Things Old, Things New

As a former Secretary of the Air Force, Missouri Senator Stuart Symington has developed a keen sensitivity to one sign of the approach of spring. "Here we go again," he sighed last week, as he noted the emergence of "warnings of grave new dangers to this country because of developments in Soviet weaponry." The annual congressional committee hearings on defense appropriations were under way and, sure enough, U.S. military intelligence had detected evidence that the Soviet Union might be deploying a new intercontinental ballistic missile.

The news surfaced in a curious way. President Nixon noted in his massive foreign policy report to the Congress on Feb. 25 that the Russians had seemed to slow deployment of their largest known ICBM, the SS-9. One explanation for this was that it might "presage the deployment of an altogether new missile system." When top intelligence officials briefed the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Soviet missile plans that same week, no mention of an ominous new ICBM was made. But when the same officials briefed the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 4, Symington, who was present, now claims that the possibility was raised--with warnings that the subject was secret. Yet last week Washington Senator Henry ("Scoop") Jackson, who was not present at the committee meeting, spoke on national television of "huge new missiles" possessed by the Russians. Symington contended that the Administration had told Jackson, a hawkish Democrat and a champion of weapons development (see box), to "put it out." Jackson denied the charge.

Warhead Cluster. Was there really a new Soviet ICBM to worry about? The White House said that Jackson was "very close" to right. The Pentagon confirmed that "we have detected some new ICBM construction in the Soviet Union--we are not sure exactly what it is or what the Soviet intentions are." Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed Services Committee that the Russians had initiated "a new ICBM-silo construction program --the silos are unlike any others they have previously constructed." One intelligence source claimed that the silos were bigger than those for the S59 and that the missiles seemed to have "a smaller warhead cluster," and presumably greater stability and accuracy.

The Administration used such claims in arguing for continued development of the Safeguard ABM system to protect U.S. Minuteman missile sites. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird urged Congress to authorize one more ABM installation (three are under construction) and give the President the choice of locating it near the nation's capital or a Minuteman complex--depending on the outcome of U.S.-Soviet arms talks.

Iron Bombs. The Pentagon also revealed that the Soviet Union has developed highly mobile and quick-firing launchers for some of its SAM antiaircraft batteries. These launchers have been detected north of the DMZ in Viet Nam and could, said the military, be operating in Laos. U.S. experts have discounted reports by American pilots of an entirely new Soviet antiaircraft missile in Laos. It is now believed that standard Soviet ground-to-ground rockets, which cannot track aircraft, are being fired in the approach paths of U.S. planes in order to disrupt attack patterns.

On the allied side, the Air Force has also found a new use for an even older weapon--the 15,000-lb. conventional iron bombs of World War II vintage. They are being parachuted from C-130 transports in Viet Nam and Laos to create "instant copter pads." The same task is being performed by an ultramodern weapon called a "fuel air bomb," which weighs up to 1 1/2 tons. Dropped by parachute, it relies on the detonation of propane gas and air to create intense heat and shock waves, which effectively clear small landing areas.

As the Administration battles for more military funds, its most fearsome weapon may be its terminology. An annual report to Congress by Laird concludes with one of those tidy Pentagon charts, replete with arrows, boxes and converging lines, and a title that tries to sum up the Nixon-Laird approach: FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE OF LASTING PEACE AND FREEDOM THROUGH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF REALISTIC DETERRENCE AND A FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY OF VIGOROUS NEGOTIATION.

Perhaps it has more zing when translated into Russian.

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