And Then There Were Two

The filing deadline for South Viet Nam's presidential elections came last week, and Nguyen Cao Ky's chances went. In what one U.S. embassy official described as "the most critical week of the election," President Nguyen Van Thieu managed to eliminate his Vice President from the October balloting. South Viet Nam's Supreme Court ruled provisionally that Ky was ineligible to run because he lacked a sufficient number of certified endorsements. If the Thieu-controlled court confirms that decision, as is virtually certain, there will be a two-man contest between Thieu and General Duong Van ("Big") Minh--unless Minh carries out his threat to drop out on the grounds that the election is rigged.

The key factor in shrinking the field was an electoral law that Thieu rammed through the National Assembly in June. It requires a candidate to submit to the Supreme Court the certified signatures of 100 provincial councilmen and city mayors (out of 550) or of 40 Assemblymen (out of 191). The hitch--for Ky --was that in the 44 provinces, only the province chiefs could certify the signatures, and they all owe their jobs to Thieu. Ky submitted 102 endorsements, but only 62 were certified; the court ruled the rest invalid because the endorsers had already signed for Thieu. The President had amassed the astonishing total of 448 endorsements from councilmen and 104 from Assemblymen; Minh barely made it with 44 Assembly endorsements.

On Cue. When the search for provincial endorsements looked utterly hopeless, Ky's forces made a last-minute stab at the Assembly. There, 59 members had remained uncommitted despite Thieu's pressure tactics. Suddenly, as if on cue, Dr. Tran Tarn, a Catholic theologian and former Director of Information in the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, declared himself a candidate, and 28 Assemblymen just as suddenly endorsed him, thus leaving an insufficient number to validate Ky's candidacy. Even before the filing deadline passed, Tarn dropped from the race. Few observers believe the Tam candidacy was anything other than a Thieu ploy to block Ky.

Ky, strapped for cash, probably could not have mustered more than 20% of the vote in the election. But that 20% might have been enough to let Minh slip into power, since most of it probably would have been siphoned from Thieu's reservoir of votes--the military and the hardliners.

Will Minh now withdraw and turn the election into a farcical no-contest? The U.S. embassy, appalled at the prospect, is putting heavy pressure on him to stay in the race. As a measure of U.S. concern, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker arrives in Washington this week for consultations at the White House, and it is safe to assume that the situation will be a major item on the agenda. The signs are that, at least for the time being, Minh will stay. Says his running mate, Saigon Physician Ho Van ("Little") Minh, 35, who is no kin: "Ky's elimination is an important factor for us, but not the decisive factor. We are ready to accept a certain degree of pressure, of threats, of the use of administrative machinery to influence the vote. But there is a limit."

Made in America. Big Minh has been presented as the peace candidate and the Buddhist hero of the 1963 coup. In fact, as admitted by one of his aides, his peace stance hardly differs from Thieu's; the important thing is that Hanoi says it will not talk with Thieu, but will talk with someone else.

Minh's real strength is that he is a southerner, a nationalist, a reputably good soldier and a sympathetic personality.

Thieu's great advantage lies in his control of a huge government and military machine ("made in America," says Minh) that can be used for campaigning, pressuring the voters, and, if necessary, falsifying the results. On that account alone, Thieu's ticket is regarded as unbeatable by most observers.

It is widely believed, however, that Thieu could win without resorting to dubious tactics. Moreover, as a career officer and a Catholic, he has substantial support among the 1,000,000 members of the military and Catholics, 2,000,000 strong in a population of 17 million. He should win strong support in the populous Mekong Delta with help from his wife and his running mate, ex-Premier Tran Van Huong, who are both closely identified with that area. Huong, a two-time mayor of Saigon, should also help Thieu win votes in the capital.

Political Disruption. Thieu has grown increasingly intractable as far as the U.S. is concerned. The gradual U.S. withdrawal has significantly decreased Washington's leverage in Saigon. The new U.S. approach to China has reduced that leverage further, largely because Thieu fears that a deal is about to be worked out that will undermine him and his government. Thieu has made little headway in binding up the nation's wounds. The morale of the ARVN is low, the government has failed to confront the financial crisis evolving from U.S. withdrawal, and corruption gnaws relentlessly at the nation's moral fiber.

A recently captured Viet Cong document takes note of these difficulties. While conceding the Communists' military inferiority, the document describes their political prospects with confidence. "We should clearly realize," it continues, "that although the enemy has gained some temporary results, he has suffered serious political failure and given us absolute political superiority." If the document presages a shift in Communist strategy from the military to the political, Big Minh and Little Minh could turn out to be the least of Thieu's problems.

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