Watch on the Suez: Intelligence Gaps

IN a crowded briefing room in Tel Aviv, a lean Israeli colonel last week presented to the world what Israel considers proof of a major Egyptian cease-fire violation. The colonel's evidence came in the form of a series of large, fuzzy aerial photographs. To the untrained eye, the photos looked like little more than a jumble of black scratches and splotches on the desert sand. But to the Israeli military command, the pictures demonstrated that the Soviets and Egyptians had violated the truce as soon as it began at 1 a.m. on Aug. 8 by continuing to move SAM-2 antiaircraft missiles into the cease-fire zone. The photos were poor in quality, and had no reference as to when or where they were taken. "I admit you'll have to rely on my word of honor that the dates of the pictures are correct," said the colonel, who is an aide on the Israeli general staff.

The evidence was frankly not good enough for the U.S. intelligence community, which had been shown the pictures the week before. The resulting dispute stemmed in part from the substantial differences in the ways the U.S. and Israel gather and evaluate their intelligence. To monitor the Suez Canal front, the Israelis rely chiefly on high-speed passes by camera-carrying Phantoms during the daytime. At night, the mainstay of Israeli intelligence is a chain of electronic listening posts in the Sinai hills near the canal. But both these methods have glaring weaknesses: the Phantom pictures are often blurred, and the electronic sensors, which monitor Egyptian and Soviet radar and radio transmissions, frequently pick up ambiguous signals that are difficult to interpret. Furthermore, the Israeli listening devices can easily be spoofed by Egyptian and Soviet countermeasures.

The U.S. intelligence effort is considerably more sophisticated. Yet last week's flap uncovered some amazing faults. One reason that the U.S. was unable to refute or substantiate the Israeli claims was simply its tardiness in getting off the mark. Although the truce went into effect on Aug. 8, the U.S. was unable to get its U-2 reconnaissance planes over Suez until noon on Aug. 9. Then the pilot of the first U-2 botched the job, allowing the brilliant sunlight to get in the camera and render his photos useless. Thus the first worthwhile flight was not made until Monday, almost three days after the cease-fire began.

U.S. intelligence experts had urged the start of flights as early as ten days before the ceasefire, but disagreements over what aircraft to use and negotiations to secure the permission of allied governments in the area delayed them. British, Spanish and Turkish diplomats called to the State Department agreed that the U-2 would be a valuable pence-keeping device. But back in their capitals, the bureaucracies hemmed and hawed.

Another day was lost when Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, aware that his enemy was moving missiles toward the canal, unexpectedly called for the truce to start 24 hours earlier than scheduled, hoping to stop the missiles in their tracks. The upshot was that at the crucial moment when the truce began, the U.S. had no immediate "before and after" shots to test the veracity of the Israeli claims that the Egyptians had deployed SAMs at six to 15 sites in the cease-fire zone after the truce went into effect.

There were additional misunderstandings between the U.S. and Israel. After the violations had been charged, both sides were puzzled over why the U.S. before the cease-fire had counted about ten more missile sites than the Israelis had. Finally, someone realized that the U.S. was measuring the 32-mile depth of the Egyptian cease-fire zone from the western bank of the Suez Canal, whereas the Israelis were starting at the shipping channel in the center. In the area of the Great Bitter Lake, it made a difference of several miles and accounted for the disparity in the findings.

Further friction developed over the unwillingness of the U.S. to accept the Israelis' interpretation of their electronic evidence. Since most of the Egyptian activity took place in darkness, the Israelis could rely only on electronic monitoring devices. As far as the Americans were concerned, all the tapes showed was that there had been a flurry of activity, but not that missiles were being installed.

The flap also revealed the limits of the U.S.'s famed "spy-in-the-sky" satellite system. Until the old-fashioned U-2s were pressed into service, the U.S.'s only reconnaissance over Suez was by the Samos satellite. Many Americans have reassuringly assumed that Samos satellites are constantly aloft, their cameras, radar and heat-seeking infra-red sensors trained on potential trouble spots below. Unfortunately, the cease-fire episode jarred that reassuring concept.

The Samos satellites are useful in providing wondrously explicit photos of fixed installations; the U.S. can keep close track of the construction of large underground silos for Soviet ICBMs. But the Samos is not useful in keeping tab on swift battlefield movements. For one thing, there are too few of the satellites (the exact count is a secret), so that Samos makes less than one pass per day over Suez. Thus the pictures fail to show the sequence of events that is sometimes essential in analyzing the true nature of suspicious ground activities.

Furthermore, while Samos does transmit some information to ground stations, it is not easy to get photos from the satellite quickly. At a signal from a ground-command center, Samos ejects capsules of films, which descend by parachute. They are retrieved in the air by two U.S. aircraft, which catch the capsules in a sling that they drag between them.

In addition, Samos must be brought back to earth every two weeks to reload its camera. Thus there have been times when the U.S. had no spy-in-the-sky at all. Last week a further disquieting note was added when a Government scientist stated that the Russians were testing an anti-satellite satellite that can blow a spy-in-the-sky to bits.

Although the U-2s fly at least ten kilometers on the Israeli side of the canal, the Egyptian daily Al Ahrarn accused the U.S. of "spying under the guise of supervising the cease-fire." But the U.S. is unlikely to desist. American intelligence experts do not want to be put again in the position of not having their own data.

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