More Bombs Than Ever

THE contrast was surreal. After a weekend of pre-Christmas festivities at the White House, Richard Nixon flew to the Florida sunshine, Henry Kissinger in tow, with not a word to the country or the world about Viet Nam. But the President's message to the enemy was as unmistakable as it was brutal. First he ordered a new seeding of North Vietnamese harbors with mines. Then he launched the biggest, bloodiest air strikes ever aimed at the North. Nixon seemed determined to bomb Hanoi into a settlement that he is willing to accept. As the old year gave way to the new, the Nixon-Kissinger design that only a few short weeks ago had seemed to be irresistibly leading to a settlement was again in question, and hope was once again overshadowed by doubt (see MEN OF THE YEAR, page 13).

The order, in Air Force lingo, was "five by five" (loud and clear) to clobber the enemy's homeland as never before. The military was invited to hit targets previously off limits around Hanoi and Haiphong. From Guam and Thailand they came, wave after wave of green-and-brown aerial dreadnoughts. About 100 B-52s, flying in "cells" of three, were being used round the clock, supplemented by F-4 Phantoms, F-111s, and naval fighter-bombers from aircraft carriers. The missions reminded aviators of the last months of World War II in Europe, when bombers prowled the sky striking at "targets of opportunity," which meant everything.

The armada attacked factories and shipyards, roads and bridges, airstrips and antiaircraft sites, barracks and supply points. The upper part of the country had enjoyed a respite since Oct. 22, and the North Vietnamese had collected new stocks of ammunition, repaired bridges, railroad tracks and oil pipelines. These were among the priority targets. But the weather was uniformly bad, and the B-52 is better at saturation bombing than pinpoint attack; Hanoi's claim of high civilian casualties was propagandistic but plausible.

Radio Hanoi reported that a camp holding American prisoners was struck. The State Department apologized to Poland for the reported sinking of the freighter Josef Conrad and the killing of three seamen. One Soviet and one Chinese vessel were also said to have been damaged, along with some foreign embassies. "The way things are going," said one disillusioned State Department official, "we'll hit the cathedral in Hanoi on Christmas Eve." At week's end, however, the White House indicated that there would be at least a one-day bombing halt over Christmas.

Americans were paying a heavy price as well. Two sailors aboard the guided-missile destroyer Goldsborough died when shore fire hit the ship. The B-52s, with their six-man crews, suffered the worst losses. During the previous seven years, only one of the giant planes had gone down in combat. Last week at least eight were shot from the sky. After the first five days of strikes, the Pentagon acknowledged losing twelve aircraft. One airman was reported killed and 43 missing, 38 from the Air Force and five from the Navy.

Damage Scars. The B-52s employ sophisticated "electronic countermeasures" (ECM) to confuse enemy radar, but the North Vietnamese have been using increasingly effective equipment and techniques of their own to break the electronic "bubbles" surrounding the B-52s. The Communists also have modern Soviet surface-to-air missiles, which they are firing in heavy barrages. With so many targets, they were bound to hit something. Besides the downed B-52s, others were seen returning to Guam bearing damage scars.

Whether the Communists can maintain that kind of hit rate and whether Nixon will tolerate continued high losses if they do remain two gaping questions. But White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler said early in the week that bombing "will continue until such time as a settlement is arrived at." He also indicated that the strikes would preclude a new Communist offensive. The U.S. intelligence community, however, has been expecting no big enemy push.

Both within the Administration and on Capitol Hill it is universally accepted that the terror bombing has only one purpose: to bludgeon the Vietnamese into giving concessions that Henry Kissinger could not win at the conference table. Nixon obviously felt that the Communists were stalling. On Dec. 14, after Kissinger left Paris, Nixon sent a cable to Hanoi. He warned that unless serious bargaining began within 72 hours, he would renew bombing north of the 20th parallel. When no reply came, he kept his word. The White House believes that the North Vietnamese knew the risk all along. On Dec. 3, the day before the last round of talks between Kissinger and Le Due Tho began, children were evacuated from Hanoi. Last week it was reported that all civilians were being evacuated, leaving only military and antiaircraft units.

Many within the Administration disagree with Nixon's extreme tactics, believing that Washington should have accepted the October agreement and forced Saigon to go along. Besides its human cost, the policy of massive bombing carries other high risks. Detente with Moscow and Peking could be chilled; Congress could rebel. But even Nixon's critics must concede that recent precedent is on his side. Similar risks applied when he ordered the mining of North Vietnamese harbors in May. Nixon not only got away with that unscathed; he could well argue that his gamble led to the serious secret negotiations that brought a cease-fire closer than ever before. In the past, however, bombing simply stiffened the resolve of the North Vietnamese.

For the moment, the North Vietnamese have not reacted as harshly as they might. Their delegation walked out of last Thursday's formal bargaining session in Paris, but those sessions have long since become meaningless anyway. Separate technical talks between U.S. and North Vietnamese experts who have been trying to iron out certain details of a proposed agreement were also suspended at Hanoi's behest. But they were not called off. The North Vietnamese have not packed their bags and gone home. They are apparently waiting to see what happens next. Therefore, U.S. officials think, the negotiations door remains significantly ajar.

To keep it that way, Nixon also had an ultimatum of sorts last week for South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. Nixon sent Kissinger's deputy, General Alexander Haig, to Saigon with a letter for Thieu. It warned Thieu against making any diversionary peace demands of his own and told him to be prepared to sign any agreement reached between Washington and Hanoi. If he demurs, Nixon said, Congress will be inclined to end all assistance to South Viet Nam and, he implied, the White House would not press Capitol Hill to do otherwise. Apparently Washington wanted Hanoi to get the message: Thieu's leverage in the talks has its limits.

Hanoi may also get the message that it can expect minimal help from Moscow and Peking. Both Russia and China expressed routine outrage over the renewed bombing, but, as in May, their reaction was far short of apocalyptic. In a speech observing the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Union, Soviet Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev declared that better relations with the U.S. depend on a prompt settlement of the Viet Nam War. Criticism, in fact, was harsher in West European countries. In Paris, Le Monde compared the bombing to the Nazi destruction of Guernica in the Spanish Civil War. Britain's biggest newspaper, the Daily Mirror, commented: "The American resumption of the bombing of North Viet Nam has made the world recoil in revulsion."

Apathy. At home Nixon was getting off rather lightly. There was no spasm of protest, as occurred during the Cambodian invasion. With Congress out of session, there was little opportunity for concentrated opposition there, though there were rumblings. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield promised to push once again for antiwar legislation. "It is long since past the time to stop worrying about saving face," he said, "and concentrate on saving lives and our own sense of humanity." Ted Kennedy issued a subdued call to arms: "Without question, if the war goes on, if the current tragic stalemate continues, many Senators, myself included, will intensify efforts to end the war through legislation."

Such attempts have habitually failed in the past even when opposition to the war was much more heated. Congress has never been able to cut off funds for the war. Discouraged as they may be, many legislators are reluctant to tread on that executive prerogative. In the case of the current escalation, the will seems to be lacking to mount a successful challenge to the President. "I sense a kind of public apathy, a feeling of hopelessness about it all," says Senator Frank Church. The bombing, he declares, will "merely deepen the sense of cynicism about our leaders and our Government." Now that most American troops have been removed from Viet Nam, the public has grown more indifferent to the war, even to the saturation bombings. More than ever before, it is the President's war; the public, the Congress, much of the bureaucracy are mere spectators, not asked or expected to participate. The eventual outcome will be a dramatic personal victory or defeat for a President who chose to go it alone.

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