Of Mosques and MIGs

When Westerners besieged him during a recent party in Cairo with questions about Moscow's growing military role in Egypt, Soviet Ambassador Sergei Vinogradov replied in French, with just three words: "Defense, defense, defense." The Israelis do not see it quite that way. They argue that hundreds of Russian pilots and planes, along with dozens of sophisticated Soviet-manned SA3 missiles, have largely relieved Egypt of the burden of defending its own skies, enabling Cairo to devote all its offensive attention to Israel.

Missiles at Aswan. Hoping to persuade Washington on that point, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban flew to the U.S. last week to renew a request for 25 Phantom jets and 100 Skyhawks. Premier Golda Meir requested the planes during her Washington visit last September, but President Nixon deferred action two months ago because, he said, Israel already had air superiority without them. Seeking to reverse that decision, Eban noted that as many as 250 Soviet pilots are flying late model MIG-21s in Egypt, and that the Russians have emplaced 25 advanced SAM missiles around the Aswan High Dam, the port of Alexandria and the Egyptian air force base at Cairo West. Strengthening Eban's case still further, Aviation Week & Space Technology last week carried photographs of concrete hangarettes, some camouflaged to resemble mosques, from which the Russian MiGs are flying. The magazine also printed a map snowing construction sites for the SAMs spaced at 71-mile intervals all along the western bank of the Suez Canal.

Many Westerners consider it unlikely that the Soviets really intend to invite Israeli attacks by moving so close to the canal. Normally, the SA-3s and their systems are housed in two low, rectangular, 40-ft.-long buildings that hold missiles, computers, radar and other electronic controls. One radar system, which requires a 65-ft. tower, is code-named "Squat Eye" by NATO; another is called "Low Blow." Both are fully visible from the air, and also are detectable by electronic reconnaissance. Yet neither Israeli recon flights nor U.S. electronic snooping devices have so far uncovered evidence of missile sites along the canal. Moreover, there are indications that the Russians are having difficulties with the SA-3s that have already been placed in position in the rear; they are intricate devices that have never been fired in combat, and there are signs that the Soviets have had difficulty calibrating them properly.

Finally, there is no tactical reason for the Russians to risk installing SA-3s along the canal. They have accomplished their objective -neutralizing Israeli raids into Egypt, building up Egyptian defenses and binding the Arabs even more closely to Moscow -with the missiles that are already in place in the interior of Egypt. To send SAMs or pilots to the 25-mile strip west of the canal, over which Israel has proclaimed air superiority, would be to risk a military confrontation that Russians are not believed to want.

For those reasons, Eban got a mixed reception in Washington. The Pentagon is convinced that the Soviet threat in Egypt is real, and is anxious to provide Israel with additional jets. The State Department, worried about the low estate of the U.S. in oil-rich Arab lands, is skeptical. In a 90-minute visit with Secretary of State Rogers, Eban was unable to overcome that feeling. As a result of this division, the White House will likely delay its decision for weeks or months. Though Nixon did see Eban for 50 minutes, it was mostly to help the Israelis save face.

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