Kissinger's Complaint

After a week of shuttling between an American businessman's home near the golf course of St.-Nom-la-Breteche and a Communist-occupied villa at Gifsur-Yvette, Presidential Aide Henry Kissinger last week summed up his talks with Hanoi's Le Due Tho in two words: "Significant progress." He declined to disclose details, but it was known that his main effort had been to work out a strict schedule of adherence to the Viet Nam ceasefire. (One major problem: the North Vietnamese demand for the release of all political prisoners in the South and a guaranteed political role for the Viet Cong.) Outside of Viet Nam, Kissinger's main goal was to stop the fighting in Cambodia. "We are trying for a Laos-type solution," said one top U.S. official, meaning direct talks between the government and the Communist-backed Khmer Rouge rebels.

Back in Washington, Kissinger found his negotiations overshadowed by a problem of grave personal concern. The disclosure that he had acquiesced in the 1969 bugging of some of his own aides had dragged his name into the widening Watergate mess and threatened to undermine both his credibility and his ability to continue in his post.

Already some of his liberal friends are turning against him. Some State Department veterans see Kissinger's acceptance of the taps on his aides as a sad breach of both manners and tradition. Those who believe that even tapping must be subject to a certain etiquette are dismayed by his admission that he himself read reports of the taps rather than, as is customary, leaving the job to some independent third party. One man, who is reported to have been among those bugged, claims that he is not bothered by the idea of Kissinger's listening to his office calls, but he resents the idea that Kissinger monitored his personal life.

Kissinger's academic colleagues are also disturbed about his involvement in the bugging. One noted journalist decided to boycott a 50th birthday party that Kissinger's old friend, Harvard Profes sor Guide Goldman, scheduled for him at New York's Colony Club over the weekend. Others have merely wondered how a man like Kissinger could have al lowed himself to be so compromised.

Just why Kissinger did allow it remains unclear. He himself has said that he regrets the whole episode, but that he was told that it was the usual prac tice followed in previous Administra tions. Some observers believe Kissinger was truly concerned about security and worried that leaks would damage delicate negotiations, though most agree that the disclosures in question concerned information that was a secret only to the American people, not to the Communists.

Hard-Nosed. A few suspect that Kissinger wanted to solidify his position with the President by proving that he could be just as "hard-nosed" as White House Aides Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman. Such a desire would derive naturally from Kissinger's past career at the White House. Trapped between the hostility of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, who distrusted any signs of independence, and the jealousy of State Department officials who resented his power and success, Kissinger has been a target of sniping ever since he joined the Administration. He has tried on three separate occasions to resign. Each time, his friends have persuaded him to stay on.

Kissinger, who feels that he has been misunderstood by his friends, is upset by the doubts about his behavior. But his anger has not prevented him from doing his job. Aside from his talks with Le Due Tho, he spent the week in Par is working out the agenda for President Nixon's meeting with French President Georges Pompidou in Iceland this week. He seems determined to continue. "We have got to get back to governing," he told TIME Diplomatic Editor Jerrold Schecter. "The fact that a few frivolous zealots misused their trust does not mean that we can stop functioning as a government."

Whether Kissinger himself can continue to function will depend upon his ability to maintain the confidence of both the President and the international community. His departure, which does not now seem likely, would be unfortunate. Even Kissinger's critics ac knowledge that both his policies and his tactics have helped normalize relations with mainland China, promote detente with the Soviet Union and reduce the U.S. role in Southeast Asia. Few want to see the architect of these triumphs forced from office.

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