Of Mills, Textiles and Okinawa

Back in November 1969, President Nixon and Japan's Prime Minister Eisaku Sato agreed to move toward an agreement that would let Okinawa--occupied by the U.S. since 1945--revert to Japan in 1972. Nixon understood from Sato that in return the Japanese would formally consent to a limitation on the flow of synthetic textiles into the U.S. Nixon had promised in his presidential campaign to limit textile imports from Japan, so it seemed a good deal for the U.S. Moreover, Sato needed Okinawa to placate his anti-American opponents in the Diet, and the U.S. needed Sato as a solidly pro-American political leader in Japan. But then the woof got warped.

Because protectionism seemed good politics in a congressional election year, throughout 1970 the Administration, joined mainly by Southern textile magnates and their friends in Congress, pressed hard for a bill that would impose import quotas on textiles. House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Wilbur Mills, Arkansan and free trader, feared that any such law would wind up as a Christmas-tree bill for protectionists eager to defend domestic prices for everything from hats to shoes. Official negotiations with the Japanese had ended, so early this year Mills began private bargaining--with the Administration's knowledge--that resulted in a unilateral Japanese agreement to limit textile shipments to the U.S. (TIME, March 22).

Letter of Intent. Mills was understandably pleased with himself, but his smile soon froze. Nixon has been exasperated by Democrat Mills' opposition to the Administration plan for sharing federal revenues with the states; he also resents Mills' undertaking personal diplomacy in the Japanese textile matter, though both Secretary of State William Rogers and National Security Assistant Henry Kissinger favored Mills' unorthodox solution. No good, said Nixon, who reportedly feels that the restrictions obtained by Mills do not protect U.S. textile interests sufficiently. Now Nixon's men think they have found a way around Mills.

It turns out that two weeks ago--two days after Mills got his agreement from the Japanese--Secretary Rogers sent the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a "letter of intent," reporting that the President would soon submit a proposed treaty covering the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. The Japanese expected an executive agreement, which would not require any Senate action. Now reversion--like any treaty--will require a two-thirds majority of the Senate, and there are enough textile-state Senators to make passage difficult unless the Sato government makes a binding bilateral agreement to cut down on textile shipments to the U.S. "We are not trying to sandbag the Japanese with this," a White House staffer insists. Perhaps Nixon is only trying to sandbag Mills, but he may hit Sato as well. That could be dangerous. In the unlikely event that reversion of Okinawa collapses because Nixon has tied it to textiles, Sato could fall as a result. But there is still plenty of room for all sides to maneuver before any such crisis could come about.

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