delayed. Mao wanted to convene it last year but nationwide chaos stirred up by his Cultural Revolution forced one postponement after another. The revolution, he had originally hoped, would rekindle the zealous spirit that spurred Chinese Communists to emerge from the caves of Yenan and conquer all of China after World War II. It would also, Mao thought, reinvigorate a party that had become little more than an ossified, bureaucratic establishment. Only when a measure of peace--or at least stalemate--eased the power struggle between the army, old party cadres and Maoist radicals, did Chairman Mao decide to convoke the meeting.

Mao opened the congress with a short televised speech. He appeared robust and rotund despite his 75 years. The main address was delivered by his chosen successor, Defense Minister Lin Piao (see box). Hunched on a stool, the frail Lin, 61, read a thick manuscript that analyzed the results of the Cultural Revolution and set out the newest orders for the party. After Lin's address, the 1,512 delegates split up into working groups to discuss Lin's report.

The congress intends to adopt a new party constitution that, according to a draft that found its way outside China early this year, will enshrine Mao's policies as official guideposts and formally designate Lin as his heir. The congress will also legitimize the new leadership that has emerged from the crucible of the purges. Finally, the delegates will select a new Central Committee. The old committee was purged of at least two-thirds of its membership, including such leading figures as President Liu Shaochi and Teng Hsiao-ping, the party secretary-general. With that, the congress will officially establish the ruling group that may well preside over the post-Mao succession period.

No Guests. China's masters were secretive about the congress. They even refused to disclose its exact location (it was probably held in Peking's Chungnanhai district, an enclave reserved for high officials). In contrast to the 1958 congress, there were no foreign guests who might later tell outsiders about what happened.

Even so, the composition of the congress as announced by Chinese news media explained a great deal about the strains and tensions with which Mao must still cope. Standing with him in places of honor were loyal supporters who had gained prominence in the Cultural Revolution, such as Lin, Mao's wife Chiang Ching, and Ideologue Chen Pota. But there were also on the dais such longtime party faithfuls as Vice President Tung Pi-wu, Economic Planner Chen Yun, and the famed Marshals Chu Teh and Liu Po-cheng, who had all been violently denounced in the not-so-distant past as "revisionists" and "capitalist-readers."

Army's Share. Significantly, Mao had to make room in the congress for moderates: among the 176 members of the congress's temporary presidium, the Maoist militants were actually outnumbered by more conservative men, most of them old-line party bureaucrats and relatively pragmatic military men. These moderates control the bulk of China's revolutionary committees, the new administrative units at the provincial and local level. The large number of military delegates to the congress testified to the fact that the People's Liberation Army remains the single most powerful and cohesive force in China.

If the congress presidium is elevated to Central Committee status, as is expected, the army will almost certainly be entitled to a share of policymaking. That will add to Mao's difficulties in rebuilding the party and putting it once more, as he says, "in control of the gun." It will also create tension between military officers, who are now in positions of local authority, rehabilitated party cadres and Maoist radicals, who would like to assume command of revolutionary committees.

Shaken Respect. Mao's actions indicate that pragmatism has been forced on him for the time being--not only in the political sphere but in economics as well. Because of the damage inflicted on the economy by the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese are now being told that they must work harder, be more frugal and behave in a manner that will promote agricultural and industrial production. Even so, Mao's revolution has had deep effects on the Chinese, especially among the youth, whose respect for authority has been shaken if not totally shattered. That may make it harder for Mao to achieve a smooth transition of power to his successor.

What of the effects on the outside world? Even if Mao and his heirs manage to maintain only the present modicum of order, the effects might be considerable. A China at relative peace with itself would present both perils and promise. A stronger China would intensify Russia's anxiety about the disaffected neighbor with whom it shares 4,100 miles of partially disputed border. Communist parties the world over may experience increased Chinese efforts to gain their allegiance. A more stable China might prove to be hostile and aggressive. In that case, Asian countries would be in a quandary over whether to seek accommodations with China or to ask the U.S. for protection. But a more confident China might also prove to be more cooperative on the international scene--and that, in turn, could give the U.S. a chance to normalize relations with Peking.

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