Monday, Nov. 02, 1970
The Faith of Nations
One of the paramount problems of our time is that we must transcend the old patterns of power politics in which nations sought to exploit every volatile situation for their own advantage or to squeeze the maximum advantage for themselves out of every negotiation.
With these words, Richard Nixon last week explained the prerequisite for the era of negotiation into which he aspires to lead the two superpowers. In a speech at the United Nations to mark its 25th anniversary, the President stressed the necessity for nations to refrain from the all-too-common diplomatic practice of deception and ruse. "The profoundest national interest of our time, for every nation," said the President, "is not immediate gain but the preservation of peace."
Nixon conceded that the U.S. and Soviet Union remain divided by profound differences. Nonetheless, he urged both powers to keep their competition "peaceful" and "creative." warning of the dangers of accidental confrontations. "History shows, as the tragic experience of World War I indicates, that great powers can be drawn into conflict without their intending it, by wars between smaller nations."
Essential Element. Nixon was thinking of the Middle East. During the preliminary soundings for the cease-fire plan put forward by Secretary of State William Rogers, the Soviets gave their support, raising the possibility that they were finally ready to work with the U.S. for equitable settlements there and elsewhere. But Soviet actions have since undermined the essential element for international settlements: faith in the other side's intentions.
The most serious of Moscow's dubious tactics was the Soviet-directed emplacement of a vast antiaircraft missile system on the west side of the Suez Canal. Soviet diplomats verbally approved the Rogers plan, which specifically prohibited new military buildups in a 32-mile-wide zone on either bank of the canal. Nevertheless, ever since the standstill went into effect at midnight Cairo time on Aug. 7, the Soviets and Egyptians have been installing new antiaircraft missiles there.
Israel, which last week vainly filed its 23rd complaint against the introduction of new weapons into the standstill zone, now estimates that some 45 to 50 SAM batteries are fully operational and another 100 sites have been prepared to receive missiles. The batteries, each containing six missile launchers, have continually edged forward, so that the SAMs now have theoretical command of the air space behind Israel's Bar-Lev Line on the Suez's east bank. If hostilities resume and Egyptian guns again pound the Israeli fortifications, the SAMs could exact a heavy toll from Israeli fighter-bombers crossing the Canal to silence Egyptian artillery. Since at least 15 of the sites house highly sophisticated SA-3s, which are manned by Russians, the Israelis estimate that as many as 3,000 to 4,000 Soviet technicians are stationed within the standstill zone. The SAMs, which constitute one of the greatest antiaircraft shields in history, form a rough triangle along the Suez Canal, guarding the routes to Cairo and the Nile Delta (see maps).
The Soviets and Egyptians refuse to admit that they have violated the ceasefire. In private, some Soviet officials have pushed the line that even if the Egyptians did slip a few missiles into the cease-fire zone, they did it without Soviet responsibility and, anyway, it did not matter much. The story is hard to swallow, considering the substantial number of Soviet technicians on the scene. In a speech to the U.N., Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko scoffed at the American charges of Soviet violations as "nothing but a fabrication" and criticized Washington for providing Israel with new weapons. In fact, the Nixon Administration has offered a new $500 million arms package to Israel, including some 200 modern tanks and 18 additional Phantom F-4 fighter-bombers. This shower of arms and other supplies for the Israelis was bound to infuriate the Arabs. What ever happened to that "more evenhanded" approach to the Middle East that the Nixon Administration once promised? Washington argues that the weapons are necessary to restore the strategic balance upset by the emplacement of Soviet-built missiles in the ceasefire zone.
It is difficult to blame the Egyptians and Russians for wanting to install missiles in the first place; the Israeli air force was clobbering Egypt almost at will, so that Moscow felt it had to provide some help for its client and ally. Egypt argues that protection against future Israeli attacks along the cease-fire strip also is vital to its security. However, violating a formal truce to achieve this protection is a serious matter.
Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad, in a private conference with Rogers, came up with the most novel explanation yet for the missiles' sudden appearance in the desert. The sites were installed before the cease-fire went into effect, he said, but were "covered with sand." All the Egyptians did after Aug. 7 was to sweep off the sand. "How about covering a few back up?" deadpanned Rogers.
Perfect Excuse. What disturbs and angers the U.S. is that the Soviets have no desire to pressure Egypt to make even that tiny "rectification." As a result, the Rogers peace initiative seems officially doomed after next week, when the 90-day cease-fire expires. Israel has refused to enter Middle East peace negotiations until all the missiles are removed. Last week Premier Golda Meir reiterated that position in an address to the General Assembly and in talks with Nixon. Egypt countered by refusing to extend the cease-fire unless negotiations started. While both sides seem inclined to keep their Suez guns silent--in effect, informally extending the cease-fire--the momentum for a Middle East settlement has been all but lost.
Actually, the Israelis seem anything but displeased. The missile violations gave Jerusalem the perfect excuse to stall negotiations without seeming to be unreasonable. They also benefited Israel by turning on the U.S. arms faucet again.
Before Nixon spoke at the U.N., he invited Gromyko to the White House for what turned out to be a two-hour and 40-minute talk. Both men were aware that the current tension in U.S.Soviet relations has cast a shadow over the crucial Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which are scheduled to reconvene next week in Helsinki. Although Gromyko emphasized Soviet hopes for a successful agreement, the Kremlin has raised American suspicion by stepping up experiments with two models of MIRV (multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicle), which are designed to be borne by the giant S59 and the smaller SS-11 missiles. In response, the Pentagon last week authorized the Navy to triple its research program on ULMS (undersea long-range missile system), which could eventually become the most effective nuclear deterrent if the Soviets develop the capacity to knock out American land-based bombers and Minutemen.
Sudden Drama. The Soviet Foreign Minister declined to soften Russia's recently restated demand for the severing of all of West Germany's governmental ties to West Berlin as the price for easing Communist control of the isolated city's vital access routes. Both Nixon and Gromyko steered away from one subject that had presumably been settled: the "submarine base" allegedly under construction at Cienfuegos, Cuba. Under a secret agreement reportedly reached earlier, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw the four submarine-refueling and supply vessels sighted at Cienfuegos in return for a U.S. promise to soft-pedal the incident. Nixon decided not to mention it to Gromyko, although the vessels are not yet outside Cuban waters. Two are still in Cienfuegos and two in a harbor near Havana.
A note of sudden drama was injected into the meeting when Nixon was informed by an aide that a light aircraft carrying two U.S. generals had strayed across the Turkish border and made an emergency landing in Soviet Armenia. The President immediately told Gromyko that he hoped the generals, their pilot and a Turkish liaison officer would be released quickly. Gromyko responded that the Soviets would take the "necessary steps" to investigate the incident, which was apparently caused by bad weather. At week's end the foursome, including Major General Edward Scherrer and Brigadier General Claude McQuarrie Jr., remained in Soviet custody. Despite requests from the U.S. embassy in Moscow, American representatives had still not been allowed to see them.
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