The World of Richard Nixon

We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.

SEEKING, as always, to make "one thing clear," Richard Nixon succeeded last week in doing exactly that. He submitted to Congress a voluminous (40,000-word, 119-page) "State of the World" message that confirmed a significant change in U.S. foreign policy. American interest will be defined with more discrimination than before. Commitment of resources--financial and human--will be more cautious. Allies will be asked to share burdens more fully than before.

Billed by Nixon as the most comprehensive such statement ever made, the State of the World is too long, too obvious in spots, and often self-serving. It is also short on specific means to be employed to settle some problems. But the message served an important purpose nonetheless. Nixon has long been concerned about the nation's lack of a cohesive foreign policy distinctly proclaimed to the world. His adviser for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, has shared that concern.

Giant Step. Nixon's message, of which Kissinger is the principal author, defines global objectives for the coming decade. Further, it treats the subject as a whole instead of a collection of separate problems. And it does so in a cool tone that allows realism to outweigh verbal flourishes. Nixon emphasizes not isolation, but rather more credible involvement. Thus he takes a qualified step back from the doctrine of almost automatic intervention in hemispheric affairs that drew the Johnson Administration into the Dominican Republic, a giant step from John Kennedy's rhetorical commitment to intervene anywhere in defense of liberty. Moreover, he abandons the belief, which he himself once held, that the world, threatened by a monolithic Communist bloc, must rely on U.S. military and economic power for survival.

Instead, the "Nixon Doctrine" recognizes that "others now have the ability and responsibility to deal with local disputes which once might have required our intervention." Echoing his Guam declaration, the President says: "The United States will participate in the defense and development of allies, but ... America cannot--and will not --conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world."

1 1/2 Wars. Nor will the Pentagon base its planning on the assumption that the U.S. will intervene in conflicts throughout the world. That notion produced the "2 1/2-war" strategy, under which the Joint Chiefs of Staff--without success --tried to maintain general-purpose forces adequate to fight major wars in both Europe and Asia, and a smaller action elsewhere. But under the Nixon plan, the U.S. will switch to a "1 1/2-war" strategy that will enable it to fight a major war in either Europe or Asia, a minor action somewhere else.

Nixon insists that the reduction in conventional military strength will in no way limit U.S. ability to meet its treaty commitments to any nation. But it will place a heavier burden on American allies and bring about important foreign policy changes in several areas of U.S. interest. Specifically:

EUROPE. Describing the Continent as the cornerstone of a durable peace, Nixon stresses U.S. determination to remain in Europe: "We can no more disengage from Europe than from Alaska." But "disengage" is a relative term. A mutual reduction of forces, if the Russians agree, is one goal. Increased military efforts by the West Europeans is another. In any event, though Nixon pledges continued support for NATO, he declines to commit the U.S. to maintain its current troop strength of 310,000 on the Continent beyond mid-1971.

MIDDLE EAST. Convinced that peace can come about only through direct negotiations between the nations involved in the Mideast conflict, the U.S. will continue its efforts to bring both sides together. But Nixon views any Soviet quest for "predominance" in the area "as a matter of grave concern," and sees small hope of a Mideast settlement until the U.S.S.R. shows signs of a serious desire for a relaxation of tensions. Until a settlement is reached, however, the U.S. will continue its present policy of providing arms to Israel to help maintain the balance of military power in the region. By emphasizing the importance of negotiations now, Nixon seems to be supporting the Israeli position, and that is how the antagonists read him.

VIET NAM. The U.S. will continue the program outlined in Nixon's Nov. 3 speech and seek peace in Southeast Asia through two means--Vietnamization and negotiation. The U.S., Nixon reports, has made progress at the former, but not at the latter. Nor does Nixon see any signs of an impending Paris breakthrough, though he remains cautiously hopeful. By implication, Nixon's steadfast support for the present Saigon regime prevents any realistic hope of negotiation. Still, the President insists that the U.S. is ready to negotiate on any point but self-determination for the people of South Viet Nam. "The key to peace lies in Hanoi."

THE U.S.S.R. Complaining strongly about Soviet activity in the Middle East and its support of North Viet Nam, Nixon finds current relations with Moscow "far from satisfactory." He expresses satisfaction, however, about the start in U.S.-Soviet negotiations on arms limitation and reaffirms U.S. readiness to meet with Kremlin leaders to discuss any matter. He also says that the U.S., while recognizing the Soviet Union's security interests in Eastern Europe, will continue the efforts begun during his 1969 visit to Rumania to improve relations with Communist nations.

ARMS CONTROL. Soviet missile strength is approaching, and may exceed, that of the U.S. The U.S.S.R. will have 1,290 ICBMs to the U.S.'s 1,054 by the end of the year, though the U.S. will maintain a lead in submarine-launched missiles, 656 to 300. Expressing dismay over the Soviet buildup, Nixon pledges that the U.S. will enhance its own security by going ahead with the Safeguard ABM program. Oddly, there is no mention of continuation of U.S. testing of multiple-warhead offense missiles, possibly because the U.S. hopes to discuss controls on the numbers of such weapons when the second round of arms-limitation talks gets under way in Vienna April 16.

Welcome Weltanschauung. The President's message stimulated an immediate reaction abroad. The French press, resentful of American influence in Europe, generally welcomed Nixon's new Weltanschauung as a realistic view of a changing globe. But the Germans and the British, both leary about the possible withdrawal of American forces from Europe, were more cautious. Communist bloc reaction was restrained. Tass said that "the main aims of U.S. policy remain unchanged," pointed angrily to Nixon's decision to press ahead with the Safeguard program as evidence of continued American emphasis on military force as the basis of policy.

By contrast, reaction at home was conspicuously sparse. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield expressed general approval of the message. Senator Eugene McCarthy attacked Vietnamization as unlikely to succeed, and undesirable even if it did. But neither McCarthy's criticism nor the lack of congressional comment can diminish the importance of the President's message.

With as much reason as rhetoric, the message takes a hard look at the world as it is and assigns to the U.S. a role it can credibly play in global affairs.

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