Blaming the Critics

Richard Nixon is determined to extract some concessions from North Viet Nam in exchange for U.S. disengagement from the war. To do this, he believes, he must convince the other side that his domestic position is solid. Further, he must make his American critics believe that they cannot rush him. The President is having trouble on both counts, but not for want of trying.

After his recent press conference declaration that antiwar outcries would not affect his policy, the President held two private meetings with Republican congressional and party leaders. The first took place at Camp David, where, amid Maryland's Catoctin Mountains, the participants lounged beside a figure-eight swimming pool and heard the President blame many of his Administration's problems on the Democratic-controlled Congress. The second meeting was a White House breakfast. The deliberations at such sessions almost always leak out; that is often the intention. The President's main message, echoing Lyndon Johnson, was that U.S. opponents of the war must take the blame for the war's continuation.

Bombing Suggestion. In the wake of Ho Chi Minh's death, suggested the President, North Viet Nam must reappraise its war strategy, and a united U.S. front --or at least an absence of public criticism of the war--would make Hanoi more tractable. One trouble with the argument is that the Communists have given no hint in Paris of changing their attitude in the slightest, despite nearly nine months of little domestic protest. Fighting is in another lull, but it is doubtful how long it will last. Still, declared Nixon: "The other side doesn't seem to realize it, but I'm in here for another three years and three months. I'm not going to be the first American President who loses a war."

The Republican legislative leaders emerged swinging from the conferences. Nixon had mentioned the crucial nature of the next "couple of months," and Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott predicted that "you will have a new situation" if criticism subsides for 60 days. What that situation might be, or why Hanoi would be influenced by such a temporary, artificial hold-down of protest, was not explained. Senator John Tower suggested that if the Communists do not become more reasonable "over the next few days," the U.S. should consider resuming the bombing of North Viet Nam. Representative Bob Wilson, chairman of the House Republican Campaign Committee, noted the endorsement given by several Democrats to the planned Oct. 15 antiwar demonstration (see box] and condemned their support as "nothing more than a cheap effort to make a few political points at the expense of the national interest."

Christmas Present. Despite such remarks, the Viet Nam debate is clearly not a partisan issue, at least not yet. There are too many divisions within both parties. The argument that renewed dissent in this country is reinforcing Communist stubbornness is also shaky, since it presumes that Hanoi makes its decisions on the basis of protest in the streets and in the press. These obviously enter North Viet Nam's calculations, but there are far clearer guides to U.S. intent and will.

Hanoi knows that the war issue felled Lyndon Johnson. It heard Richard Nixon express the hope that he could beat Clark Clifford's withdrawal timetable, which called for all U.S. ground combat troops to be out of Viet Nam by the end of 1970. Hanoi watched as Nixon began to reduce manpower in South Viet Nam. And it heard Senator George Aiken, senior Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, predict that Nixon will announce "another troop withdrawal for Christmas, enough to make 100,000 for this year."

William Fulbright spoke for many in the U.S.--even some who otherwise disagree with him--when he said: "I object to the policy that we should all keep quiet and hope for the best." The newly aroused protesters, both on Capitol Hill and on the campuses, seem in no mood to be silenced. Charles Goodell, eager to make a liberal reputation in liberal New York before next year's election, is pressing his bill to remove all U.S. troops from South Viet Nam by December 1970. Administration strategists think the proposal should be brought to a vote soon; it would probably be defeated. Unilateral withdrawal is plainly not acceptable to a majority of Congress or of the country--at present. But proposals for bigger steps toward disengagement continued. Charles Percy urged Nixon to halt all bombing and offensive ground operations in South Viet Nam. Mike Mansfield, the Democratic Senate leader, proposed that Washington attempt a ceasefire. He credited Nixon with wanting out of Viet Nam, "sure as hell." That Hanoi knows this too makes the dispute over the propriety of dispute academic.

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