The Sudden Danger to Detente in Europe

THE key to any detente in Europe between the Soviet Union and the West is the innovative Ostpolitik pursued by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Until recently, the success of Brandt's flexible policy of accord with the Soviet bloc was virtually taken for granted in the chanceries of Europe. No longer. Today there is a very real danger that more than two years of diplomatic labors could be undone, possibly even drowning Richard Nixon's hoped-for "era of negotiation" in a renewed round of cold war invective. Improbable as it might seem--and to the distress of almost everyone concerned--the future course of East-West relations hangs on a margin of two votes in West Germany's Bundestag.

The danger exists because the European detente is shakily built on a series of tentative treaties and agreements that are linked together like pieces in an intricate jigsaw puzzle:

> The central pieces are the 1970 treaties of Moscow and Warsaw, which recognized the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western border and ruled out the use of force in any future disputes between West Germany, Poland and Russia. Brandt made their ratification by the Bundestag contingent upon the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement improving the status of West Berlin.

>The Soviet Union made that settlement in last September's Berlin agreement, which guaranteed relatively free access to the divided city across East Germany. But Moscow declined to put the terms into effect until Bonn ratifies the Moscow treaty.

> For its part, NATO insists that the Berlin agreement must be functioning before the Western powers will join a European security conference, which is much wanted by the Soviets. That conference could in turn influence talks on mutual and balanced force reductions, a goal of the U.S.

Thus the whole fragile structure hinges on ratification of the Moscow treaty by Bonn's Bundestag, where Brandt's governing coalition of Social Democrats and Free Democrats until two weeks ago had a majority of 251 out of 496 seats. That slim margin is now imperiled. First, one Social Democrat Deputy declared himself opposed to the treaties and bolted to the opposition, reducing Brandt's support to 250 votes--only one more than the absolute majority necessary to ensure ratification of the treaties. Two weeks ago, a Free Democrat Deputy announced that he was undecided about how to vote, and several others were reported wavering. Two defections would cause a tie vote, defeating the treaties. Brandt airily dismissed the danger of defeat as "exaggerated and overdramatized." But the fact is that party discipline among the Social Democrats had been weakened.

Vague Terms. By contrast, the opposition Christian Democrats are united in their drive to defeat the treaties, on the grounds that the terms are vague and virtually rule out eventual reunification of the German people. The Christian Democrats want guarantees of free travel between the two Germanys and Soviet recognition of the Germans' right to self-determination. To satisfy those conditions, the treaties would have to be rewritten, which the Soviets would surely refuse to do. Christian Democratic Leader Rainer Barzel takes a sanguine view of the matter. Failure to ratify the treaties, he insists, will not result in "the collapse of the world, only the collapse of the Brandt government."

Barzel drastically understates the ominous potential for diplomatic damage. If the treaties go, so will the Berlin agreement: that could lead to resumed East German harassment of traffic between West Germany and West Berlin and, at worst, could bring on another Berlin crisis. There would be an immediate break in the painfully protracted negotiations between West and East Germany on establishing normal relations between the two governments, and an end to Bonn's talks with Warsaw and Prague.

The longer-range consequences are equally serious. Demonstrating Soviet concern, Izvestia warned last week that rejection of the treaties would lead "to a slippery and disastrous road." Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev, who has staked his prestige on detente in Europe, might have to yield ground to Moscow's hardliners. Defeat of the treaties could also create diplomatic trouble for West Germany's allies. U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers last week termed the Berlin agreement a major achievement of the Nixon Administration. In fact, the successful outcome of those talks last fall was one reason Nixon agreed to visit Moscow in May; if the treaties are not ratified, that visit could be jeopardized.

The Bundestag will vote on the treaties in May. Meanwhile, there is an outside chance that Brandt's coalition might win the state elections that will be held on April 23 in the traditionally conservative state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. This election could conceivably overturn the opposition majority in the Bundesrat, or upper house, which voted down the treaties in February by 21 to 20. If the Bundesrat reverses course, a simple majority of Bundestag members present and voting, rather than an absolute majority of all 496 deputies, would suffice to pass the treaties. On the other hand, if Brandt's coalition were to lose the Baden-Wuerttemberg election by a decisive margin, that could surely inspire further defections by wavering Free Democrats, thereby bringing down the government.

Brandt would undoubtedly fight the ensuing national election campaign on the issue of Ostpolitik. Since polls show a slim majority of West Germans in favor of the treaties, the Chancellor could be returned with an enlarged majority, and push the treaties through. But West Germans are also deeply worried about rising prices and unemployment, and Barzel could win on the issue of economic policy alone. That would leave the Christian Democratic leader in the awkward position of trying to put together his own version of Ostpolitik in the face of open anger on the part of the Soviet Union and displeasure among West Germany's closest allies.

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