The Dance Around the Fire

FEW people really expected much progress to be made in the Viet Nam peace negotiations during the closing days of the U.S. election campaign, and none was. Indeed, there was reason to believe that the Nixon Administration, acutely sensitive to charges of election-eve opportunism, had deliberately postponed taking any hasty action on the proposed settlement until the voting was out of the way. Washington's stalling led to a certain amount of blustery but predictable rhetoric from Hanoi, a ritual that one West European diplomat described as "the dance around the fire." But there was ample evidence that the negotiations were still, as a high Administration official put it, "on the track." Within a matter of days after the election, most observers believed, Presidential Adviser Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese Negotiator Le Duc Tho would fly to Paris to fix the final details of a settlement.

While preparing for a final negotiating session, Hanoi was at pains to assure its unhappy ally, the National Liberation Front, that it had not sacrificed too many of the Front's longtime goals: insistence upon a coalition regime in Saigon, for example, and the removal of Thieu. The U.S., on the other hand, was still hoping that Hanoi would make further, more specific concessions on several key points. Among them: that a cease-fire in South Viet Nam be followed quickly by one in Laos and Cambodia, and that the North Vietnamese commit themselves to the withdrawal of troops from at least the northernmost provinces of South Viet Nam.

The South Vietnamese President, Nguyen Van Thieu, meanwhile continued to reject the proposed accord and at the same time to rally his people in preparation for a ceasefire. Last Sunday, despite a ban on public demonstrations, his government permitted (and stage-managed) the largest political rally the capital has seen in six years. More than 10,000 Vietnamese Catholics marched to the Saigon city hall to register their support of Thieu and their opposition to the settlement.

Despite Thieu's adamant public stance, the continued optimism of the Nixon Administration suggests that Thieu may be showing somewhat more flexibility in private than he has revealed in public; but his final disposition on the whole question remains unclear. What guarantees the U.S. may have given Thieu are not known. The U.S. is believed to be considering a plan to hire Viet Nam War veterans and other civilians to work as advisers to ARVN after the ceasefire, a scheme that would inevitably draw criticism from Hanoi, to say nothing of U.S. war critics.

On the battlefield, the Communists continued their campaign of sharp, small-scale thrusts into villages and hamlets along the entire length of South Viet Nam in an effort to gain control of more ground before an in-place ceasefire. These attacks, while costly to both sides, tended to keep the South Vietnamese forces off balance, to hit the pacification program by shaking the villagers' faith in their government, and to permit the infiltration of Communist cadre and the recruitment of new troops.

In terms of dramatic impact, the most striking thing that the Communists could do before a settlement is reached would be to launch an attack on Saigon. Guerrilla forces are already operating in small units within 15 miles of the capital, on Highway 1 to the northwest and Highway 13 to the north. Allied intelligence analysts doubt that the Communists are capable of making a major thrust on Saigon, though they concede that attacks by sappers and rocket crews could occur at any time.

More Muscle. To protect the capital, U.S. B-52s have been concentrating on a portion of Binh Duong province, which lies 25 to 50 miles north of Saigon. In addition, every night at least five C-130 gunships circle the city from 8:30 p.m. until dawn, dropping illumination flares and firing on anything that moves in certain areas along the capital's perimeter. On the ground the city is further protected by 33 watchtowers, heavy artillery and a national police force of 21,000 men. Says one U.S. analyst: "As in any big city, it is possible for small groups to get through this defense system. But the idea of any kind of large force coming through is out of the question."

Still, the possibility remains of concentrated Communist attacks on such targets as Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa airbases. Such a move is all the more likely at a time when the U.S. is pouring huge quantities of military supplies, including F-5E jet fighters obtained on a crash basis from Iran, Taiwan and South Korea, into South Viet Nam in an effort to give the ARVN more muscle before a cease-fire goes into effect. The Communists are trying equally hard to beat the deadline by rushing troop reinforcements and as much materiel as possible down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Neither side wants to be at a disadvantage when the dance ends and the fire goes out.

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