Once More, Some Signs of Hope

THE breakdown of the Paris peace talks in December, after such high expectation that peace was finally "at hand," not only embittered much of the U.S. and the world but caused many to regard last week's resumption of the negotiations with as much skepticism as hope. The bitter interim also proved sobering for both sides--for the North Vietnamese because of the fierce U.S. bombing that nearly razed Hanoi, for the U.S. because of worldwide condemnation of the bombing as well as heavy losses of planes and crews. Yet the bitterness did not prevent the two parties from starting hard bargaining almost as soon as the talks resumed. By week's end there once more were hopeful signs that the talks had progressed to a point from which--with good will, a modicum of flexibility and a determined firmness with their allies--the Americans and the North Vietnamese might finally be able to reach a settlement.

The clearest sign of progress was Presidential Adviser Henry Kissinger's decision to recess his talks with North Viet Nam's Le Duc Tho and fly to Florida to consult with Richard Nixon at his Key Biscayne home. Though Kissinger was not due to arrive until after midnight, Nixon's aides let it be known that the President would wait up to hear what Kissinger had to report. Before he left Paris, Kissinger described the week's sessions with the North Vietnamese as "very extensive and useful negotiations." At Orly Airport, he declared that it was now up to the President to "decide what next step should be taken to speed a peace of justice and conciliation."

Kissinger obviously feels that he has done all he possibly can on his own to bring about a settlement--and that the President must now carry the ball. Administration officials insisted that no draft agreement had yet been initialed in Paris, and few observers believed that Kissinger's briefcase contained anything as final as a completed cease-fire agreement. There were clearly problems left to be solved and these may well require a final round of bargaining in Paris; but just as clearly, Kissinger had some important new proposals for the President's eyes.

If Nixon approves what Kissinger brought back--and the betting in Washington was that he would--the next step is to persuade the Saigon regime of President Nguyen Van Thieu to go along. In view of Thieu's intransigence to date, that may take considerable presidential muscle. After meeting later on Sunday with both Kissinger and General Alexander M. Haig Jr., Kissinger's former aide, Nixon dispatched Haig to Saigon to put the strong arm on Thieu.

Outward Courtesy. The week's resumed negotiations had begun bleakly enough, with none of the smiles and handshakes that had characterized the autumn meetings. No one greeted Kissinger when he arrived at the Communist villa in exurban Gif-sur-Yvette on the first morning, and he had to open the door himself. Next day at St.-Nom-La-Breteche, the Americans received the North Vietnamese with similar coolness. By midweek, however, a measure of outward courtesy had returned. On Saturday morning, for the first time in the talks, Kissinger sent for an American-embassy photographer to take pictures at a closed session--a move that was interpreted as a hopeful sign.

Underlying the talks last week were the most basic questions of trust and guarantees. One critical problem involved the status of the demilitarized zone and the question of whether, after the ceasefire, the North Vietnamese will be able to move freely through the DMZ to resupply their troops in South Viet Nam. The North Vietnamese take the position that, according to the 1954 Geneva accords, the DMZ is merely a temporary military demarcation line and not a political boundary. Saigon insists that in South Viet Nam there is "one and only one legal, elected government." The North Vietnamese argue that the presence of their forces in the South is a guarantee to the Provisional Revolutionary Government (the political branch of the Viet Cong), and that any North Vietnamese troop withdrawal from the South should be linked to demobilization of the South Vietnamese army and the holding of free elections.

In more than 35 hours of meetings, Kissinger and Tho narrowed down the key differences. Early in the week, they apparently reached some agreement on the issue of U.S. war prisoners. On the question of how to enforce the cease fire, the North Vietnamese had originally proposed an International Control Commission force of 250, while the U.S. wanted 5,000; last week the two sides were reported to have agreed on a force of 2,000.

In a sense, the problem for both Washington and Hanoi is how to get their Vietnamese allies into line. The U.S. obviously has its problems with Saigon, while Hanoi is under pressure from the P.R.G. to remain firm. "For the North Vietnamese as well as for us," said one Administration official, "getting Saigon and the P.R.G. into line is like getting two tigers to stand still in a cage--or maybe two rattlesnakes."

After the disillusionment of last month, nobody in Washington was prepared to predict when an agreement would be ready. "This time we want to be damned sure we've got everything buttoned down before sounding off," said one U.S. official. But he added: "Several vital humps have been jumped, and the thrust now is toward an agreement." That thrust may be so strong that if Richard Nixon is satisfied with what Henry Kissinger brought home, he will simply not allow Saigon to veto it.

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