A Bold New Plan for Peace

UNTIL last week, virtually no progress had been made toward peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors since the end of the Six-Day War in June 1967. Then, in what King Hussein described as a "historical pronouncement," Jordan's plucky ruler outlined a bold, ambitious plan that could conceivably normalize relations between his country and Israel--with potentially far-reaching consequences for the entire Middle East.

In a speech at Basman Palace in Amman, Hussein addressed 500 of his subjects, including representatives of the Israeli-occupied West Bank of the Jordan River. The King proposed the creation of a new autonomous region of Palestine, consisting of the West Bank with its 620,000 Arab residents. Jordan and this new region would form a political entity called the United Arab Kingdom. "Any other Palestinian territories to be liberated" could also become part of the autonomous region, Hussein said. That was an oblique reference to the Gaza Strip (pop. 360,000), an Israeli-occupied Arab area that was administered by Egypt before 1967. The two parts of the United Arab Kingdom would each elect legislative councils, which in turn would choose their own governors-general. The Palestinian capital would be in the old Arab sector of Jerusalem; foreign affairs, defense and the economy would be controlled by a national government in Amman, over which Hussein would preside. The King did not specify the timetable for this "new step toward liberation."

Vital Interests. Israel's official response was negative and then some. In the opening speech of a Knesset (Parliament) debate on the proposal, Premier Golda Meir was both skeptical and sarcastic. The King's message, she said, "is a pretentious and one-sided statement which not only does not serve the interests of peace but is liable to spur on the extremist elements [in the Arab world] whose aim is war against Israel." Predictably, Mrs. Meir was totally opposed to Hussein's suggestion that Israel surrender part of Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip to enlarge his nation. "He crowns himself king of Jerusalem," she said scornfully, "and envisions himself as ruler of larger territories than were under his control prior to the rout of June 1967." Nonetheless she conceded that "the truth of the matter is that this plan affects Israel's most vital interests." The Knesset thereupon adopted a resolution urging the government to "continue to negotiate" with Jordan--a calculated signal to Amman.

Mrs. Meir's remarks in the Knesset sounded unusually harsh toward the most moderate Arab leader that Israel faces. Conceivably, the scornful tone had been deliberately tailored to spare Hussein from Arab antagonism; an immediate sign of Israeli enthusiasm would have meant the kiss of death for the King. If that was the case, her seemingly undiplomatic diplomacy was well-advised. Even before Hussein announced his plan, rumors abounded in the Middle East that Israel and Jordan had already mapped out a peace plan at a series of secret meetings. Reported details of the agreement included extraterritoriality for Moslem shrines in Jerusalem and Arab sectors of the city, and Israeli withdrawal from a demilitarized West Bank, except for a string of armed settlements near the river.

Premier Meir and King Hussein explicitly denied that any deal had been made or was contemplated. Still, as Jerusalem's Arab newspaper Al Quds commented, it was difficult to believe that Hussein would have proposed so far-reaching a plan "without some behind-the-scenes activities." In fact, high Jordanian and Israeli officials have held a series of secret meetings over the past few months. Hussein and Israel's Deputy Premier Yigal Allon had lengthy talks in Amman in November. Mrs. Meir and the King followed these witha private meeting at which they discussed the prerequisites for peace between their nations.

CIA-Inspired. One thing about the Jordanian plan was certain last week: it will have thunderous effects on Israeli politics. The ideas of creating an autonomous Palestinian region, returning Arab Jerusalem to Jordanian control, and establishing nahal (fortified) settlements on the West Bank are also contained in the 1967 peace plan proposed by and named after Allon. The Deputy Premier, who likes Hussein's proposals, is a certain candidate for Mrs. Meir's job if the 74-year-old grandmother chooses not to run again in Israel's autumn general election.

Hussein reportedly briefed other Arab leaders on his proposals before the palace speech, and promised not to undermine Egypt's efforts to negotiate a reopening of the Suez Canal. Perhaps for that reason, the reaction of other Arab nations was angry--but not nearly so angry as it might have been. The militant government of Iraq, which is fanatically opposed to Hussein, refused to receive a delegation that the King sent to explain his proposals. In Cairo, the semi-official newspaper Al Ahram charged that the proposals had been "inspired by the CIA to liquidate the Palestine question." But the leaders of Egypt, Libya and Syria, who were meeting in Cairo, made no immediate comment.

On the West Bank, the reaction of Palestinians was mixed. A few Arab leaders praised Hussein, but since West Bankers generally have little more use for the King than for their Israeli rulers, the principal reaction was indifference. "We have heard words for so long that we don't care any more," said an auto dealer in Nablus. Some were openly cynical about the timing of Hussein's proposals. For one thing, it appeared that the King was trying to outmaneuver the fedayeen's Palestine Liberation Organization, which is on the verge of creating a Palestinian government-in-exile. For another, Hussein's speech came on the last day of registering candidates for the municipal elections on the West Bank that Israel has ordered to take place March 28. Hussein mentioned the elections only in passing, but it was obvious that he hoped to influence them by making his proposals an issue. Presumably he has. In a final spurt of civic consciousness, 141 Arab candidates entered the elections, which some West Bank leaders had initially wanted their people to boycott.

Capitalist Plot. In a pre-speech briefing of his Cabinet, Hussein declared that his plan had East-West support. It is true that he had advised the ambassadors of France, Russia, Britain and the U.S. of it before his speech, but he may well have been exaggerating the degree of Big Power approval. Privately, U.S. State Department officials are encouraged that Hussein has done something to get Middle East peace talks off dead center; but they are reluctant to endorse the plan for fear of antagonizing Hussein's supersensitive Arab neighbors. At the United Nations last week, Soviet diplomats privately mocked the proposals as a "capitalist plot" to undermine the Arabs. Officially, however, there was no instant rebuff from Moscow, which lately has preferred diplomacy in the Middle East to hostile encounters. Hussein will visit Washington soon to discuss his plan with Richard Nixon, and wants to stop in London, Paris and Moscow for similar high-level talks. Presumably, the President will discuss the implications of Hussein's proposals with Soviet leaders at the Moscow summit in May.

In spite of the secret talks, Israel and Jordan have not reached agreement on all the elements involved in a peace plan or on how to formalize and implement it. Hussein, for all his courage, cannot make a unilateral settlement that Palestinians or his tougher-minded Arab neighbors would regard as a sellout. To do so would be to risk his life and his throne. Nonetheless, in a troubled area where stalemate and hostility represent status quo, there was a measure of hope to be taken in the fact that someone at last had made a different move.

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