Kissinger's Plea for Peace

That annual rite of fall in Manhattan -- the convening of the U.N. General Assembly -- got off to a celebrity-studded start last week. The undisputed star of the show was Henry Kissinger.

In his first week as Secretary of State, he seemed determined to touch bases with as many of the 135 member nations as possible. When he led off the week with an address before the General Assembly, the mood was one of almost tangible excitement. Ushers noted with surprise that all copies of the text had been snatched up beforehand.

"The anguish, the turmoil and the promise of the real world have frequently been obscured by rhetoric and distorted by slogans," Kissinger declared.

"Beyond the bilateral diplomacy, the pragmatic agreements and dramatic steps of recent years, we envisage a comprehensive, institutionalized peace -- a peace which this organization is uniquely situated to foster and to anchor in the hearts of men."

It was an auspicious beginning, but on the whole his plea for a stable peace was a bit too cautious to ignite his hopeful audience. In addition to his broad statement of principles, Kissinger made two specific proposals: 1) that the Security Council establish more effective peace-keeping guidelines so that the U.N.

can play a useful role in future crises, and 2) that a world food conference be convened in 1974 to discuss ways of stockpiling adequate supplies to deal with natural disasters. Both proposals won praise.

Kissinger seemed more in his element in an intensive round of private meetings. Most effective was his luncheon for 15 Arab envoys. It was a clear sign that he intends to give the Middle East top priority. Denying a report from London that he had already worked out a plan for peace, Kissinger told the envoys that the U.S. was ready to assist in a settlement but that they should not expect any "miracles."

With European diplomats, Kissinger sought to leave the impression that President Nixon's trip is still a possibility this year. No dates were mentioned, however, and Western envoys are now more or less resigned to the likelihood that the constitutional crisis over the Watergate tapes and the plight of Vice President Agnew will force Nixon to postpone his visit until 1974. Kissinger looked over a draft proposal outlining long-range Common Market goals and priorities and politely suggested that the nine nations try for something more specific than vague generalities. Both the U.S. and the members of the European Economic Community would like to have a formal agreement to sign, if and when Nixon goes to Europe.

Kissinger gave a dinner for Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in his Waldorf Towers suite and told him of congressional and public concern over Soviet treatment of dissident intellectuals. In a press conference before returning to Washington, Kissinger again criticized congressional attempts to link "most favored nation" status, which would give the Russians trade concessions, to Soviet emigration restrictions. If M.F.N. is blocked, he warned, other countries would doubt whether they "can rely on U.S. performance." Besides, he suggested, no matter how the U.S. feels about the "human values at stake," U.S. foreign policy cannot necessarily impose them on others.

Moral Aspects. Different speakers at the U.N. warned the Soviet Union that it will have to pay a price for the kind of detente it seeks. Chancellor Willy Brandt's speech, marking West Germany's entrance into the U.N., was primarily devoted to a plea for peace, justice and an end to poverty. He pointedly spoke of "the moral aspects of international coexistence. It is peace that benefits if people and information can move as freely as possible across boundaries," he declared. British Foreign Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home also echoed that theme. Gromyko's answer was adamant. "We shall allow nobody to interfere in our internal affairs."

Later in the week, Gromyko had a private session with Richard Nixon, who promised that his administration would make a "diligent" effort to overcome objections to improved trade status for the Soviet Union. Initially it seemed as if the U.S.S.R. was seeking to placate Congress when Moscow announced that it had belatedly ratified two 1966 U.N. General Assembly covenants on human rights. One of them declared that "everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own." But there was less in the Russian action than met the eye. Analyses of the covenants in Pravda and in Novoye Vremya, a weekly publication dealing with international affairs, argued that the wording of the U.N. documents justified the Soviet Union's right to limit not only emigration but the free flow of ideas and information as well.

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