West Germany Looks to the East

There must be, there can be, and there will be negotiations between Bonn and East Berlin.

--Willy Brandt

WHEN the new Chancellor of West Germany uttered those words in his state-of-the-nation address in January, many of his friends and foes alike felt that he was indulging in wishful rhetoric. But last week, less than two months after his address, emissaries of Chancellor Willy Brandt arrived in East Berlin to work out plans for his visit to East German Premier Willi Stoph, who last month invited Brandt to come over for a talk. In three days of sessions, the East and West German officials were far from agreement on the details. Nevertheless, the talks are scheduled to resume this week, and West German officials still hope that some time soon the first meeting will take place between the heads of the two rival German states.

A quarter-century after the cold war began, Willy Brandt, the anti-Nazi who last October became West Germany's first postwar Socialist Chancellor, is seeking to lessen the obstacles that still divide Europe. As soon as he came to power, Brandt touched off a whirl of diplomatic activity. One of his first acts was to end West Germany's 18-month reluctance to sign the nuclear-nonproliferation treaty. Only last week, in ceremonies in Washington, Moscow and London, the pact prohibiting the spread of nuclear weaponry was finally proclaimed to be in effect. Thanks to De Gaulle's departure, Brandt also got the Common Market moving again toward the settlement of its old agricultural differences and toward an expansion of its membership that is likely to bring British admission within the next couple of years.

But most of the attention has focused on Brandt's Ostpolitik. In addition to the East Berlin meetings, talks resumed in Moscow last week between Egon Bahr, Brandt's chief foreign adviser, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. In Warsaw, Polish officials prepared to start a new round of discussions with a West German delegation this week. Meanwhile, Brandt was in Britain seeking support for his policy. After receiving an honorary doctorate of civil law at Oxford, Brandt said in Latin that his aim was "an equitable and lasting peace system in Europe under which individuals and nations are safe from coercion and can determine their own destiny."

Brandt's eastward policy has also raised fears. Some people in the West are concerned that he might make a Rapallo-like deal with the Soviet Union or that he might inadvertently compromise vital Western interests.

Calculated Risk. In an effort to assess the promises and perils of Brandt's Ostpolitik, TIME Associate Editor David Tinnin spent the past three weeks in Washington, Bonn, Berlin, Warsaw and Moscow. The following conclusions emerged:

P: Given a reasonable response from Poland, Brandt is prepared to recognize within the next year the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's eastern frontier, thus ceding to Poland the huge former German territories that passed under Polish control in 1945.

P: In return for better relations between the two German states in the areas of unrestricted travel and improved postal, telephone and cable communications, Brandt would be willing to grant, within the next 18 months, de jure recognition to the German Democratic Republic in all international affairs. Even so, he insists that in relations between the two German states, Bonn would never consider East Germany a foreign country and that East Germans always would share a common citizenship with West Germans.

P: Basically Brandt is embarked on a calculated diplomatic risk. He is betting that over the next two or three decades, the attractiveness and economic strength of the West will work marked changes on the East bloc countries--if only they can be opened up to outside influences. The orthodox Communists who rule most of the Warsaw Pact countries are betting just the opposite: that they can use West German economic aid and know-how to enhance their hold on the allegiance of their citizens.

P: There are fears among some West Germans about what they call the Finlandization of their country. Anticipating U.S. troop withdrawals, they worry that West Germany will be left so vulnerable to Soviet pressure that the country may be decisively influenced by a desire not to offend Moscow.

P: A cardinal failure of recent U.S. policy has been that Washington has sought to achieve a nuclear settlement with the Soviets without simultaneously seeking a military detente concerning ground forces in Europe, where the Warsaw Pact combat forces outnumber NATO forces by at least 2 to 1. With the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) negotiations soon to begin in Vienna between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, many Europeans are increasingly worried that they no longer loom very large in American defense considerations. Sensing this attitude, the Soviets have resumed their old call for a European security conference designed to make Moscow the guarantor of peace in Europe and thus replace 25 years of Pax Americana with Pax Sovietica.

Outdated Attitudes. Willy Brandt, who learned the difficulties of dealing with the Soviets as mayor of West Berlin, bridles at suggestions that he is giving away too much to the other side. In his opinion, he is simply relinquishing West Germany's claim to outmoded bargaining positions. "Our aim," he says, "is to bring Europe closer together and to establish at least partial communication between the two halves of the divided continent. We mean this in the sense that Communism is itself no longer totally monolithic and that modern societies need interchange of information for their own development."

