Sinkiang: Where It Could Begin

IF full-scale war ever erupts between the Soviet Union and China, a likely location for the opening battle is the Chinese region of Sinkiang. Occupying almost one-sixth of China's area, Sinkiang contains several volatile ingredients. Unlike other disputed border areas farther east, where the Amur and Ussuri rivers create a natural boundary, the 1,500-mile Sinkiang-Soviet frontier in many stretches is only vaguely demarcated. In addition, the area is the site of one of the most tempting targets in all of China: the nuclear testing grounds at Lop Nor.

Sinkiang is accustomed to trouble. A sparsely populated land of towering, snow-capped peaks and arid deserts, it is the fought-over gateway between Central Asia and the east. Marco Polo passed through Sinkiang on his way to China. So did other traders who carried Asia's luxuries to Europe. Chinese, Tibetans, Mongols and Turks have all left their mark.

Only 3,000,000 of Sinkiang's 8,000,000 people are Chinese, many of them recent settlers imported to strengthen Peking's ethnic hold. The others come from at least 14 minority nationalities. Some 4,000,000 are Uighurs, descendants of the 9th century Turkic invaders, and 600,000 are Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Tadjiks. Divided by customs and heritage, the various minorities nonetheless are united in their hate of their present masters, who first penetrated Sinkiang under the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220).

Russian involvement in Sinkiang dates to the Czars. In the mid-19th century, Alexander II sent troops into northwestern Sinkiang to quell a Moslem revolt. An 1881 treaty restored part of the area to China, but Russia retained a large hunk. Stalin expanded Soviet influence in Sinkiang by using Soviet consulates and cultural centers for propaganda. In 1944, Moslem rebels financed by Moscow set up the East Turkestan Republic in Sinkiang. Up to the time Mao Tse-tung won control of China, the Russians were trying to establish Sinkiang as an independent republic.

In a sense, the Chinese Communists might be better off if Stalin had succeeded. Sinkiang has meant mostly trouble for them. The proud, independent tribesmen have resisted Communist indoctrination efforts. They resent attempts to collectivize their herds of goats and cattle. Playing on those resentments, the Soviets in 1961 encouraged Sinkiang's Moslems to stir up the native groups by comparing their bad treatment under the Chinese with better conditions in the Soviet Union. When the snows melted in the spring, some 60,000 Uighurs and Kazakhs fled across the border. Soviet trucks picked up the refugees, while Russian troops sometimes covered their escape.

Since then, the situation has grown increasingly serious. Soviet radio stations beam programs into Sinkiang exhorting the minority groups to rise up in a war of liberation against the Maoists. The Chinese, badly outgunned along the entire Sino-Soviet border, are at a special disadvantage in Sinkiang. Against some 150,000 to 200,000 troops across the Soviet border the Chinese have only 85,000 to 100,000. The Soviet troops, moreover, are backed up by medium-range missiles.

Despite their military superiority, the Soviets so far have carefully avoided even mentioning the possibility of a preventive strike against the Chinese nuclear test site in Sinkiang. At present, the Chinese lack an effective missile for their nuclear bombs. In four or five years, however, they may develop a delivery system that could establish a balance of terror between the two nervous neighbors. So far, Soviet policy has been to confine the fighting strictly to limited border areas. Still, the increasing gravity of the Sino-Soviet dispute--and the relative weakness of China's defenses--must present a certain temptation to Soviet military planners.

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