The War of the Long Breath

A thousand days have passed since Israeli jets and tanks swept out of a June sunrise to demolish Arab air power in five hours and Arab armies in six days. Since then, the Middle East balance has scarcely shifted, despite Arab threats of renewed war and big-power efforts toward peace. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's war of attrition, designed "to regain by force that which was taken by force," has been foiled by successful Israeli reprisals and pre-emptive strikes. The result is a war of stalemate--what Guerrilla Leader Yasser Arafat last week called "the war of the long breath" (see color pages).

Military activity consists mostly of small but deadly raids or bombardments across the borders separating Israel from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Last week Israel sent three heliborne commando teams to attack power lines, an army camp and a bridge deep inside Syria, in reprisal for Syrian attacks on Israeli positions on the Golan Heights. Two days later, Lebanon protested to the United Nations over Israeli shelling of three border villages. In a five-hour aerial battle over Suez, the Israelis claimed to have downed a MIG-21 --their 76th kill of an Egyptian jet during the thousand days.

Strength and Security. So far, the stalemate seems to have worked in Israel's favor. Without a peace treaty, Israel holds on doggedly to the territories captured in the six days. The country is now four times larger than it was before the war, and, as a result, Tiberias is now the only sizable city that can be hit by shells lobbed from beyond Israel's frontiers. Meanwhile U.S.-built Israeli Phantoms strike regularly deep into Egypt without fear of challenge--or retaliation. Nasser's Soviet-made MIG-21s can reach major targets in Israel, but they are mainly defensive airplanes; with bomb racks added they would lack the range to make it back home. Besides, they would have to encounter Israeli pilots whose advantage over them in combat is now 7 to 1.

As a result, Israel's strategy is to emphasize strength and security above a shaky, unreliable armistice. "The moment Nasser believes that Israel is weak," said Premier Golda Meir last week "that is the danger point of a new war."

Israel has asked for additional U.S. jets to maintain its strength, but President Nixon indicated last week that for the time being the request will not be granted. Washington reasons that even without more planes, Israel will dominate Middle East skies for some time to come; by not increasing the level of armaments, the U.S. hopes to persuade the two sides to try again for some kind of peaceful settlement. Israel has already received 28 of the 50 Phantoms ordered during Lyndon Johnson's Administration and approved by Nixon; delivery will be completed before summer's end. Moreover, Arab air strength is limited by a problem that it will take a long time to overcome: a shortage of trained pilots. Thus even France's recent sale of 108 hot Mirage jets to Libya is unlikely to change the equation soon. Egypt, with 33.5 million people, is unable to train enough pilots to fly 350 Soviet aircraft; Libya, which has a more backward population of 1,800,000, will have a tougher time learning to handle its latest Paris models.

Moscow is now arming Egypt with advanced SA3 antiaircraft missiles, a move that adds a new element to the Middle East arms balance. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan warned that the new missiles would be destroyed, just as the SA-2s were.

Very Clever. Israel's strength has largely cowed regular Arab forces. Their place on the line--and in Arab hearts--has been taken by the irregulars of the fedayeen ("men of sacrifice"). Scattered among eleven different organizations, the largest of which is Arafat's Al-Fatah, the fedayeen now total about 50,000 men at various levels of training and with broadly differing philosophies. Arafat, for instance, adheres to conservative Moslem precepts and single-mindedly preaches the need for eliminating Zionism. George Habash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, is a Marxist who considers the struggle a class war against unprogressive Arab states as well as a war with Israel, which he considers a capitalist-imperialist outpost.

Last week Arafat discussed the war with TIME Correspondent Gavin Scott, first in Amman and the next morning in a cave on the Israeli border, from which he was directing fedayeen operations. Describing his visit to the cave, Scott cabled: "The escort abruptly swerved off the road that twisted through the rust hills dominating the Jordan Valley. There was a whoop from a clump of trees and a commando packing a submachine gun came out to investigate. After a check, we were led 200 yards to the cave, which commanded a vista of Israeli-held territory three miles away. Inside, in a rock chamber perhaps ten feet wide, Arafat sat at a wooden table studying military reports by the light of a gas lamp. On the rock walls were maps of Israeli army positions. Submachine guns were stacked in a corner." Arafat introduced Scott to a 13-year-old commando who, he said, had already been on 14 operations. "He's one of the best we have. Very smart. Very clever."

In his talks with Scott, Arafat claimed that such youthful fighters could keep the war going indefinitely. "As Napoleon and Hitler were drowned in the snows of Russia, the sands of our deserts will swallow the Israelis," he said. "Our people can put up with many invasions. It is better to die as fighters than to die of hunger in the refugee camps. It is enough that after 20 years in the tents, children born in the tents are still pointing their guns toward Haifa."

Pan-Arab Force. To a great extent, the fedayeen have been more of an annoyance than a genuine threat to Israel. But in one memorable battle two years ago, they managed to bloody an Israeli force in the Battle of Karameh in Jordan. In the 1968 fight, the Israelis slew 110 guerrillas, but lost 23 killed of their own, suffered 70 wounded and were forced to fight their way back across the Jordan River.

The real power of the fedayeen is that they polarize Arab feeling at home. They are the only true pan-Arab force, moving easily from country to country to fight and collecting taxes in the form of payroll deductions from other Palestinians' salaries and manning their own border checkpoints. They are the new heroes of Arab youth: nine-year-olds train with real guns and chant a fedayeen cry, "Oh Zionists, do not think you are safe. Drinking blood is a habit of our men." They are the idols of grown Arabs, who refer affectionately to Arafat as "the old man," to Habash as "the doctor," and to the fedayeen generally as "the boys."

The boys and their promises of eventual victory create unrealistic hopes. In so doing, they reduce the already slight prospects for meaningful negotiations to end the stalemate peacefully. Under such circumstances, the first thousand days may easily stretch into several thousand--and a longer breath than anybody bargained for.

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