The U.S. Goes to Market

Without any congressional debate or much public discussion, the U.S. is enlarging its role as a major international supplier of weapons. Even more intriguing: the U.S. choice of prospective new markets for sophisticated equipment. Last week Secretary of State William P. Rogers announced that President Nixon had authorized the sale of F-5E supersonic jet fighters to Marxist Chile and four other South American countries. Earlier, the State Department had indicated American willingness to sell the prestigious F-4 Phantom jet fighter-bomber to Saudi Arabia, a heavy financial backer of the Palestinian liberation movement against Israel. The department also disclosed that negotiations were under way for the sale of other advanced armaments to another Arab country, Kuwait.

Although State Department officials contended that there was nothing novel about the proposed sales, the ventures in both areas appeared to be reversals of longstanding policies. Conforming to the formally expressed wishes of Congress, the U.S. has not sold any sophisticated weapons in Latin America for five years. It has never supplied Phantoms to an Arab country. Though some have been sold to Iran, the Phantom has generally been regarded as a symbol of U.S. military aid to Israel.

Major arms sales to Latin America ceased after Congress complained about Latin leaders spending huge sums on weapons and then seeking aid to feed their peoples. In 1968 Congress voted against further sales unless the President decided that they were important to the security of the United States. In announcing Nixon's waiver to permit sales to Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela, the Administration put no emphasis on "security" interests. Rogers said that the policy of "paternalism" had not worked.

In fact, Latin America does offer lucrative potential arms markets, which must be especially tempting to the U.S. in light of its current imbalance of payments in world trade. But there is as yet no guarantee that the U.S. will capture these valuable markets. No contracts have been signed and some may be difficult to conclude in the face of competition, particularly from the French. "The U.S. always rubs us the wrong way when it decides to sell us equipment," a brigadier general in the Argentine air force told TIME last week. "The Viet Nam War is over, so now we are supposed to buy surplus remodeled F-5Es. Admittedly they are cheaper than the French Mirage [$1.6 million each, compared with $2.2 million for the Mirage], but this is just a hooker to sell expensive spare parts later." In fact, France has already sold more than 500 Mirages to Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela.

There is no doubt about the eagerness of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to buy U.S. arms. Saudi Arabia is negotiating for up to $ 1 billion worth of Phantoms and other equipment, such as gunboats, minesweepers and landing craft. Kuwait wants about $500 million worth of equipment (including undetermined aircraft) and services to help build airfields, for example. Though such sales would also help the U.S. balance of payments, Washington sources indicate there are bigger factors involved here.

First, the U.S. does not regard either Saudi Arabia or Kuwait as a threat to Israel. That view is not necessarily shared by Israelis, many of whom feel that the planes could easily be loaned to a more militant Arab power, like Egypt. But in the State Department's view, the Saudi and Kuwaiti interests are focused primarily on protecting their oil-rich territories against possible attack by other Middle Eastern states. Soviet-armed Iraq, for instance, has already scared tiny Kuwait with border incursions. But why should the U.S., which carefully avoided trying to fill the military vacuum left by Britain's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, decide to get involved now? The answer, mentioned but not emphasized by Washington officials, may largely be oil.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are two of the biggest Middle East suppliers of oil to the U.S. By helping them to protect themselves, the U.S. is also helping to protect valuable sources of much needed fuel. At the same time, the U.S. would be reducing the chances of either country shutting off oil supplies to the U.S of their own accord. If they become as reliant on the U.S. for weapons (and the training and spare parts that go with them) as the U.S. is dependent on them for fuel, the pipelines are likely to remain open. In short, the politics of oil (TIME cover, April 2) seem to be emerging, at last, as a major factor in U.S. Middle East policy.

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