The Future of Viet Nam

AFTER a quarter-century of war, Viet Nam confronts problems of such magnitude that they seem insurmountable. The area has been ravaged by 15 million tons of explosives, more than were used by U.S. forces in all of World War II.* Of this total, almost 80% has been inflicted on South Viet Nam, where it averages out to more than 500 Ibs. per acre, or 1,333 Ibs. per person. The death toll on both sides is estimated at 1.5 million, with millions of others wounded. As the war clawed across the countryside, it uprooted a rural society, driving millions of refugees to the cities. Corruption, bribery, black markets, theft, drug peddling and prostitution flourished.

New Politics. What is startling, however, is how much has survived. The population on both sides is greater now than before the major fighting. It stands at 18 million in the South and 21 million in the North--in each case a gain of 2,000,000 since 1965. Even after all the destruction, Viet Nam remains, at least by Asian standards, a basically rich country, capable of rapid agricultural and industrial regeneration. How fast it will recuperate depends on how long it has some semblance of peace and political stability. President Thieu's political leadership may soon be finished. He will have a difficult time dominating the divergent political and religious factions that will become increasingly active when the cease-fire starts. Thieu is already toying with the idea of resigning and turning the government over to a committee until he can be re-elected President in a general election, to be held in roughly six months. If Thieu does resign, however, he is unlikely ever to return to power.

Many of Thieu's opponents sense his political weakness, and rumors of a coup are circulating for the first time in a year. Who could succeed Thieu? One name often mentioned is that of General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh"), who is a former chief of state. Other possibilities: former Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky; Au Truong Thanh, a former high official who was exiled to Paris in 1968 as a neutralist; Nguyen Van Huyen, president of the South Viet Nam Senate; Tran Thien Khiem, the country's Premier; and Tran Van Tuyen, an anti-Thieu member of the South Vietnamese Lower House.

In the period of uncertainty and transition that lies ahead, the main question is whether--or when--the Red flag will go up over Saigon. Most experts now believe that the chances of a Communist takeover within the next five years are actually quite slim. Historically, strong central governments have been disliked in the South, and most of the Southerners are either anti-Communist or neutral. The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese army now control between one-third and one-half of the land but only an estimated 10% of the population, all in thinly settled rural areas. The crowded cities are heavily infiltrated by Viet Cong cadres, but they are all under non-Communist control.

Though in the minority, the Communists are by far the best-organized political group in the South. They might get as much as 25% of the vote in a free election in the South if it were held today. In any future Parliament, Communists will be a major bloc. They will sometimes cooperate with opponents, often act as a disruptive force, and always strive to exploit any advantage that would help them to win ultimate control of the government. But that does not mean an imminent takeover.

Will the North Vietnamese try to help the Southern Communists gain full power, even at the risk of reopening the hostilities? High officials in the White House think not--at least not for five years, and what happens after that is impossible to predict. These U.S. analysts contend that the North Vietnamese have been so badly battered by the bombing and other punishments of war that they will have enough trouble rebuilding their own land. Other Southeast Asia experts, including many who opposed the U.S. war effort, believe that the war has so completely exhausted both sides that the Vietnamese people, North and South alike, want no more large-scale fighting. Even if North Viet Nam wished to make a grab for power in the South, it might be restrained by the bigger Communist nations on which it depends for military supplies. Both China and Russia could well conclude that a quick takeover by Hanoi would impede their developing trade and political relations with the U.S.

Might the North alternatively achieve a Communist-dominated reunification by negotiation? The proposed truce settlement calls for reunification but does not provide any detailed plan. Most experts believe that a negotiated reunification within the next five years is even less likely than a Communist takeover. It will take many years before the divisions in Viet Nam--caused by history, the blood debts of the war, internal political disputes and regional differences--can be surmounted. There are also some rivalries between Hanoi and the Viet Cong, and these splits have been aggravated since the death of Ho Chi Minh. The Communists no longer have a single father figure to guide and inspire them.

Provided that a political agreement holds together at least for several years, the U.S. and other non-Communist nations will play a large role in reviving the Vietnamese economy. President Nixon has made a commitment to the governments of both North and South Viet Nam to help finance reconstruction. Henry Kissinger has said that an "illustrative figure" for U.S. spending might be $7.5 billion over five years, with perhaps $2 billion going to the North. Government officials have not figured out whether the U.S. would give aid directly, as it did under the Marshall Plan, or work through a multi-national consortium. High officials of both the U.S. and North Viet Nam declared last week that they want to normalize relations with each other. The North Vietnamese are accomplished at political balancing acts; by opening relations with the U.S. and accepting U.S. aid, they might well nudge the Soviets and Chinese to increase their own flow of aid.

Along with the U.S., the Japanese will lead in reconstructing Viet Nam. They know Indochina well, having occupied it during World War II, and they are eager to build political and economic influence. The Japanese government proposes to start a $2 billion rehabilitation fund for both North and South. Japan would pay about half of that amount and invite contributions from other countries, notably the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France. Beginning almost immediately, the Tokyo government would ship to Viet Nam tons of medical supplies and other emergency aid.

Japan's hustling businessmen are eager to cultivate a lively trade of Vietnamese raw materials and farm produce in exchange for Japanese appliances, motorbikes, small trucks and cars. In North Viet Nam, for example, the Japanese are talking about developing the big Hon Gay coal mines, building up the nearby port of Cam Pha, and shipping 2,000,000 tons of coking coal annually to Japan.

Other nations are also planning to join in, with aid, trade and investments. Sweden has announced that it will give $70.5 million to North Viet Nam over the next three years. The French, who have never got Viet Nam out of their blood, will seek to revive the huge Michelin rubber plantations near Saigon, which are now producing at scarcely 40% of prewar levels. The French also plan to make investments in transportation and trucking in the South. Meanwhile, in West Germany, Britain and other nations, businessmen are looking forward to winning construction or development contracts.

The economic problems are still immense. South Viet Nam has a 20% annual rate of inflation and a towering trade deficit (last year its exports amounted to less than $8,000,000 v. imports of $373 million). But despite all its physical and human destruction, the war also provided Viet Nam with the basis for what could become a modern economy. Working for the Americans or the South Vietnamese government, some 300,000 people learned useful skills as clerks, mechanics, technicians, engineers. The war also brought forth all manner of entrepreneurs, from the black-marketeer to the small industrialist. Last year they built or expanded factories that produce textiles, plastics, detergents, bricks, ceramics and flour. South Viet Nam is abundantly endowed with highways, power lines, ports and well over 100 airfields--mostly built for the war but now in place.

South Viet Nam's real potential for future prosperity rests on its farms. Agriculturally, it is one of Asia's most fertile countries, and despite the ruin of many farm areas, the green revolution brought about by fast-growing "miracle rice" enabled South Vietnamese farmers to harvest a crop last year that was 25% greater than in 1965--although 10% fewer acres were cultivated.

Economic need will probably force the North to seek some form of cooperation with the South. Hanoi now relies on China for its rice, and that is a position of dependence that the Vietnamese have struggled for centuries to avoid. It would be tempting for the Northerners to import from the rice bowl in the South.

The Vietnamese are a tough, resilient people. Over the centuries they have been invaded by the Chinese, bullied by the Japanese, occupied by the French and bombed by the Americans. Through all this, they have developed a love of their land, a burning desire for peace and a keen instinct for survival. Having survived the war, they will surmount the problems of peace--and there is at last the hope that they will eventually prosper.

* Although the raids then were more destructive because the targets were densely populated cities and industrial complexes rather than jungle and villages.

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