Limited Options

Not since Nikita Khrushchev took his missiles out of Cuba in 1962 has any Russian military departure been as momentous as Egypt's abrupt expulsion of Soviet advisers. Yet by last week, Egypt's President Anwar Sadat must have been puzzled by the reaction--or lack of it--of those countries that stood to gain the most from the Soviet eviction. Premier Golda Meir of Israel had responded merely by reiterating her long-standing demand for direct negotiations. Washington was silent on direct White House orders. Even France's President Georges Pompidou turned down an urgent request from Sadat for an invitation to Paris to discuss the situation. Pompidou, after first agreeing, had second thoughts about the reaction from France's small (550,000) but vastly influential Jewish community.

The silence elsewhere was largely due to the fact that other capitals knew neither the exact reasons for the Soviets' seemingly amiable departure nor whether the event had been totally played out. Had the Russians merely decided that Egypt was not worth the large numbers of men being poured into that country? Was it possible that, as in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, they were pulling back to return in vengeful fury? Would they have been so amiable before the Moscow summit talks with President Nixon? On the other hand, was Sadat attempting what one European observer called "the Maltese fake"? Tiny Malta last winter tossed out British forces in a show of independence, then abruptly invited them back when Britain upped its military rent. That hardly seemed to be Sadat's game. Perhaps even the Soviets did not know how it would all turn out. Al Ahram Editor Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, a friend of Sadat's, last week reported puzzlement in the Kremlin leadership over where the Soviets had gone wrong (see box).

Sadat got one positive foreign reaction last week, but it was less than entirely welcome. Rejoicing at the Soviet humiliation, Libya's staunchly anti-Communist Leader Muammar Gaddafi invited Sadat to Tobruk and Benghazi for three days of political conversation, and the Egyptian leader, after a few days of rest near Alexandria with his handsome wife Gehan, complied. Gaddafi's idea was that, with the Russians out of Egypt, the two Arab nations could finally consummate "a full and complete revolutionary merger" and presumably launch a jihad, or holy war, against Israel. Sadat wants neither another losing war nor competition for power from a would-be Nasser like Gaddafi; he shrewdly persuaded Gaddafi to establish for now a "unified political command" which will spend at least 13 months studying the military, monetary, judicial and economic problems involved in the proposed merger. Chances are that the union itself will never take place.*

Nevertheless, Sadat badly needs to follow up the exodus of all but a small force of Soviets (see following story) with some kind of major diplomatic move. The removal of the Russians was a bargaining card that he would prefer to have played in return for the territory occupied by Israel. Instead Sadat had to use it to mollify Egyptian generals who were angry over Soviet insuits and to stem domestic dissatisfaction with his own policies. Now he needs something else with which to bargain for the return of the occupied territories. For the moment none of his options seemed particularly promising.

One was to threaten again to use Arab oil as a lever to induce the U.S. to apply pressure on Israel. Such a threat is difficult to enforce. Even if the Arab oil-producing states could be persuaded to agree on an embargo, their oil prices would drop because--at least at present --no other market could absorb oil denied the West. Paris has long coveted a greater Middle East role, but Pompidou's coolness indicated that France was not inclined to take the Soviets' place in Egypt. About the best option Sadat had last week was to seek big-power support for a new bid by United Nations Mediator Gunnar Jarring to negotiate a peace agreement. In view of Israel's antagonism to Jarring, it was a forlorn hope.

The sudden Soviet departure has completely changed the situation from Jerusalem's viewpoint. "Egypt is completely exposed to any Israeli jet or tank," one high-ranking Israeli military commander said last week. "We intend not to take advantage of the situation, but it gives us a lot of satisfaction." Matityahu Peled, 48, who is a lecturer in Arab studies at Tel Aviv University--as well as a leading Israeli dove--predicts that now "Israel can sit down for the next 50 or 100 years and live a normal life without making peace and without facing another fight." That attitude irritates Peled, who believes that Sadat is truly prepared to bargain for peace. Says he: "We have a government of territorial expansion today that says 'We don't need to return the territories' to maintain not peace, but at least a peaceful situation."

* Judging by previous Arab unity attempts, such a merger would be neither enduring nor effective. Egypt and Syria set up the United Arab Republic in 1958, but by 1961 the Syrians had tired of Nasser's domination. Last year, after much discussion, Syria, Egypt and Libya formed the Federation of Arab Republics; apart from a new flag and a secretariat in Cairo, the federation has had little practical effect so far.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.