Sounds and Silence in Paris

For 21 months, through 86 formal sessions and a number of private meetings, the words of the Viet Nam negotiators have filled the conference room. With rare exceptions, the talk has been meaningless exchanges of the unacceptable that amount almost to silence. Even a whisper of potential change in such an atmosphere becomes a hopeful rumble. And hope is rumbling now in Paris.

In the spring of 1969, Washington and Hanoi traded fresh peace formulations that evoked optimism for awhile. That mood crumbled under the weight of Communist intransigence, and the Nixon Administration's attitude toward the talks became highly pessimistic. In recent weeks there has been a minute modification because of a number of factors. Last month the National Liberation Front placed on the once disputed table a "new" eight-point plan. Though it saw nothing really new of substance in the presentation, Washington has not rejected it. Rather, the U.S. is seeking elaboration--even though it does not expect much to materialize.

Pros and Cons. Meanwhile it is Washington's turn to break the silence. At the end of his trip to Europe, President Nixon was to meet in Ireland for an exhaustive review of the U.S. position with his chief Paris negotiator, David Bruce; Deputy Negotiator Philip Habib; and Henry Kissinger, Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs. Nixon will get as many as a dozen proposals, each with its pros and cons, then go off alone with the intention of making some hard decisions.

It is likely that the President will soon put forward a new American initiative, including some sort of cease fire proposal, coupled with what has remained consistent U.S. policy: international supervision of any truce, free elections, and no imposition of a coalition government through negotiation against the wishes of Saigon. There is speculation that Nixon may announce his plan--perhaps linking it with new troop withdrawals--in an address to the nation this month. It would be logical for him to time the announcement for maximum effect on the congressional elections. But White House aides insist that if Hanoi expects changes in basic Administration policy for domestic reasons, it is mistaken. Whatever the Hanoi regime expects, a spokesman for its delegation in Paris described reports of a new American proposal as "only for political purposes." Moreover, Saigon sees things the same way.

One intriguing aspect of both the Viet Cong proposal and the one expected from Nixon is a new emphasis on an old element that has been present implicitly or explicitly in all peace plans--a ceasefire. The N.L.F. said that if the United States promised withdrawal of all its troops by next June 30, Communist forces would not shoot at them on the way out. Their eight-point plan also referred for the first time to a formal cease-fire--but only after all political matters have been settled. The latter prospect is as dim as ever.

Unusual Alliance. There has been renewed emphasis on a cease-fire from other sources as well. In a Sept. 1 letter to Nixon, 30 Senators of both parties, including such doves as Albert Gore and Edward Brooke and such hawks as Henry Jackson and Barry Goldwater, urged the President to propose an internationally supervised "standstill" cease-fire for all forces in South Viet Nam. The term standstill means that opposing forces would remain in place, continuing to control the areas they now hold. As the Senators see it, the cease-fire would be the first of several steps: withdrawal of all foreign troops within a specified time after the shooting stops; free elections, supervised by a commission including both Saigon and N.L.F. members; guarantees of freedom of speech, press and assembly; the release of all prisoners. The unusual alliance of lawmakers argued that the U.S. would have nothing to lose by making a positive gesture that could conceivably perk up the talks.

The Senators' proposal is a variation of the plans proposed by the National Committee for a Political Settlement in Viet Nam and Cyrus Vance, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and later one of Lyndon Johnson's negotiators in Paris. Vance has been pressing his suggestions with Administration officials in private and is now fighting for them publicly. He believes that U.S. willingness to pledge total troop withdrawal by an early date might be the necessary inducement for Communist agreement to a ceasefire. Under his scenario, an international force of perhaps 3,000 men, manning 300 monitoring posts, would supervise the ceasefire. As Vance sees it, there are a number of built-in advantages to his proposal. For one thing, it would leave each side in control of what it now has. Such control might lead to elections in which neither the Viet Cong nor the government of Nguyen Van Thieu would risk a total loss of power. Vance's expectation is that the Communists would win elections where they now have military and administrative control and that Saigon would control the cities and the central government.

The plan is promising, but it also contains serious problems. The principal one is the continuing unwillingness of Hanoi and the N.L.F. even to consider an internationally supervised ceasefire. Finding a willing and effective international supervisory body will be almost as difficult. The International Control Commission, once active in Laos, has fallen into disuse, though it still exists in a legal sense. Nixon first made such a proposal on May 14, 1969, though he was well aware of the enormous difficulty of supervising the jigsaw-puzzle of opposing forces. Complicating the problem of control still further is the guerrilla war itself, and the jungle terrain in which large bodies of troops are not easily observed. Finally, neither the Thieu regime nor Hanoi seems willing to accept an arrangement that is not loaded in its favor.

Still, U.S. interests do not always coincide precisely with those of the South Vietnamese government. Therefore the U.S. has reason to press ahead with proposals that just might reduce the shooting--and even lead to some progress in Paris.

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