Vietnamization: Policy Under Fire

EVER since the 1968 Tet offensive, officials in Washington and Saigon have recoiled from any excessive hopefulness about progress in the Viet Nam War. But hope is a hardy plant. For several months, a mood of guarded optimism has been budding in Washington, as dispatches from the field tell of new South Vietnamese strength and growing Communist weakness. Now, however, serious doubts are being cast on the validity of this "underground optimism," as it has come to be known.

Ambiguous Yardsticks. As a converted U.S. hawk with eminent academic credentials put it recently, the new mood is merely a case of "the old illusions resurfacing." This week a report that is being released by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reinforces such doubts and suggests that unduly sanguine analyses from the field may once again be misleading the nation. The document was prepared by James G. Lowenstcin and Richard M. Moose, both former foreign service officers who are considered moderates of a mildly dovish persuasion. They visited Viet Nam for eleven days in December. They warn that the yardsticks used to measure progress in Viet Nam consist of "far more ambiguous, confusing and contradictory evidence than pronouncements from Washington and Saigon indicate." Adds the report: "A visitor to Viet Nam can easily find evidence to support any case he wishes to make." Other observations:

> Despite claims that record numbers of Viet Cong cadres have been killed or put out of action, some Americans admit that these consist mostly of lower-level officials. "Most of the Viet Cong infrastructure," they add, "is intact."

>While it is claimed that all American combat troops have been withdrawn from the IV Corps in the Mekong Delta, briefing officers fail to point out that 23,000 U.S. support troops and advisers remain. That figure is only 15% less than the total estimated Communist forces in the area--hardly a level indicating substantial self-sufficiency on the part of the South Vietnamese.

> While some pacification officials in South Viet Nam claim that 92% of the population lives in "relatively secure" hamlets, others put the figure as low as 60%. The disparity arises because officials include in their figures those hamlets that are not under actual Communist control, grading them on a descending security scale from A to C. Many of the C hamlets, however, are not even relatively safe; they belong to the Viet Cong at night, and South Vietnamese pacification workers refuse to sleep in them.

Fragile Gains. The report does not dispute claims that in many areas major progress has been made in securing the countryside and turning the war over to the Vietnamese. It concedes that 1) pacification of the countryside is progressing, and roads and canals are the safest in years; 2) the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) has improved, though it remains spotty and heavily dependent on U.S. support troops; and 3) an effective home-front militia is armed and operating.

While the overall situation seems to be improving, the Foreign Relations Committee report adds, the gains are often so fragile that they could easily be wiped out overnight by a major enemy push. As far as the future is concerned, Lowenstein and Moose claim that both Vietnamese and Americans in Saigon operate on the assumption that U.S. strength in Viet Nam will remain at a level of at least 250,000 for many years. In Washington, planners see only 200,000 remaining--and not necessarily past early 1972.

The success of Vietnamization depends on the stability of the South Vietnamese government, and the report indicates that President Nguyen Van Thieu's regime is becoming more effective, if not more popular. But it adds that Thieu himself is considered "increasingly autocratic, secretive and isolated." Despite foreign suggestions that he seek wider political backing, many of Thieu's critics believe he will not move in that direction as long as he can count on U.S. support. Besides, there is doubt that many opposition politicians would be willing to join Thieu's regime. Nonetheless, Thieu has made major efforts in his two years in office to tighten up his administration. He has either fired or reassigned every one of his nation's 44 provincial chiefs in an effort to sideline the incompetent or dishonest. While his motive is also to entrench his own men in these vital posts, observers agree that the caliber of his appointees has been an improvement. He is now embarked on a new cycle of hirings and firings that promises to bring a drastic overhaul of South Viet Nam's entire military administration.

Chances for Success. In the first weeks of 1970, Thieu replaced the chiefs of six provinces that remain particular Viet Cong trouble spots. He also shifted commanders of two sensitive military regions: a special tactical zone west of Saigon, where Communist troops have recently stepped up infiltration, and the 7th ARVN Division in the northern Mekong Delta, an arena that could serve as a major testing ground of the initial, tentative steps toward Vietnamization. Long considered a weak link in ARVN, the 7th has a tough new commander to lead it against the 8,000 North Vietnamese troops prowling the Delta. Thieu is said to be planning an even wider shake-up of province chiefs and military commanders after this week's Tet holiday, a move that could enhance the chances for success of the Vietnamization policy.

The Lowenstein-Moose report is pessimistic about those chances. Though based on only 11 days' observation, the report will please those who believe that Vietnamization is an immoral policy because it prolongs an immoral war as well as those who believe that it simply cannot work.

Can it? As TIME'S Saigon Bureau Chief Marsh Clark reported last week: "It is far too early in the game to tell whether, when we yank out some of the props, the South Vietnamese structure will be able to stand on its own. However--and I think this is important --nothing has happened so far to indicate that Vietnamization will not work, while there is some very limited evidence that it might."

Tense Anticipation. One test of its chances could come this week. Two years ago, American and ARVN forces were caught napping by the nationwide Communist attack, and they are determined to prevent a repetition. With the Communists apparently committed to a nibbling strategy of protracted guerrilla war rather than big, set-piece battles, military intelligence experts anticipate no nationwide attacks this year. Nevertheless, South Viet Nam is girding for the worst. The streets and markets of the cities bulge with goods and festive decorations in anticipation of welcoming the Year of the Dog, but beneath the holiday mood lies the tension of an armed camp. Soldiers' traditional leaves have been canceled, ARVN has stepped up its ambushes along infiltration trails, and there are guards everywhere--around cities, at bridges and roads, at military and refugee camps. Mobile teams are making sudden surprise checks at intersections, throwing up blockades, checking ID cards, poking into trucks and cars.

They are well advised to do so. Isolated guerrilla attacks and terrorist bombings in previously quiescent areas show that the Communists are still able to harass where least expected. The brief recurrence of the air war over North Viet Nam, which suggested that Communist MIG fighters are now stationed as far south as Vinh, 150 miles from the Demilitarized Zone, has evoked concern at the White House. There is no doubt that the Communists are capable of widespread disruption and destruction--if not during Tet, then at some other time. What remains to be seen is whether they are also capable of turning Vietnamization into just another empty hope.

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