Helsinki: Coming Down to Earth

Rarely in Europe's history had so many Foreign Ministers gathered in a single spot. They came to Helsinki last week from Moscow and Washington, Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican -35 nations in all. The tantalizing goal that drew them was the molding of a new era of peace for Europe: a chance to knit the current East-West detente into a lasting fabric.

With the ground carefully paved by 199 days of preliminary talks (TIME, July 9), it was easy to hope that little could go wrong in the opening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Both East and West had made concessions; both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had bestowed blessings. Although generally skeptics by nature, many diplomats gathering for the opening ceremonies in Finlandia House radiated a mild optimism.

Then Andrei Gromyko spoke. Leading off in a week devoted largely to oratory, the Soviet Foreign Minister's speech made it clear that the Soviet Union was using the conference primarily as a means of gaining international acceptance of its hegemony over Eastern Europe. He ignored Western proposals that the conference concentrate on increasing person-to-person contacts between the citizens of East and West Europe.

Gromyko hammered away at the twin themes of a code of conduct guarantying respect for "the territorial integrity of all European states in their present frontiers" -a position that among other things would make the division of Germany permanent -and increased economic cooperation between Communist and capitalist nations. Gromyko's talk -which (at 50 minutes) ran precisely twice as long as the agreed-upon limit -was then in effect seconded by the Foreign Ministers of Poland and East Germany.

No one should have been surprised that the Russians emphasized their long-held desire to have the borders of Eastern Europe finally legitimatized. But many observers were disappointed that the Soviets were so adamant in their opposition to liberalizing daily contacts between the people of East and West, particularly since in the preliminary meetings they had indicated a willingness to approve such contacts.

Western European statesmen pointedly warned that unless greater human contacts are accepted by the Soviets, the chances of border recognition are nil. West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel noted acidly that "the inviolability of frontiers only assumes its full meaning if frontiers do not disturb natural ties and if it is possible to maintain and establish contacts across frontiers." Britain's Sir Alec Douglas-Home, discussing Gromyko's proposed code of conduct for Europe, said that "we cannot leave such sentiments hanging in the air. We must come down to earth."

Bizarre Theory. Proposing improvements in cultural linkups like the uncensored circulation of all European newspapers throughout the nations represented at Helsinki, Douglas-Home warned that "if we do not improve the life of ordinary people at this conference, we shall be asked -and with justice -what all our fine diplomatic phrases have achieved." Then, warning the Soviets, he added: "If progress on the other items [human contacts] is not achieved, there will be no alternative but to disperse, acknowledging that the conference was premature."

In contrast to Sir Alec's tough words, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers delivered a much milder speech -but he made clear the U.S.'s support for broader human contacts. Some observers felt that he underscored growing European uncertainty about the U.S. by omitting from his talk a prepared statement to the effect that the issues of European security and cooperation "should not and cannot be settled by the U.S. and the Soviet Union alone." This was interpreted by many European observers to mean that the U.S. was leaning toward the intractable Soviet position. In fact, Rogers left the statement out because he believed it smacked of condescension. Yet among the conference's undercurrents was a bizarre theory from some West Europeans that the U.S. was considering a total withdrawal from Europe -perhaps in collusion with the U.S.S.R. -in a move to undercut Western Europe's growing economic unity.

As the week ended, Foreign Ministers and their aides streamed out of Helsinki -their speeches delivered, but their problems unresolved. The Helsinki conference was over. The next step -second-stage negotiations scheduled to begin next September in Geneva -is intended to smooth out now jagged points of confrontation. The three-tier series is then scheduled to culminate in a jumbo summit, which may or may not occur in a year or so. But Helsinki raised more problems than it resolved, and throughout East Europe party leaders were warning the rank and file of a new ideological confrontation with the West. In such an atmosphere, there were increasing doubts that compromise was possible, though official optimism remained. In the success -or lack of it -at Geneva, the true significance of Helsinki would finally be defined.

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