The Fretful Neighbors

MORE than a few Latin Americans harbor the suspicion that Salvador Allende's presidency may be unexpectedly brief. A Mexican television worker described one popularly held belief last week: "If Allende chooses to be a thoroughgoing Socialist, the Chilean army will decide, with a big wink from the U.S., that its sacred duty is to oust the man." There is no doubt that Washington is deeply distressed by the prospect of a Communist Chile. Ranking Administration advisers predict that a Communist country on the South American mainland would have far more influence throughout the hemisphere than Castro's Communist island could ever hope to have. For all that, however, the U.S. is in no position to do anything about the Allende phenomenon--not even wink.

Direct intervention, on the order of the Dominican Republic operation of 1965, would seriously undermine the U.S.'s already low prestige in the hemisphere. In any case, it would probably be ruled out by geography. Santiago is 5,000 air miles from Washington; the country as a whole is cordoned off from the world by the Andes on one side and the Pacific on the other. Direct action is out, and the U.S. has little indirect leverage to apply. Cut off aid? This year's total, $2,500,000 in loans, would scarcely be missed. Tighten the economic screws? Chile sells little of its copper in the U.S.: 90% of it goes to Japan and Western Europe. In the end, says Sol Linowitz, former U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States, "the U.S. role in this entirely Chilean affair is to keep hands off--entirely." After all, Linowitz notes, "Chile is in this hemisphere, and we should be no more disturbed about Allende in Chile than about the military dictatorships of Argentina and Brazil. What kind of a double standard do we have?"

Some analysts predict, however, that if a Santiago-Havana Communist axis were to emerge by the 1972 elections, the Administration might well feel impelled to take action. But the question remains: what could it do? Chile's neighbors are facing the same puzzle:

ARGENTINA. Increasingly, the country's right-wing junta feels surrounded by sources of political contagion--the terrorist movement in Uruguay, the leftist military junta in Bolivia, and now a Communist threat on the other side of Argentina's rugged Andean frontier. The Argentines have no plans to charge into Chile, but they are keeping in close touch with Peru's generals in an effort to make ready for anything. One military man in Buenos Aires predicts that clashes will break out on the Argentine-Chilean border within 15 months. A former Argentine foreign minister says that it is "absurd" to think that Allende will not attempt to "stir up subversion and revolution outside Chile." The near-panic in the Argentine junta is such that the generals are preparing a special amnesty which would allow Dictator Juan Peron to end his 15-year Madrid exile and return to Argentina. The generals' theory is that Catholic Peronismo, still strong among Argentina's working classes, would act as a buffer against atheistic Communism from Chile.

PERU. Like the Argentines, Peru's generals fully expect a Communist-dominated Chile to become a sanctuary for all manner of subversives. With an unimportant Communist movement at home and an easily patrolled 120-mile border with Chile, Junta President Juan Velasco Alvarado is less worried about Communist infiltration than the possibility that the Allende phenomenon could somehow taint his own leftist but determinedly non-Communist regime.

Velasco also frets that Moscow will bankroll Allende's army, forcing Peru into a costly and unwanted arms race. Above all, Velasco fears that Allende might pull Chile out of the Andean Group, a year-old five-nation trade organization on which Velasco pins his hopes for substantial economic progress. In such circumstances, Peru is unlikely to seek a struggle with the Allende regime.

BOLIVIA. At least seven Chileans were among a band of guerrillas crushed by government troops recently in jungles 160 miles northeast of La Paz. Nevertheless, Bolivians seem remarkably unconcerned by the prospects that their country's currently manageable guerrilla problems might well multiply after Allende takes power. Bolivia's new leftist junta expects to get along well with the Allende regime, and there is every chance that La Paz and Santiago will resume diplomatic relations, which were broken in 1967 over a border dispute. Over the long term, Bolivians are less concerned about Communism than the possibility that the Soviets will arm Chile, the U.S. will arm the Argentines, and Bolivia will be caught in an Andean version of the Middle East.

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