Europe's Look at the U.S.

Whatever else Watergate critics say about President Nixon, they have usually been willing to concede his mastery in foreign relations. But these days Europeans are beginning to doubt Nixon's wisdom even in foreign affairs--at least in Europe. While Nixon and Henry Kissinger still call for a bold New Atlantic Charter, a host of anxieties about America's intentions plague Europeans.

They are particularly troubled by the new chummy atmosphere between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki and attended by 35 Foreign Ministers (TIME, July 16), the Europeans openly voiced their suspicions that Nixon may have made too many concessions to Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev. They suspected that Nixon gave in to the Russians on such issues as mutual--but not necessarily balanced--troop withdrawals and nuclear deescalation.

Typical of how widespread are European suspicions was a proposal made by Rumania's President Nicolae Ceausescu in May that lesser countries on both sides might have to band together to avoid becoming the hapless victims of the two superpowers. Though the idea struck Italians as overly suspicious then, TIME Correspondent Jordan Bonfante now reports that "since the summit and Helsinki there seems to be a new wave, or at least a sizable ripple, of comparable misgivings among the Italians too."

First Taste. West Germany fears especially the Nixon-Brezhnev Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which calls for urgent bilateral consultations in the event of the risk of nuclear war, but provides for only subsidiary talks with America's European allies. Chancellor Willy Brandt got a first taste of the agreement when he received no more than a vaguely worded letter from Nixon only 48 hours before the agreement was signed. From Bonn, TIME Correspondent Bruce Nelan reports that "the reaction to the nuclear agreement was a collective gasp in Western Europe. Almost everyone believes that De Gaulle is now vindicated in his view that the U.S. would not risk nuclear destruction to defend Europe or risk New York to save Hamburg."

No one is saying whether the French would be any more eager to put Paris on the line for Berlin. At any rate Europeans are anxious to have assurances of a U.S. nuclear umbrella. It was partly to allay that anxiety that Washington invited West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel to Washington last week for hastily arranged talks with Nixon and Kissinger. Scheel presumably re-emphasized German fears that the Nixon-Brezhnev agreement robs NATO of nuclear credibility and opens the door to Soviet blackmail.

Less ostensibly perturbed about America's motives, British officials nonetheless have their own fears. They are especially disappointed with Washington's failure to demand more concessions from the Russians. TIME London Correspondent William McWhirter reports that while British officials have been pleased with the frankness of U.S. briefings about the Nixon-Brezhnev talks, "they remain cynical, suspicious and disenchanted about the haste with which the U.S. traded away its own leverage over Soviet policy. It seems to the British that the Communists now have a short-term license to ruthlessly consolidate power within their own bloc--without fear of U.S. interference."

An example cited by the British of America's permissive attitude toward the Soviets was the performance of Secretary of State William Rogers at the Helsinki conference. Britons tartly note that Rogers made scant mention of the need for freer movement of people; they disparagingly compare his mild remarks to the tough stand taken by British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home. "It is as if," reports McWhirter, "the British see a crude trade at work in the U.S.-Soviet detente--something along the lines that Moscow would overlook Watergate if Washington forgave Prague." Says Critic George Steiner: "There is an absolute conviction that to overcome his terrible weakness Mr. Nixon sold everything to Brezhnev. It would never have happened in a confident White House." Or, as one British official told the New York Times's Anthony Lewis: "The contempt the Nixon Administration has shown for its own society inevitably raises questions about its attitude in foreign relations."

As seen from Washington, the European attitude is irritating for three main reasons:

> Excessive suspicion. For Europeans, who see themselves caught between two superpowers, it takes only a little imagination to invent innumerable diabolical theories to explain every American action, no matter how straightforward or innocent.

> Inconsistency. Only a few years ago, France's General de Gaulle was still breaking the ice for the West in Moscow. Now that the thaw is on, Europeans have performed a complete turnabout. Where they once damned the U.S. for risking war because of its cold war policy, they now go out of their way to pick apart Washington's motives for seeking a detente. Complaints about allowing Moscow to consolidate its hold on Eastern Europe are partly unrealistic: it has been evident for years that very little--short of war--can be done to dislodge that hold.

> Inability to unite. European nations complain that they are being treated separately and as lesser powers by the U.S. But they have failed to get together in a united Western Europe grouping that might deal on more nearly equal terms with the superpowers and maintain its own united nuclear force.

Mutual irritation aside, there are some genuine conflicts between the U.S. and its European allies, foremost among them the instability of the dollar (see ECONOMY & BUSINESS) and the presence of 313,000 U.S. troops on the Continent. International Affairs Expert Michel Tatu of Le Monde recently wrote that U.S. insistence on Europe's increasing its financial support for U.S. troops stationed in Europe "makes the G.I.s in West Germany look even more like Europe's mercenaries, which is insulting to the dignity of both parties." Why should Europe not say to the U.S. President: "Admit that your troops are not in Europe out of love but because you have vital interests here." The U.S. could then fix a time limit for withdrawal gradual enough to enable Europe to take up the slack.

Henry Kissinger wants to link future negotiations about the U.S. military presence in Europe to trade concessions. But in the current atmosphere of waning confidence, Europeans are increasingly resisting, suspicious and overly sensitive to the slightest nudging by Washington. TIME Correspondent David Tinnin reports that Kissinger's unkindest critics have already begun to claim that he is determined to keep Western Europe "in line" in much the same highhanded way that Brezhnev keeps his despotic hold on the East. Though this is clearly exaggerated, it nonetheless represents a foreboding element in Europe's new view of Washington. If allowed to harden, such attitudes could make "the year of Europe" a fiasco.

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