Parrying a Policy

Richard Nixon's arrival in the White House was welcomed with particular warmth in Taipei. After all, the former Vice President was well known as a vigorous antiCommunist, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek naturally expected him to continue Washington's longstanding policy of isolating the Red government on China's mainland. Of late, however, the warmth has turned to deep dismay over the Nixon Administration's increasingly friendly gestures toward the mainland government.

Washington announced last November that it would no longer oppose seating Peking in the United Nations so long as Taiwan retained its seat as well. Nixon, in his "State of the World" message, went out of his way to make a deep verbal bow to the "750 million talented and energetic" citizens of the "People's Republic of China." Last week the State Department ended the restrictions that have effectively prevented travel to China by U.S. citizens for 20 years. (The gesture is mostly symbolic at present because Peking has shown no willingness to issue visas to U.S. travelers.) Before long the Administration is expected to make a more substantial effort to improve relations. Among the possibilities: an offer to pull down trade embargoes and even to extend full recognition.

Damaged Claim. So far, Washington's overtures have alienated the Republic of China in Taipei without noticeably mollifying the People's Republic in Peking. By moving toward a two-China policy, Washington offends both governments--since each claims to be the true representative of all Chinese people. The new, more realistic China policy espoused by Nixon is an obvious net gain for Peking. But the Chinese Communists are not about to respond to any attempt to improve relations so long as the war in Indochina continues. The U.S., in fact, has once again replaced Russia in Peking's lexicon as "the world's most vicious imperialist."

For their part, Chiang and his government are deeply disturbed by Nixon's approach. A two-China policy damages the Chiang regime's vestigial claim to be the legitimate government of all China. Ever since the Nationalists arrived on Taiwan as refugees from the mainland in 1949, the regime's status as an embattled government in exile has served to justify its tight, autocratic rule of the island. The 2,000,000 mainlanders enjoy a number of political and economic perquisites, but the 12 million native Taiwanese have only token representation in the Taipei government. The change in U.S. policy thus may give a lift to the weak and diffuse Taiwan independence movement.

Talking Tough. For the moment, however, it is not the native Taiwanese but pro-Nationalist extremists who most threaten the serenity of Chiang's island fief. A bomb went off last October in a USIS library, and last month another smashed a Bank of America branch. The incidents remain unexplained, but just in case they presage more anti-U.S. explosions, American businessmen have begun to seal off auxiliary entrances to stores and factories and to hire extra guards.

In a bristling letter to the White House, 200 Taiwanese legislators last week warned Nixon that his policy was "unrealistic and fallacious." Taipei's semi-independent United Daily News, in an almost unheard of salvo at Chiang's Cabinet, blasted the Foreign Ministry for being "cowardly and insensitive" in making Taiwan's case in Washington. Last week mild-mannered Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming, 72, a Paris-educated lawyer and wartime Ambassador to the U.S., abruptly decided to retire, citing reasons of health. The "Gimo," who is now 83, has also decided that the Nationalists should press their case via a diplomatic offensive aimed at every trade fair and VIP in sight. First guest, due in Taipei next month: Congolese President Joseph Mobutu.

In public, Taipei's leaders continue to rail against "appeasement." But in private a more realistic reassessment of Taiwan's future is under way. Some Taiwanese fret that anything so dramatic as walking out of the U.N. the moment Communist China comes in might cost the Chiang regime much of its good will in the U.S., and thus accelerate the trend toward U.S. accommodation with Peking. As one Nationalist official puts it, the great fear is that ultimately "a two-China policy might lead to a one-China policy." By that he meant a situation under which the U.S. would allow, if not openly sanction, a Peking takeover of Taiwan.

Though the U.S. has a treaty commitment to defend Taiwan, it is not generally recognized that for two decades Washington has officially regarded Taiwan's status as "unsettled," meaning that its future must eventually be resolved by the political heirs of Mao and Chiang themselves. Peking could eventually decide that, like Hong Kong, an autonomous Taiwan could be a useful portal to the world. With one of the strongest economies in Asia, Taiwan could not only survive but prosper even more by trading with its giant neighbor.

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