MIDWAY MEETING: THE PERILS OF PEACE

ASIDE from its symbolic location in mid-Pacific, the tiny atoll of Midway has little to recommend it as a meeting place for heads of state. At this time of year, the heat and humidity are almost unbearable. Overfriendly gooney birds create a hazard by flocking to greet incoming aircraft. Limited facilities bar a prolonged palaver--unless the visitors are willing to bunk down in a spartan Navy barracks.

Originally, South Viet Nam's President Thieu requested a session with President Nixon in Washington. Secretary of State William Rogers, on a visit to Saigon, suggested a rendezvous halfway. The danger of antiwar demonstrations, at least, should be absent at the U.S.-owned garrison isle of Midway. Regardless of the setting, the Midway meeting--designed to align U.S. and South Vietnamese positions for the peace negotiations--may well be more important than any of the five previous summits that have punctuated the war.

A Great Nation. Some observers in Saigon, in fact, compared the session with the Battle of Midway, which, 27 years ago this week, turned the tide in the Pacific war. If the comparison was vastly exaggerated, it did express Saigon's fear that the Nixon Administration might be willing to make concessions in Paris that would destroy the Thieu regime. "Our government obviously wants to know the intentions of the United States," said Pham Dang Lam, Saigon's chief negotiator in Paris, who then pointedly recalled Nixon's words that "a great nation cannot renege on its pledges."

In case Washington did not get the message, Thieu was saying much the same thing on visits to the two other most staunchly anti-Communist countries of Asia, South Korea and Taiwan. In Seoul, as balloons held aloft huge Vietnamese and Korean flags, he warned against "a false peace, a counterfeit peace." South Korea's tough President Chung Hee Park, who has sent 50,000 of his own men to South Viet Nam, agreed with his guest that a coalition with the Viet Cong was out of the question and that recognition of the legitimacy of the present government would have to be part of any peace package. They also jointly opposed unilateral withdrawal of even a part of U.S. forces, although the Nixon Administration has obviously been contemplating this.

Thieu approved President Nixon's May 14 speech before it was delivered. But partly as a result of subsequent reporting out of Washington, he discovered hidden nuances that disturbed him. In the somewhat Delphic address, Nixon had talked of establishing "procedures for political choice that give each significant group in South Viet Nam a real opportunity to participate in the political life of the nation." That could mean, among other things, Viet Cong participation in future elections and thereafter in a future government. Thieu has gone as far as that, although only on the difficult condition that the Viet Cong stop calling themselves Communists. In the speech, Nixon also hinted that the U.S. would be willing to accept Communist participation in an interim government that would rule the country pending elections. That could mean something very close to a coalition government. More troubling to Thieu than any specific language may have been the President's insistence that he was open to almost any suggestion the other side might make.

To the South Vietnamese, even a hint of coalition--at least in public --reeks of sell-out and disaster. Merely discussing it is against the law in South Viet Nam.* A number of South Vietnamese are in jail for suggesting no more than Nixon did. The Saigon regime fears that once the Communists were in the government, they would swallow up Thieu & Co. and eventually seize power. Asked in Seoul about the prospects for a coalition, Thieu said firmly: "I would like to give the shortest answer of this press conference. Just one word. Never. Are you satisfied?"

The Dilemma. The U.S. must face up to the question of whether the Thieu government is becoming a roadblock to peace. The first part of the problem concerns the Communists: Will they deal with Thieu? They vow that there will never be peace so long as Thieu sits in the presidential palace. This position might change in the course of negotiations, but at present it does not seem likely. When the Communists talk of a coalition, they are not thinking of a coalition with Thieu, because to join one would be to recognize his legitimacy. The second part of the problem involves Thieu's domestic political situation: Will his government be strong and broad enough to unite non-Communist forces and to hold its own against the Communists through an interim period, through elections and beyond? The answer is in doubt. He has yet to form the representative popular front that the U.S. has been urging on him for months. Though last week he did bring six political groups into what he calls the National Social Democratic Front, the alliance was not nearly so broad or potent as had been promised.

On the other hand, the Thieu regime is the strongest that South Viet Nam has had in the past six years. Even if the U.S. wanted to abandon Thieu--and there is no sign whatever that it does --it might not be able to do so for lack of a substitute. "If the Americans destroy Thieu," says one high-ranking foreign diplomat in Saigon, "the government of South Viet Nam will collapse utterly. This is the Communists' strategy." While Thieu cannot be expected to cave in on the coalition issue, it would obviously be impossible to achieve a settlement if he stuck to his present public positions. For the Viet Cong to agree to a peace formula, some device must be found to give them the appearance of a victory. They cannot be expected to come meekly to Saigon, lay down their arms, and put up candidates for an election while Thieu remains in full control.

Any Time. Actually, the President of South Viet Nam may not be quite so obdurate as he seems. Says TIME's Saigon bureau chief: "In private conversation, Thieu and Vice President Ky talk about eight months ahead of the way they talk in public. Thieu today expresses his appreciation of the political facts of life in the U.S. and of the necessity for serious negotiations with the Communists." Short of outright coalition, which the U.S. does not now advocate anyway, he might accept one of the other formulas that have been proposed. One solution, for example, might be to let each side retain the areas it now controls while a neutral commission supervises balloting. Another might be an international commission to run the government while both sides compete at the polls. Still another might be what one diplomat calls a "Tammany Hall" solution--some yet unknown equation satisfying neither side but acceptable to both.

Even while he was saying "Never" in Seoul, Thieu was perhaps hinting at yet another formula: the inclusion of leftists or Communists in his Cabinet. "At any time, any day, any week," he said last week, "when necessary, I have to change my Ministers to cope with the situation." The job Nixon now faces is to persuade the South Vietnamese President to accept the prospect of some kind of agreement with the Communists, without at the same time undercutting the fragile stability that Thieu has managed to build up in Saigon.

* The May 23 issue of TIME was banned in the country for mentioning the possibility of a coalition.

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