Anatomy of a Limited War

For the past three years, TIME Correspondent David Greenway has covered the war in Southeast Asia. In this report from Vientiane, Greenway sums up the reasons behind the Laotian crisis.

THE U.S. and North Viet Nam are involved in Laos for precisely the same reason: both countries feel that their presence is necessary to prosecute the war in Viet Nam. Neither side will admit publicly the full extent of its involvement because both are acting in violation of the 1962 Geneva accords, which attempted to impose a neutralist settlement on this divided country.

To many observers the largely clandestine American involvement in Laos raises disturbing memories of early U.S. participation in Viet Nam. U.S. officials, however, point out that the U.S. has made no long-term commitments in Laos and that the current involvement is a holding action, to be maintained until a settlement can be worked out for Viet Nam.

Both sides have always observed certain restraints, for Laos is essentially a sideshow in which neither North Viet Nam nor the U.S. wants to become overly involved. There has always been a degree of pushing and pulling during the annual wet-season and dry-season offensives. Save for air attacks, however, the U.S. has never seriously threatened North Viet Nam's hold on eastern Laos and the all-important trail networks. In turn, Hanoi has never mounted an all-out offensive against government positions along the Mekong River.

Since November 1968, the U.S. has been raising the ante in Laos. That decision was based largely on the de-escalation in Viet Nam, rather than on any increase in North Vietnamese aggression. U.S. planners believed that they could afford to stop bombing North Viet Nam only if they increased air raids on the infiltration routes in eastern Laos. Gradually, the bombing was extended to tactical support of government troops in western Laos.

Last spring, North Vietnamese troops, for the first time, captured the important government post at Muong Soui. In retaliation--and with significant U.S. logistical assistance--government troops last fall drove the Communists off the Plain of Jars and forced the evacuation of Muong Soui. The Plain, which the Communists had held for five years, has a political significance far beyond its strategic value. Its conquest by the government constituted a significant escalation of the fighting. For prestige reasons alone, the North Vietnamese felt that they had to recapture the Plain--and they did so last month.

So far, Hanoi has done no more than regain what was lost last fall. It is highly unlikely that the North Vietnamese seek the thankless burden of occupying all of Laos. But it would be surprising if, during the current offensive, they did not try to bloody the government's nose by pushing a bit farther than before.

The Laos situation is not yet out of hand. The danger is that even modest escalation has a momentum that could provoke a bigger war in Laos than either side wants. It is reasonable that the U.S. would want to keep Prince Souvanna Phouma's government propped up while trying to extricate itself from Viet Nam. But it is debatable whether increased air and ground offensives are necessary. Instead of heating up the war in Laos, Washington might well consider cooling it down. An obvious way would be to decrease air activity, but not below the level needed to preserve Souvanna Phouma and remaining U.S. forces in Viet Nam. The problem, of course, is to determine what that level should be.

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