Promises, Promises

Once again, Soviet negotiators have demonstrated their skill at what might be called the "Who, me?" diplomatic gambit. Two months ago, Russia's leaders promised Chancellor Willy Brandt that if he would affix his signature to a renunciation-of-force agreement with the Soviet Union, they would do something about easing the status of isolated West Berlin, 110 miles inside hostile East Germany. Brandt signed the Treaty of Moscow, and as the Big Four talks on Berlin resumed last week in the divided city, everyone waited to see what the Soviets would do.

For the moment, at least, the Soviets did next to nothing. While they did hint at concessions on less essential points, they stuck to their rigid old position that West Berlin must be regarded as a completely independent entity with no political ties to West Germany, whose $732 million in annual subsidies keep the city alive. The Soviets also insisted, among other things, that the U.S. must close down its radio station in West Berlin, and that the Western Allies must cease all intelligence-gathering operations there. Eventually, the Soviets want the Allies to withdraw from West Berlin, which would then become a "neutral" city at the mercy of the Communists. As if to underline the enduring vulnerability of West Berlin, the Russians revived one of their most unpleasant cold war tactics by threatening to close down temporarily two of West Berlin's three air corridors to the West.

Brandt's Concern. The Soviets' tough position may well be only a repetition of their familiar bargaining tactic of demanding the maximum before settling for somewhat less. Nonetheless the Russian stance posed a threat to Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, which rests on the assumption that the Soviets are willing to make at least limited accommodations in central Europe. Brandt has vowed that he will not submit the Treaty of Moscow to the Bundestag for ratification until there is substantial progress on Berlin, and he has urged Britain, France and the U.S. to press for a quick agreement in principle with the Soviets on the city. The fine points, Brandt's aides said, could be negotiated later. One reason for haste is that the West Germans hope to sign a renunciation-of-force treaty with Poland next month, and Bonn and Warsaw do not want their negotiations to outpace West Germany's diplomatic progress with Moscow. If that happens, the Russians are likely to be come alarmed that their allies are cozying up too quickly to Bonn.

Since Brandt's political prestige in West Germany rests heavily on the success of his Ostpolitik, his desire for quick results is understandable. The Western Allies, however, have refused to alter their negotiating tactics. They want an agreement with the Soviets on specific points, not a vague statement of principle that the Russians could later wriggle out of. The main points:

1) a Soviet guarantee of untrammeled civilian traffic by land, water and air between West Germany and West Berlin;

2) Soviet and East German acceptance of the fact that just as East Berlin has been incorporated into East Germany, West Berlin has definite, justifiable political links with the Federal Republic;

3) Communist consent for West Berliners to visit friends and relatives in East Berlin and East Germany; 4) re-establishment of telephone communications between East and West Berlin and an expansion of telex links. .

Interestingly, the East Germans have already made concessions on the final point; they have opened a grand total of 30 telex lines between East and West Berlin and will install a dozen or so telephone lines by year's end. But their moves may be intended to undercut the concept of Allied responsibility in Berlin by demonstrating that the East Germans can handle matters. The Big Three ambassadors will urge the Russians to make their own concessions at the next session, to be held this week. But the Soviets, who apparently have forgotten the promise they made only last August, do not seem receptive. Everything will be all right in Berlin, they are now telling the West Germans, after the Treaty of Moscow is ratified.

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