Tit for Tat: Two Prophecies

Mao Tse-tung and Richard Nixon have committed themselves to paper on the subject of how to conduct a relationship between old adversaries. Chairman Mao's writings are the bigger seller, but Nixon's Six Crises has its historical value. Two examples:

NIXON [1960, on Red China's admission to the U.N.]: In expressing my strong opposition, I pointed out that the issue wasn't whether Red China had one vote in the Assembly or even the veto power. What was really at stake was that admitting Red China to the United Nations would be a mockery of the provision of the charter which limits its membership to "peace-loving nations." And what was most disturbing was that it would give respectability to the Communist regime, which would immensely increase its power and prestige in Asia and probably irreparably weaken the non-Communist governments in that area.

MAO [1945, on negotiations with the Chinese Nationalists. Communist officials are being urged to read these words as an explanation of Peking's new attitude toward Washington]: There are no straight roads in the world. We must be prepared to follow twists and turns and not try to get things on the cheap. It must not be imagined that one fine morning all the reactionaries will go down on their knees of their own accord. How to give "tit-for-tat" depends upon the situation. Sometimes, not going to negotiations is tit-for-tat, and sometimes, going to negotiations is also tit-for-tat. We were right not to go before and also right to go this time.

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