Picking a New No. 2

Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both houses of Congress.

--Section 2. Amendment 25 U.S. Constitution

Until that amendment was ratified in 1967, the Constitution provided a line of succession only for the nation's top job. If a Vice President died or resigned in office--or if, like Lyndon Johnson, he achieved the presidency on the death of the incumbent--the nation's No. 2 office simply remained vacant for the rest of that four-year term. Now, if Spiro Agnew's legal troubles force his departure. Richard Nixon will be required to find a replacement.

The amendment is remarkably silent on the precise timing and the mechanics of putting a new man behind the Vice President's desk. Since no deadlines are specified, Nixon could presumably take his time about submitting a nomination. On the other hand, Congress could not only demand a nomination but also insist that the nominee submit to questioning before special committees. Would the two houses consider the President's nominee separately or together? Would they appoint special committees to consider the matter or act as a committee of the whole? The amendment does not say.

White House officials insist that no names of candidates are being assembled, but the indications are that the process would be quite different from the usual system for picking a Vice President. In contrast to the traditional "ticket-balancing," in which presidential nominees try to curry favor with voting blocs by selecting a Northern Catholic agriculture expert or a Border-state Baptist with labor-union support, an incumbent President naming a mid-term successor need concern himself only with the views of 535 voters: the members of the House and Senate.

Possibilities. Since the Democrats control both houses of Congress, Nixon's selection would have to be agreeable to them. And since his Administration has been shaken by scandal, he would have to name a man of respectable background. Beyond that, it is wholly a matter of speculation whether Nixon would prefer a strong nominee who would bolster his Administration but also make him more vulnerable to impeachment, or a stand-in who would be acceptable but lackluster. Despite the official denials that there is any list of candidates, the guessing in Washington does name names. The most commonly cited possibilities:

JOHN CONNALLY, 56. The former Treasury Secretary is admired by Nixon for his air of self-confidence and political shrewdness. Main drawbacks: Big John is a convert to the G.O.P. and is closely identified with oil interests as well as Texas wheeler-dealers.

NELSON ROCKEFELLER, 65. An old G.O.P. rival, he is now a fairly cordial supporter of Nixon's, and as four-term Governor of New York he ranks among the nation's most experienced politicians. Main drawback: despite his age. Rocky reportedly still covets the presidency and might thus start acting on his own as soon as he was confirmed.

MELVIN LAIRD, 51. A former Defense Secretary and Wisconsin Congressman, now Nixon's chief domestic adviser, Laird is an able administrator and commands impressive respect in Congress. Main drawback: both at Defense and at the White House, Laird has never hesitated to voice disagreement with Nixon, is thus considered too independent. Nixon doesn't greatly like him.

SENATOR HOWARD BAKER, 47. The G.O.P. superstar in the Watergate hearings, Baker is one of the Republicans' new lights and could help Nixon put Watergate behind him. Main drawback: Nixon finds it hard to forgive anyone connected with the Ervin committee. ATTORNEY GENERAL ELLIOT RICHARDSON, 53. Respected and utterly respectable as an administrator, Richardson could give the post-Watergate administration a believable air of reform. Main drawback: Richardson made the appointment of Special Watergate Prosecutor Archibald Cox, now regarded in the White House as a partisan enemy out to "get" Nixon.

The only trouble with such logical predictions is that Nixon's actual nominations are often highly unpredictable. Spiro Agnew is good evidence of that.

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