Preparing a Political Fallback Position

Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them aid and comfort.

--U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 3

THE revived debate about the Viet Nam War grew intense and rather nasty last week. Administration acrimony was aimed at all the Democratic presidential contenders who have challenged President Nixon's eight-point peace plan, but especially at the Democratic front runner, Edmund Muskie. To Nixon's chagrin, Muskie had suggested a peace plan that went beyond his own; it would call for a fixed U.S. withdrawal date and urge the Saigon leaders to "move toward a political accommodation with all the elements of their society"--with the implicit threat of a U.S. aid cutoff if Saigon refused.

The most egregious bit of Administration rhetoric was in fact taped before Muskie spelled out his plan, though it appeared only last week. In a Today show interview, Presidential Aide H.R. ("Bob") Haldeman charged that Nixon's Democratic opponents favored installing a Communist regime in Saigon; critics of the President's Viet Nam proposals, said Haldeman, were "consciously aiding and abetting the enemy of the United States." That language came close to the constitutional definition of treason, and angry Democrats and editorial writers denounced Haldeman. Press Secretary Ron Ziegler told clamoring reporters that Haldeman had been speaking only for himself, which was probably technically true. Haldeman, who is in effect Nixon's chief of staff, is a hard-lining conservative and political naif who is fiercely loyal to the President. "That was just Bob," said one White House aide. "He wasn't programmed."

Perhaps not, but he may as well have been. The Administration felt that it had found a plump target in Muskie's peace plan at a time when the President was still trying to get the North Vietnamese to accept his own proposal. The President's men lined up the guns and pulled the lanyards one by one. Republican National Chairman Bob Dole warned that Muskie's speech announcing' his plan "may have greatly damaged the prospects for peace in Viet Nam." Herb Klein, the White House communications director, charged that some of the Democrats "seem to parrot Hanoi's line." Repeating a joke he had heard at a Washington Republican fund-raising dinner, Attorney General John Mitchell declared that Muskie was following a Northern strategy --North Viet Nam's, that is. Vice President Agnew said in a TV interview taped for this week: "There has been a definite undermining, even if unintentional, of our position."

Finally, the President himself entered the fray. In a radio speech to the nation presenting his annual State of the World report on foreign policy (see following story), Nixon struck the statesmanlike note, saying that he did not "question the patriotism or the sincerity" of his critics. But he urged them to be careful not to "give the enemy an incentive to prolong the war until after the election." Next day, at a press conference, he was tougher. Said Nixon: "The responsibility for the enemy's failing to negotiate may have to be borne by those who encourage the enemy to wait until after the election." While the White House insists that the President genuinely worried about the chances for a negotiated peace, Nixon is plainly preparing a political fallback position. Since he pledged in 1968 to end the war, he now wants to be able to blame the Democrats--at least in part --if he does not.

Weighed Words. To be sure, a presidential candidate--especially a pre-convention front runner like Muskie--has an unusual responsibility not to say anything that could imperil the national interest. His words are weighed far more carefully abroad than those of just another Senator, especially if he proposes an alternative to existing policy. On the face of it, there is some merit in Nixon's contention that Hanoi may await the outcome of the 1972 election in hopes that Americans will pick a Democrat who will offer a better deal than Nixon. Says a White House aide: "If I were the enemy, I wouldn't accept the President's offer at least until after November."

But former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, a Muskie adviser, insists that Muskie did not advance his plan until the National Liberation Front "clobbered" Nixon's. Besides, however late Muskie came to his views on the war, they are now well known. Hanoi and the National Liberation Front have had three years to negotiate with Nixon; if they had had any real interest in a settlement, they could have acted long ago. Moreover, contrary to some of the attacks on Muskie, his carefully worded proposal stops far short of selling Saigon down the river.

Muskie responded to the Republican attacks by reciting a litany of

Nixon criticisms of U.S. conduct of the war in 1965 and 1966. "If I am guilty of consciously aiding and abetting the enemy," he said in New Hampshire, "then President Nixon must have been too." Nixon, however, was careful to cite his own record on the war before he took office. He forbore to attack Lyndon Johnson on Viet Nam in 1968, he said, because he feared that he might jeopardize the fledgling negotiations in Paris. In that campaign, Nixon regularly said only that he had a plan to end the war; he never explained what that plan was.

Front Burner. Who gains politically from the battle? The White House is certain that Muskie has hurt himself. Democrats and independents see it differently. The Republican attacks, said Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, "put this issue back on the front burner. What they do also is to build up Muskie." By focusing on Muskie, the Republicans give the Democratic front runner greater prominence; the Administration seems to be treating him as if he were already the nominee. Further, by making Muskie out to be the leading dove, the Republicans have strengthened his position with antiwar voters who might otherwise prefer George McGovern or John Lindsay.

Whatever the domestic political consequences of the confrontation between Nixon and Muskie, there was no cheer last week for anyone who holds out hope for the Paris negotiations. Xuan Thuy, North Viet Nam's delegate to the talks, appeared on a split Face the Nation show with Secretary of State William Rogers to denounce Nixon for revealing the secret meetings with Kissinger. Nixon's act, said Thuy, is a "serious obstacle" to an agreement. Thuy's U.S. counterpart, William Porter, canceled this week's Paris session in protest against a three-day anti-American international convocation, called principally by a group of French leftist organizations, at nearby Versailles. Some observers at recent meetings had got the impression that some slight accommodation might be possible, but last week's negotiating session was unusually bitter.

The U.S. had problems with the South as well as the North. The Nixon plan included President Thieu's resignation one month before new elections would be held. Last week Rogers suggested that the U.S. was "quite flexible" on the question of just how far in advance that resignation should take place. This upset Thieu, who had earlier given his full support to Nixon's eight points. An angry Thieu called Rogers' statement "a violation of Vietnamese sovereignty" and asked Washington for clarification. Washington insisted that U.S.-South Viet Nam relations were "excellent." The explanation for Thieu's pique doubtless is that he is just as concerned about his domestic political situation as Nixon is about his.

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