Brandt feels that the old West German policy of attempting to isolate East Germany has also become self-defeating. Says he: "I can only be happy when the people in Thuringia and Saxony are in a position--even if they work under a system that is not so good--to make a favorable impression on the world market. They should have the possibility of wider horizons."

Czechoslovak Debacle. One of Brandt's first ventures in Ostpolitik had a bad ending. As Foreign Minister in the Grand Coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, Brandt established relations with Rumania early in 1967 and offered diplomatic and economic ties to Czechoslovakia. The Soviets seized on the West German approaches to Prague as a major pretext for crushing Alexander Dubcek's idealistic experiment of wedding Western-style political liberties with Communism. Now Brandt is far more cautious.

What are Brandt's major aims? In the Moscow negotiations, he hopes to achieve a nonaggression pact in which the Soviets will, in effect, renounce their rights as victors, under the Potsdam Agreement and United Nations Charter, to intervene in West Germany against a military or political threat. Though Soviet intervention may seem remote, Bonn would rest more easily if the Russians disclaimed those rights. In Warsaw, Brandt hopes to lay the foundation for the future establishment of full diplomatic recognition and stronger cultural and economic ties. But as Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Jedrychowski told Tinnin, Poland insists on a binding settlement of the Oder-Neisse question before the other issues can be worked out. In East Germany, Brandt seeks the establishment of more humane and sensible relations between the two halves of Germany.

In his dealings with the East bloc, Brandt has leverage in two major areas. Faced with the Chinese threat in the east, the Soviets are eager to win West German ratification of the present borders of Europe. Moscow seems to fear that in the event of serious trouble with the Chinese, the West might use the old German territorial claims to blackmail or attack the East bloc.

The other area of Brandt's leverage is trade and technical aid. East Germany's own economic success has stemmed largely from increasing trade with West Germany. Both Poland and the Soviet Union want West German credits and know-how to help get their stagnating economies moving.

What can Brandt expect in return? In the short term, perhaps, very little. In the long term, however, the West Germans might be able to share in exploiting Siberia's natural wealth. Politically, Brandt at best can hope for an improved political climate and toning down of Communist propaganda against West Germany.

Domestic Dilemma. Brandt's dilemma is that his opening to the East has inspired an overly optimistic response in West Germany. Various polls show that anywhere from 74% to 82% of the populace favor his proposed East Berlin meeting with Stoph. But if Brandt fails to achieve a quick and impressive result, as may well happen, a reaction could set in. As it is, former Christian Democratic Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger is already expressing concern about the consequences of Brandt's diplomatic initiatives. It is no secret that Kiesinger would welcome an opportunity to oust Brandt, who holds only a twelve-seat majority in the 496-seat Bundestag, and form a government of his own. Is Moscow aware of Brandt's problems? Said a Soviet diplomat: "That is Brandt's affair, not ours." But the unspoken Soviet attitude is that Brandt is a promising partner in negotiations.

In speech after speech, Brandt stresses that his Ostpolitik begins in the West. "We are not marching out in front, as some people claim," he told Tinnin and Bonn Bureau Chief Benjamin Gate over a light Moselle in his house on Bonn's Venusberg. "We are only trying to catch up. Each of our allies has more normal relations with the East bloc than we have." Yet, as Brandt presses on with his Ostpolitik, he may indeed get far out in front of his allies. A key question is future U.S. troop strength. In his recent State of the World message, President Nixon said that U.S. forces in Europe will remain at their present level of 310,000 until mid-1971. After that date, large cuts may take place. To a limited degree, the NATO allies can take up some slack; last week's announcement that 4,500 previously withdrawn British troops would return to West Germany is an example. But, realistically, no one can take the place of the U.S. troops. They must be strong enough to contain a conventional Soviet attack at least for a few days, so that NATO does not face a choice of immediate nuclear war or immediate surrender.

Many Americans now argue that the U.S. should not be asked to defend Western Europe when the Continent is capable of defending itself. In the long term, the argument is valid. But it fails to take into account the present sensitive, and perhaps promising, political situation in Europe. If the Nixon Administration says that it intends to withdraw large numbers of American troops, the U.S. and its NATO allies will lose the opportunity to use those troops as a bargaining counter for comparable force reductions by the Warsaw Pact countries. By the same token, Willy Brandt will not be able to negotiate equitable settlements in Central Europe if the U.S. undercuts his position by withdrawing a large part of its forces. "The Federal Republic is no wanderer between two worlds," Brandt has declared. The implication is that Brandt's chosen world--the West--must stand firmly behind him as he seeks to find contact and reconciliation with the other one.

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