East Side, West Side

The Chinese Communist Party Congress had hardly convened in Peking before the Soviet Union started a harsh new propaganda drive against Mao and his followers. The Soviet denunciations widened the already huge gap between the two rival Communist powers and demonstrated the Soviets' deep fear of the erstwhile ally.

In their bluntest ideological attack yet in the 9 1/2-year-old Sino-Soviet dispute, the Russians finally gave up all pretense of trying to effect a reconciliation with their Asian comrades. They have now brusquely read them out of the international brotherhood. "The Communist Party of China is no more," wrote Izvestia. "The Maoist rally is actually the first congress of a new organization which has nothing in common with the Communist Party of China or with international Communism."

Fears About Security. The reason for the sudden Soviet attack lay in the maneuvering that is going on among Communist countries in preparation for the world meeting of parties now scheduled for June 5 in Moscow. The Soviets had hoped to use the occasion to formally expel the Chinese from the Communist movement. Their aim has been blocked by West and East European parties that have displayed defiance of the Soviets by refusing to go along with this plan. Now the Russians apparently have tried to sidestep the entire issue by asserting that the Maoists are no longer Communists at all and thus not an issue for debate at the world conference.

The firefights on the Sino-Soviet borders have also caused the Russians anxiety about their future security. The Soviets feel that the two recent incidents on Damansky Island in the Ussuri River may well be a small foretaste of things to follow. As Kommunist, the official Soviet party magazine, warned: "Mao and his associates are trying to instill in the minds of the Chinese people the possibility of armed conflict between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic."

In a curious switch-about, it is now the Russians who are complaining that the Chinese are in collusion with the U.S. to "undermine the united front of the struggle against imperialism." Kommunist described a vast plot, speculating that Mao and the U.S. have joined forces to encircle the Soviet Union. It also warned that the Chinese are trying to create a political following of their own that "would be directed against the world Communist movement."

ABMs and Germany. The threat in the East has placed increasing pressure on Soviet leaders to seek accommodation with the West. When the new British ambassador presented his credentials in Moscow last week, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told him that it was time to settle outstanding differences between Britain and Russia. Presumably that attitude extends to other countries in the West as well. Priority business with the West includes Russia's effort to negotiate an ABM truce with the U.S., reach a settlement of the Viet Nam war and prevent West Germany from ever becoming a nuclear power.

Though they were upset by the U.S. decision to build Safeguard, the Soviets have carefully refrained from any direct criticism of President Nixon. Instead, they still hope that they can prevail upon him to meet within the next few months to discuss some sort of limitation on the ABMs. A much more complicated issue is the question of the Soviet attitude toward West Germany, which is the only West European state that has the economic muscle and geographic location to exert a direct influence on the East Bloc.

Election Factor. Since World War II, Russia has painted West Germany as the villain of Europe, but now some Moscow policymakers wonder if that stance serves the Soviet Union's best interests. One reason for this reconsideration is that West German elections will be held in September. As the Soviets see it, the West German leader of the 1970s will be either Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, a Socialist, or Finance Minister Franz Josef Strauss, a conservative. The Soviets reckon that a relaxed policy toward West Germany would aid Brandt's cause, while a continued hard-line stand would surely enhance the possibility that Strauss might some day elbow aside Kurt Kiesinger as Chancellor.

Though the Soviets would greatly prefer Brandt to Strauss--who they suspect will want nuclear weapons for West Germany--the Russians fear that any overtures to Bonn would enrage their most loyal allies, the East Germans and Poles. Such a departure would also ruin their rationale for having intervened in Czechoslovakia to crush an alleged West German plot to pull that country into the West's orbit. As last week's events in Czechoslovakia showed, the Soviets may need an excuse to remain there for some time.

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