Nixon Declares an Encore for Spiro

THE American vice presidency has become the most important do-nothing job in the world. In this century, fully one-third of the elected Vice Presidents have, through tragedy or election in their own right, ascended eventually to the White House. With the odds heavily favoring his reelection, Richard Nixon, it could be argued, faced no decision more important than his choice of running mate. Last week he made his choice, and to many, friends as well as foes, he seemed for once to have reneged on the principle he espouses in so many other areas, and taken the easy way out. He retained Spiro T. Agnew as his running mate, offering the narrowly partisan and almost cavalier explanation that "one should not break up a winning combination." It could be a critical choice for the campaign, since Agnew is surely one of the Democrats' best issues and, more significantly, a fateful choice for the nation.

In keeping Agnew, Nixon demonstrated his confidence that Democratic Candidate George McGovern poses no great threat to his reelection. If Nixon had been worried, he could undoubtedly have broadened the appeal of the Republican ticket by choosing someone less controversial than the divisive, abrasive and limited incumbent. In selecting Agnew, Nixon also demonstrated a low regard for the larger interests of the nation. Although he is apparently in good health, Nixon would begin his second term at the age of 60; if he should serve out another four years, Agnew would be a logical Republican presidential candidate in 1976; indeed, he is already planning to run. Before announcing his renewed confidence in Agnew, Nixon revealed his decision to the most often mentioned alternative choice, former Treasury Secretary John B. Connally, the turncoat Democrat who is supporting his reelection.

Nixon's retention of Agnew pleased some key Republicans and disappointed others. "Agnew is a monster," conceded one White House staff member, "but he's Nixon's monster." Nixon appreciates Agnew's loyalty, privately concurs in his most controversial public views and, it seems certain, approved the themes of most of the Vice President's speeches before they were delivered. As one White House aide put it: "What was the President supposed to do? Call in Agnew and say, 'You did everything I asked you to do so now I'm dropping you'?"

Nixon considers Agnew a valuable campaign fundraiser, and other presidential aides contend that he is far more popular with many influential Governors, mayors and rank-and-file Republicans than his critics imagine. Then, too, Nixon has difficulty in saying no on personal staff matters and in firing people, and he still smarts from Eisenhower's indecision over keeping him for a second term. There were immediate signs, however, that this time Agnew may be under presidential pressure to restrain his oratory. Nixon has told him to attack the Democrats forcefully on the issues, but to refrain from assailing personalities.

To some extent, Nixon is taking a calculated gamble with Agnew. The Vice President is widely considered a liability in attracting new young voters to the Republican Party, a major G.O.P. effort (see following story). Before the Nixon announcement, one Republican strategist explained: "Nixon wants to build the party, but with Agnew, you automatically lose the kids. How do you build a party if millions of those first-time voters go Democratic?" Moreover, there seemed no obvious necessity for retaining Agnew. George McGovern so offends most conservatives of both parties that they would likely have voted for Nixon even if Agnew had been dropped; now Nixon will surely lose some moderate voters who cannot stomach Agnew. His only vote-getting advantage may be among the restive blue-collar workers who could abandon their allegiance to the Democrats.

McGovern did not appear to be surprised by the news. "It means we have the same team again we had in 1968," he said. "We'll have pretty much the same kind of tactics the Vice President is so famous for."

In sticking with Agnew, Nixon passed over some men who almost surely would be more capable of leading the nation if the need should arise. They include Connally, who has shown far greater skill than Agnew in negotiating difficult issues, serving as Nixon's troubleshooter on both the international monetary scene and in the domestic wage-and price-control battles. Nixon resisted the temptation to pull another surprise by naming someone like Massachusetts Senator Ed Brooke, a black. In advance, a top Nixon aide knocked the Brooke possibility down. "It isn't because he's black or liberal, but because he has opposed the President's war policy. There can be no faintheart on the war running with Richard Nixon." The same kind of reasoning was also applied by some White House aides to Illinois Senator Charles Percy. Other intriguing possibilities passed over by Nixon include New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who has drifted toward the right recently and had apparently bridged the once bitter breach separating him and Nixon, Ohio Senator Robert Taft, Ambassador to the United Nations George Bush, HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson and Interior Secretary Rogers Morton.

Doubts. The Nixon endorsement of Agnew was apparently made on the narrow ground of an illusory partisan advantage or out of purely personal loyalty. The decision should have turned on whether Agnew is fully capable of taking over the presidency if the need should arise. Although Agnew tends to arouse either adoration or enmity, any detached observer has to have grave doubts about his ability to lead the nation. Agnew's ventures into foreign policy, for example, have been uninspiring. He has represented the President overseas on five major tours, but mostly in areas dominated by right-wing dictatorships, whose leaders he has flattered more than protocol demands. His praise of such oppressive black rulers as Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta and the Congo's Joseph Mobutu, suggesting that U.S. black leaders emulate them, was a major gaffe. He is even more hawkish on the war than Nixon, and his seeming willingness to escalate military conflict would make him a dangerous President. He even initially opposed Nixon's overtures to China.

In domestic affairs, Agnew would make a highly divisive President. He apparently would be eager to employ tough police power to stifle protest demonstrations, as he showed in handling civil rights protests while Governor of Maryland. Although he has publicly pushed Nixon's welfare reforms, he has privately criticized them as not tough enough on "chiselers and loafers." He precipitated a row over federal legal services for the poor and has shown little concern about injustices against blacks. His most notable service has been his work among mayors and Governors on behalf of Nixon's revenue-sharing program, which at one point seemed virtually dead in Congress.

Yet Agnew's greatest liability as President might be one of temperament. He is excessively proud, righteous and unwilling to compromise; he has been so miffed by what he considers cool treatment by the U.S. Senate that he now presides over that body only when his vote might be needed. Although the vice presidency is a frustrating and humbling job, Agnew has shown little capacity for growth in it. The President must know that, and his central concern should have been what kind of an insurance policy or a legacy he wished to leave the nation.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.