What Actually Leaked to Whom

In his Watergate statement last week, President Nixon blamed leaks for most of the security countermeasures that led to the present crisis. What information was actually leaked, and how important was it? The most celebrated case was that of the Pentagon papers of 1971, which embarrassed the Government by recounting the long series of deceptions through which the U.S. became involved in Viet Nam, but which disclosed no important secrets. The other three main incidents:

CAMBODIAN BOMBING. William Beecher, a Washington correspondent for the New York Times (now an official at the Pentagon), reported on May 9, 1969 that U.S. B-52s were bombing Communist targets in Cambodia for the first time in the Indochina war--and with the tacit approval of Cambodia's then ruler Norodom Sihanouk. The report seems to have had little impact upon enemy action since the Communists knew perfectly well that they were being bombed. But the disclosure itself clouded the Administration's credibility (as well as that of Prince Sihanouk), since Nixon had been trying to convince the public that he was "winding down" the conflict. Another reason for Nixon's anger: only about six civilians knew full details of the raids, and if such a wellkept secret could be leaked, so could anything else.

SALT. Beecher reported in the Times on July 23, 1971 a U.S. negotiating position that had not yet been presented to the Soviets during the first phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, then under way in Helsinki. When the U.S. later tried to take a stiffer approach, the Soviets, believing that the Beecher article outlined the real fallback position, resisted. The incident brought CIA polygraph experts to the State Department to search for the source of the leak (it is not known whether he was found). The leak was a legitimate cause for worry, though there is no evidence that the disclosure had any major or lasting impact on the shape of the treaty that finally resulted from the talks. Actually, more substantial U.S. concessions were eventually made by Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger in their desire to reach a settlement during their 1972 visit to Moscow.

INDIA-PAKISTAN CONFLICT. Syndicated Columnist Jack Anderson published during December of 1971 some nearly verbatim reports of meetings of the Washington Special Action Group (WASAG) on the fighting in East Pakistan. He quoted WASAG Chairman Kissinger as saying that President Nixon wanted to "tilt" toward Pakistan. Administration officials were both furious and embarrassed that such secret discussions had become public knowledge. But neither the Indians nor their supporters in Congress were surprised by revelations of a pro-Pakistan bias in the White House.

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