Middle East: Dead But Not Buried

WHEN the U.S. three months ago became the middleman in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations over the reopening of the Suez Canal, Secretary of State William Rogers laid down an injunction. Neither side should present memorandums, he said, because written words often back negotiators into corners. He urged that all proposals or observations be kept oral.

Despite that logical precaution, Washington last week found itself trying to explain its way out of an embarrassing gaffe--caused by an American memo. Visiting Cairo, Columnist Joseph Kraft was told by Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad that Egypt had agreed to a written U.S. suggestion that Israel pull back from the canal to a line halfway across Sinai. The Egyptians would move to within 15 miles of the Israeli line, and a United Nations truce force would be set up between them.

The Israelis, who have never seen such a memorandum, much less agreed to such terms, were furious. Quickly, the State Department explained that the memo was not official. What had happened, it said, was that Donald Bergus, Washington's provisional representative in Cairo, had offered Riad his own "informal and personal" suggestion for a Suez plan. "He certainly stepped off the reservation," said one official, "but we're not going to disown him. He's a capable man with excellent contacts."

Bogus Memorandum. Publicly, Israel accepted the explanation; privately, its diplomats spoke scornfully of the "Bogus Memorandum." Their skepticism was well founded. It seemed most unlikely that Bergus, 51, who has spent more than 25 years on Middle East matters and served ably since 1967 in his present sensitive post, would have ignored Rogers' directive. A possible explanation is that Bergus was sending up trial balloons at the behest of the State Department. That seems especially likely in view of the fact that the U.S. is tinkering with a proposal--oral --much like Bergus' for solving the Suez impasse. It calls for Israel to pull back about 35 miles in Sinai, for Egyptian civilians and a token military force to cross over the canal but to move only 15 miles into the peninsula, and for a formal ceasefire. Neither Israel nor Egypt has seized on the plan, however, and one Israeli Cabinet member said last week of the negotiations: "They are dead but not buried."

Carrot and Stick. The impasse added significance to another curious U.S. move: a quiet four-day visit to Israel last week by CIA Director Richard Helms. The Administration would say nothing about Helms' trip, but he conferred with Premier Golda Meir and the hierarchy of top officials. He also toured Israeli-occupied Sharm el Sheikh at the tip of the Sinai peninsula and the area around it.

Helms' visit appeared to be more of a political mission than a security check. One reason for it could be that President Nixon, who respects Helms' judgment highly, is presently pondering an Israeli request for additional military equipment. Israel is convinced that Washington is using such aid as both carrot and stick to force it into unwanted compromises. The Israelis told Helms that since the Soviets are moving inexorably southward toward East Africa and the Indian Ocean, establishing a naval presence and setting up ports of call and repair facilities, friendly nations such as Israel ought to be included in Western defense planning. On that basis, the Israelis argue, arms shipments ought to be determined according to strategic priorities, and not be subject to the more local pressures of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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