THE VIET NAM WAR: MOVEMENT IN PARIS

AFTER a sterile year of non-negotiation in Paris, the combatants in the Viet Nam war seemed as far away as ever from agreement on peace terms. Then, during the anniversary week of the talks, two senior Communist representatives returned from North Viet Nam--via Moscow--with a few surprises in their luggage. At the first meeting after their return, held as usual in the old Hotel Majestic, Hanoi's top representative, Le Due Tho, and the Viet Cong's showcase lady, Nguyen Thi Binh, opened for presentation a repackaged set of Communist proposals. In many respects it was the all-too-familiar farrago of impossible demands, but it contained sufficient changes in content and nuance to persuade the U.S. negotiating team that the Communists might finally be ready to talk serious business.

The ten-point paper, described by the Communists as an "overall solution to the South Viet Nam problem," was officially presented by the National Liberation Front delegate, Tran Buu Kiem. Clearly, it also reflected Hanoi's views. Compared with most previous pronouncements, the statement was refreshingly free of bombast. While Americans were still denounced as "imperialists" waging a "war of aggression," there was only one such reference, and it seemed almost pro forma. But for the first time the Communists mentioned a neutral postwar South Viet Nam that would maintain "diplomatic, economic and cultural relations" with the U.S.

Elliptic Hope. On specific issues, the N.L.F. paper renewed the Communists' insistence that the U.S. withdraw all its forces and dismantle all bases in South Viet Nam "without posing any condition whatsoever." That point alone remains unacceptable to Washington. But the demand was so elliptically couched as to suggest possible compromise. The Communists no longer said unequivocally that a unilateral U.S. evacuation was essential before discussions on political issues could begin. For the first time, too, they referred obliquely to removing North Vietnamese forces from the South. Though the Communists insisted that this was a question to be settled by "the Vietnamese parties," they at least acknowledged that the issue was negotiable.

Departing from the Communist stand, the paper proposed international supervision of foreign-troop withdrawals, as previously suggested by the U.S. The N.L.F., of course, wants the supervision applied only to the departure of U.S. and allied forces, since it does not acknowledge the North Vietnamese as "foreign." Still, if international regulation could be established as a principle, it might be made to apply to both sides in the withdrawal--as well as to a subsequent national election.

All Social Strata. The N.L.F. terms seem to envision the establishment of an interim government to prepare the ground for a new constitution and national elections. The statement implies, without defining, a situation in which a cease-fire could precede the installation of a permanent government. This segment of the N.L.F. proposal seems to go part way toward satisfying the U.S. policy of separating the purely military side of a settlement from the political aspects of the final agreement. Said the N.L.F.: "During the period intervening between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections, neither party shall impose its political regime on the people of South Viet Nam."

The N.L.F. used language that would be attractive to war-weary Americans. It talked of a "broad union of all social strata, political forces, nationalities, religious communities and all persons, no matter what their political beliefs and their past may be." It spoke of "broad democratic freedoms--freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of belief, freedom to form political parties, freedom to demonstrate." None of these liberties, of course, exist in North Viet Nam or other Communist nations. The clear intent was to formalize Hanoi's hope of merging the two Viet Nams, a union that the Communist North would almost certainly dominate. Reunification, said the statement, "will be achieved step by step, by peaceful means, through discussions and agreement between the two zones, without foreign interference."

Bit of Cheer. What real impact will the ten points have on the war? It was impossible to tell so soon, and American officials in Paris, Washington and Key Biscayne, where Richard Nixon was spending a long weekend, were not rushing to any euphoric conclusions. Secretary of State William Rogers was cautious in the extreme in his first public comment on the statement: "It contains some clearly unacceptable proposals, but there are elements in it which may offer a possibility for exploration." Privately, officials gave the paper intense study. Their preliminary reading was that it represented the most significant development in the negotiations so far. Despite reservations, despite all the previous hopes and claims that faltered, the American side could not conceal a bit of cheer. The reason was not so much the program laid down by the N.L.F. but the indication that, at last, the Communists might be ready to begin bargaining over hard issues. The Saigon government also reacted in a mildly positive manner. It rejected the interim-coalition idea, as it had in the past, but expressed willingness to discuss such lesser issues, mentioned by the N.L.F., as prisoner exchange and ways to make the demilitarized zone between the two Viet Nams just that.

Rightful Owners. If the new proposals prove to be more than another mirage, Nixon's repeated claim that progress is being made will be justified. The Administration sorely needs to show some visible gain. The moratorium on criticism of the war in Congress and among the responsible antiwar groups is wearing poster-thin. During the past two weeks, delegations of students, mothers and business executives have renewed their complaints about the war in Washington. Last week, 1,300 Quakers picketed the White House. Two ranking Senate Republicans, Chief Whip Hugh Scott and George Aiken, the party's senior Foreign Relations Committee member, have declared themselves in favor of an immediate pull-out of U.S. forces. As Aiken put it, the U.S. must "turn that country and that war back to its rightful owners."

Last week other Democratic and Republican Senators joined in the attack. The unkindest cut came from a Republican, New York's Jacob Javits, who accused Nixon of continuing the "sterile and unsuccessful" policies of the Johnson Administration. "The old myths, the old self-delusions and the old phraseology recur again and again," Javits charged. He suggested that personnel changes have not gone deep enough because Ambassadors Ellsworth Bunker and Henry Cabot Lodge, General Creighton Abrams and others associated with Johnson's Viet Nam policies remain in key posts.

Notch by Notch. Javits' criticism may be overly severe, as well as premature. Nixon's dilemma is that he must do his best to maintain a credible bargaining position in Paris while assuaging the doves at home. No one can predict whether or when a settlement will be achieved, but the President meanwhile has been edging toward a reduction of U.S. forces in Viet Nam. The first pullback might take place this summer, even if there is no reciprocity on the other side. Whatever else it might accomplish, a reduction in the American troop level--perhaps including some combat units, for effect--would demonstrate to Hanoi that the South Vietnamese government is growing ever more capable of defending and unifying its territory.

The Administration has enumerated three preconditions for a cutback of forces, any one of which might suffice: progress in Paris, a reduction in the level of combat, and improvement in the capability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves. The first and third of these are subjective matters; at any time the Administration could announce that these two requirements, at least, have been met. A reduction of U.S. forces in Viet Nam, like the hint of serious bargaining in Paris, does not necessarily mean an early, comprehensive settlement. But it could be a small step toward that goal. It may be that the war will slowly end, as it slowly grew, notch by agonizing notch.

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