Deadline for Detroit

Never before have U.S. automakers been so much on the defensive--or in such deep trouble. Testifying before officials of the Environmental Protection Agency in Washington last week, executives of General Motors, Ford, Chrysler and American Motors stated that their vehicles could not meet the strict--and, Detroit says, unrealistic --standards for exhaust emissions set by Congress in the Clean Air Act of 1970. Each of the companies asked for more time--at least one year--to produce cleaner cars.

The Clean Air Act now leaves it up to William D. Ruckelshaus, administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to decide what to do. If he finds that a break for Detroit is essential to the public interest, he must grant the extension. If he believes that the automakers are shirking, he must deny it--thereby possibly shutting down the nation's mightiest industry until it can make the clean cars. Adding drama to the decision making is the fact that Ruckelshaus turned down a similar request for more time last year. He held last week's hearings only because of a court order obtained by the automakers. For them, it was a last-ditch effort.

Crash Program. The main source of Detroit's troubles is the internal combustion engine. Although safe, reliable and easily maintained, it spews out at least three noxious gases. The Clean Air Act, which is mostly concerned with public health, specifies that the emissions of two--carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons--be cut 90% of 1970-model levels in 1975-model cars, and orders the same decrease in nitrogen oxides in 1976 models. Moreover, the automakers must guarantee the emission controls for 50,000 miles.

Detroit reeled when the law was passed, then threw its top engineers into a crash effort to meet the requirements. Given too short a lead time--to retool assembly lines normally takes about two years--the best antipollution device the engineers could come up with was the catalytic converter. Shaped like a standard muffler and attached to the exhaust system, the converter would completely burn hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide,* turning them into harmless water vapor and gas. Estimated cost to the consumer: at least $200 per car.

But the converters simply are not reliable enough to do the required job. Last week Chrysler Vice President Sydney L. Terry testified that "40% of our test cars using the catalytic system failed within 5,000 miles." For emphasis, his colleague, Engineer Charles M. Heinen, laid a burned metal tube on Ruckelshaus' table. "This is a catalyticconverter failure," he said. "We had temperature sensors and control devices all over it and they didn't do a damn bit of good." Indeed, the word "failure" was repeated again and again in all the automakers' testimony.

If GM has to put existing converters on its cars, Vice President Ernest Starkman warned, "the prospect of an unreasonable risk of business catastrophe and massive difficulties with these vehicles must be faced." By "massive difficulties" he meant that the cars would be hard to start, would break down often and, most dangerous of all, perhaps stall while moving, because the antipollution device reduces engine efficiency.

Costs. Those are not the only problems that will be encountered if the converters are used. The catalyst is made of either platinum or palladium, most of which comes primarily from South Africa and the U.S.S.R.; to purchase enough of these rare metals would cost the U.S. $1.3 billion between 1975-80, thereby adding to the nation's already unfavorable balance of payments. In addition, the fuel used in autos equipped with converters must be totally lead free; only a small trace of lead would foul the converters beyond repair. Producing lead-free fuel, oilmen insist, will cost about $5 billion in new refinery facilities and pipelines. Any equipment through which leaded fuel has flowed is contaminated with lead and would be unusable. Finally, the antipollution devices would cut gas mileage per gallon by anywhere from 15% to 30% at a time when the U.S. energy crisis is reaching serious proportions.

Ruckelshaus listened impassively; he knew that three foreign autos--a Honda, a diesel Mercedes-Benz and the rotary engine Mazda--had already met the 1975 standards without catalytic converters. "If some companies can make it," he asked Detroit's representatives, "why can't all of them?"

The automakers had ready answers. Mercedes' diesel has been largely rejected in the U.S. marketplace, they said, because it is noisy, smelly and smoky. The Honda engine was relatively easy to clean up because it is small (only 65 h.p.) and powers a tiny car that weighs no more than 1,600 Ibs.; moreover, it is not sold in the U.S. Even though Mazda's rotary Wankel engine was initially dirtier than the conventional reciprocating engine, the Japanese firm managed to control its emissions by installing a thermal reactor that burns the noxious gases. The major problem with the thermal reactor, Detroit's engineers say, is its size; for the larger engines needed to power standard-size U.S. cars, it would have to be so large that it could not fit under the hood. Furthermore, the automen note, the reactor is expensive (the compact Mazdas cost several hundred dollars more than similar-sizeu U.S. autos).

Detroit had other sticky questions to answer. Until 1968 the auto industry had been notorious for delaying rather than acting to control emissions. When finally forced to act, critics charge, the manufacturers added Rube Goldberg gimmicks to the internal combustion engine rather than search for a cleaner alternative. With that history in mind, Ruckelshaus asked: "What will you do if an extension of time is granted? Will you try to develop alternate technologies, or simply delay the use of the catalyst?"

"We've got a long-term commitment to the catalytic system," answered Joseph Bidwell, assistant to GM President Edward N. Cole. But rather than force the automakers to equip all of their 1975 models with a still-unproven device, he and Ford executives suggested, a trial run should be made that year only in California, the state most affected by auto pollutants. Bidwell also pointed out that GM was currently pouring $250 million into researching emission controls and, like the other automakers, vigorously investigating other kinds of engines.* But so far, Bidwell admits, "we haven't solved the emission problem by shifting power plants."

California's Way. Chrysler President John Riccardo takes a different tack, insisting that the only immediate solution is to change the requirements of the Clean Air Act. He argues that California, the state with the worst auto pollution, has a more reasonable law, based on what he says are much more complete public health data than were available to Congress in 1970. It sets somewhat more lenient standards on pollutants (see chart) than those in the national law.

Given one more year to refine and modify the reciprocating engine, Riccardo insists, Chrysler could probably meet the California standards without using catalytic converters. Thus, he contends, the U.S. could achieve cleaner air without substantial increases in the price of cars and without sacrificing fuel economy; the plan would also make unnecessary the mass purchases of platinum and palladium, and construction of new refining facilities. Furthermore, one more year's production of cars with emissions that have already been significantly reduced would not noticeably degrade air quality. Sensible as Riccardo's proposal sounds, however, changing the provisions of the Clean Air Act would require fast congressional action, which for the moment seems unlikely.

Testimony before the EPA will continue until midweek as the foreign auto manufacturers have their say. After that, Ruckelshaus has 60 days to make what is surely the hardest decision of his career.

* Another system, still being developed, would cope with the nitrogen oxides. * GM's compact Vega may offer a rotary engine as an option on 1975 models. Farther in the future are the steam engine, the gas turbine, the Stirling engine and, perhaps, a battery-powered electric car.

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